The role attributed to the observer in various interpretations of quantum mechanics as well as in classical statistical mechanics is discussed, with particular attention being paid to the Everett interpretation. In this context, the important difference between "quasi-classical" (robust against decoherence) and "macroscopically given" (rather than being part of a thermodynamic ensemble) is pointed out.
The role attributed to the observer in various interpretations of quantum mechanics as well as in classical statistical mechanics is discussed, with particular attention being paid to the Everett interpretation. In this context, the important difference between "quasi-classical" (robust against decoherence) and "macroscopically given" (rather than being part of a thermodynamic ensemble) is pointed out.
The central part of Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is a quantum mechanical model of memory and of observation as the recording of information in a memory. To use this model as an answer to the measurement problem, Everett has to assume that a conscious observer can be in a superposition of such memory states and be unaware of it. This assumption has puzzled generations of readers. The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to find a set of simpler assumptions which are sufficient to show that Everett's model is empirically adequate. I argue that Everett's model needs three assumptions to account for the process of observation: an assumption of decoherence of observers as quantum mechanical systems; an assumption of supervenience of mental states (qualities) over quantum mechanical properties; and an assumption about the interpretation of quantum mechanical states in general: quantum mechanical states describe ensembles of states of affairs coexisting in the same system. I argue that the only plausible understanding of such ensembles is as ensembles of possibilities, and that all standard no-collapse interpretations agree in this reading of quantum mechanical states. Their differences can be understood as different theories about what marks the real state within this ensemble, and Everett's theory as the claim that no additional 'mark of reality' is necessary. Using the three assumptions, I argue that introspection cannot determine the objective quantum mechanical state of an observer. Rather, the introspective qualities of a quantum mechanical state can be represented by a (classical) statistical ensemble of subjective states. An analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics leads to the conclusion that they suffice to give empirically correct predictions. The argument for the empirical adequacy of the subjective state entails that knowledge of the objective quantum mechanical state is impossible in principle. Empirical reality for a conscious observer is not described by the objective state, but by a Everettian relative state conditional on the subjective state, and no theoretical 'mark of reality' is necessary for this concept of reality. I compare the resulting concept of reality to Kant's distinction between empirical and transcendental reality.
The problem of measurement taken at face value shows clearly that there is an inconsistency inside the quantum formalism.The phenomenon of decoherence is often presented as a solution to it.A widely debated question is to decide between two different interpretations.The first one is to consider that the decoherence process has the effect to actually project a superposed state into one of its classically interpretable component, hence doing the same job as the reduction postulate.For the second one, decoherence is only a way to show why no macroscopic superposed state can be observed and so, to explain the classical appearance of the macroscopic world, while the quantum entanglement between the system, the apparatus and the environment never disappears.In this case, explaining why only one single definite outcome is observed remains to do.In this paper, we examine arguments for and against both interpretations and defend a position according to which the outcome that is observed is relative to the observer in close parallel to the Everett interpretation.
Introduction In the July 1957 issue of the Reviews of Modern Physics: Hugh Everett iii put forward a new interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett 1957). John Wheeler, Everett's thesis adviser, published, in the same issue, an accompanying paper supporting Everett's views (Wheeler 1957). Everett's aim was to cut through the fuzzy thinking displayed by many authors, some of them quite prominent, who in previous years had written incredibly dull papers on how they understood quantum mechanics. Everett's idea was simply to assume that quantum mechanics provides a description of reality in exactly the same sense as classical mechanics was once thought to do. This is a shocking idea, for it leads to a multiplicity of “realities.” Few physicists in 1957 were prepared to accept it. And yet it can be shown to work. It is the purpose of this article to expand on Everett's original demonstration and to reveal the courage John Wheeler displayed in betting that his student was right. Classical theory of measurement System, apparatus, coupling Our starting point is the standard theory of measurement, which we shall first examine classically. In its simplest form a measurement involves just two dynamical entities: a system and an apparatus . It is the role of the apparatus to record the value of some system observable s . For this purpose system and apparatus must be coupled together for a certain period of time, which will be taken to be finite.
A complete reappraisal of the philosophical meaning of Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics is carried out, by analysing carefully the role of the concept of "observer" in physics. It is shown that Everett's interpretation is the limiting case of a series of conceptions of the measurement problem which leave less and less of the observer out of the quantum description of the measuring interaction. This limiting case, however, should not be considered as one wherein nothing is left outside the description. Something is still needed besides this description: pure cognitive capacity, the subject, or, in a very abstract sense: "mind". The set of branches which arise, according to Everett, from a measuring interaction, gain a renewed signification. They do not refer to distinct "worlds", but to the points of view "mind" can identify itself to. This idea is compared and contrasted with Squires' "selection" of a branch by the mind (without quotation marks). Finally, the notion of indeterminism in quantum mechanics gains an unexpected and new light from a strict application of the previous ideas.
This paper is concerned with the description of the process of measurement within the context of a quantum theory of the physical world. It is noted that quantum mechanics permits a quasi-classical description (classical in the limited sense implied by the correspondence principle of Bohr) of those macroscopic phenomena in terms of which the observer forms his perceptions. Thus, the process of measurement in quantum mechanics can be understood on the quasi-classical level by transcribing from the strictly classical observables of Newtonian physics to their quasi-classical counterparts the known rules for the measurement of the former. The remaining physical problem is the delineation of the circumstances in which the correlation of a peculiarly quantum mechanical observable A with a classically measurable observable B can result in a significant measurement of A. This is undertaken within the context of quantum theory. The resulting clarification of the process of measurement has important implications relative to the philosophic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
We discuss the role of the observer in quantum mechanics. We briefly discuss various interpretations of quantum-mechanical measurement currently used in the literature. Then we point out the difficulty in deciding what occurrences should be classified as ’’observations.’’ Using the Copenhagen Interpretation, we discuss the effect of successive measurements on the decay rate of an unstable quantum system. For two types of systems, those with a small finite number of decay levels and those with a continuum or semicontinuum, we review the decay behavior, and in the latter case distinguish between: small time behavior, with survival probability falling off as t2; the intermediate region, where it varies exponentially with time; and the long-time region, where the decay is less than exponential. If we cannot define an observation, we show that only an exact exponential decay is allowed. Attempts at solutions of this difficulty are mentioned. Lastly, we take an example of a polarized beam of light passing through an optically active medium, and discuss the process of successive measurement from classical and quantum mechanical viewpoints. The two descriptions appear to differ because we are implicitly considering two different experimental arrangements. We put forward classical and quantum-mechanical descriptions of each experiment.