Suppose some data have been encrypted, can you compute with the data without decrypting them? This problem has been studied as homomorphic encryption and blind computing. We consider this problem in the context of quantum information processing, and present the definitions of quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) and quantum fully homomorphic encryption (QFHE). Then, based on quantum one-time pad (QOTP), we construct a symmetric QFHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm depends on the secret key. This scheme permits any unitary transformation on any
n-qubit state that has been encrypted. Compared with classical homomorphic encryption, the QFHE scheme has perfect security. Finally, we also construct a QOTP-based symmetric QHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm is independent of the secret key.
Quantum homomorphic encryption integrates quantum computing with homomorphic encryption, which allows calculations to be performed directly on encrypted data without decryption on the server side. In this paper, we explore distributed quantum homomorphic encryption, focusing on the coordination of multiple evaluators to achieve evaluation tasks, which not only ensures security but also boosts computational power. Notably, we propose a
(k,n)-threshold universal quantum homomorphic encryption scheme based on quantum state sharing. Each server is capable of executing a universal gate set, including the Clifford gates
{X,Y,Z,H,S,CNOT} and a non-Clifford T gate. The scheme provides that k evaluation servers chosen from
n (0<k≤n) cooperate to complete the quantum homomorphic encryption so that the client can get the evaluated plaintext after decryption. Several concrete examples are presented to provide clarity to our solution. We also include security analysis, demonstrating its security against eavesdroppers.
Quantum homomorphic encryption, which allows computation by a server directly on encrypted data, is a fundamental primitive out of which more complex quantum cryptography protocols can be built. For such constructions to be possible, quantum homomorphic encryption must satisfy two privacy properties: data privacy which ensures that the input data is private from the server, and circuit privacy which ensures that the ciphertext after the computation does not reveal any additional information about the circuit used to perform it, beyond the output of the computation itself. While circuit privacy is well-studied in classical cryptography and many homomorphic encryption schemes can be equipped with it, its quantum analogue has received little attention. Here we establish a definition of circuit privacy for quantum homomorphic encryption with information-theoretic security. Furthermore, we reduce quantum oblivious transfer to quantum homomorphic encryption. By using this reduction, our work unravels fundamental trade-offs between circuit privacy, data privacy and correctness for a broad family of quantum homomorphic encryption protocols, including schemes that allow only the computation of Clifford circuits.