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arXiv:1211.1917

Experimenters' Free Will and Quantum Certainty

J.J. Bisognano

Published Nov 8, 2012• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Physics has long lived with a schizophrenia that desires determinism for measured systems while demanding that experimenters decide what to measure on a whim. Intriguingly, such a free will assumption for experimenters has thwarted many attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of how quantum probabilities evolve to clear-cut measurements. An overview of this quantum measurement problem is presented without equations, and the lesson is drawn that denial of experimenters' free will may be the only workable solutions. If the free will assumption is rejected, then a door is open that may ultimately reconcile quantum mechanics with the definiteness of individual experiments. A holistic view is offered for an Escher-like self-consistent space-time net of events rather than a conspiracy of initial conditions as a way forward.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1211.1917

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Physics has long lived with a schizophrenia that desires determinism for measured systems while demanding that experimenters decide what to measure on a whim. Intriguingly, such a free will assumption for experimenters has thwarted many attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of how quantum probabilities evolve to clear-cut measurements. An overview of this quantum measurement problem is presented without equations, and the lesson is drawn that denial of experimenters' free will may be the only workable solutions. If the free will assumption is rejected, then a door is open that may ultimately reconcile quantum mechanics with the definiteness of individual experiments. A holistic view is offered for an Escher-like self-consistent space-time net of events rather than a conspiracy of initial conditions as a way forward.
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