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arXiv:1207.7192

A brief note on epistemic interpretations and the Kochen-Specker theorem

O. J. E. Maroney

Published Jul 31, 2012• 0 citations
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Abstract

One of the recent no-go theorems on Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum proves that there are no 'maximally epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory. The proof utilises similar arrangements to Clifton's quantum contextuality proof and has parallels to Harrigan and Rudolph's quantum deficiency no-go theorem, itself based on the Kochen-Specker quantum contextuality proof. This paper shows how the Kochen-Specker theorem can also be turned into a no 'maximally epistemic' theorem, but of a more limited kind.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1207.7192

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One of the recent no-go theorems on Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum proves that there are no 'maximally epistemic' interpretations of quantum theory. The proof utilises similar arrangements to Clifton's quantum contextuality proof and has parallels to Harrigan and Rudolph's quantum deficiency no-go theorem, itself based on the Kochen-Specker quantum contextuality proof. This paper shows how the Kochen-Specker theorem can also be turned into a no 'maximally epistemic' theorem, but of a more limited kind.
We examine the relationship between quantum contextuality (in both the standard Kochen-Specker sense and in the generalized sense proposed by Spekkens) and models of quantum theory in which the quantum state is maximally epistemic. We find that preparation noncontextual models must be maximally epistemic, and these in turn must be Kochen-Specker noncontextual. This implies that the Kochen-Specker theorem is sufficient to establish both the impossibility of maximally epistemic models and the impossibility of preparation noncontextual models. The implication from preparation noncontextual to maximally epistemic then also yields a proof of Bell's theorem from an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-like argument.
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, ``$\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories'' try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called ``ontic states.'' Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d=2d=2d=2, but also showed that any deterministic $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must be ``measurement contextual'' in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theory must ``behave badly under tensor product.'' In this paper, we prove that even without the Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions, there are no $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in dimensions $d\ensuremath{\ge}3$ that satisfy two reasonable conditions: (1) symmetry under unitary transformations and (2) ``maximum nontriviality'' (meaning that the probability distributions corresponding to any two nonorthogonal states overlap). This no-go theorem holds if the ontic space is either the set of quantum states or the set of unitaries. The proof of this result, in the general case, uses some measure theory and differential geometry. On the other hand, we also show the surprising result that without the symmetry restriction, one can construct maximally nontrivial $\ensuremath{\psi}$-epistemic theories in every finite dimension ddd.
The purpose of this note is to complete the interesting review on quantum contextuality [1] that appeared recently. In particular we will introduce and discuss the ideas of extracontextuality and extravalence, that allow one to relate Kochen-Specker's and Gleason's theorems, and also to shift the emphasis from the first to the second one. We will also argue that whereas Kochen-Specker's is essentially a negative result (a no-go theorem), Gleason's is a positive one since it provides a mathematical justification of Born's rule. The link between these issues is provided by a specific quantum feature that we call extravalence.
Formalizing an old desire of Einstein, “ψ-epistemic theories” try to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics, while viewing quantum states as ordinary probability distributions over underlying objects called “ontic states.” Regardless of one's philosophical views about such theories, the question arises of whether one can cleanly rule them out by proving no-go theorems analogous to the Bell inequality. In the 1960s, Kochen and Specker (who first studied these theories) constructed an elegant ψ-epistemic theory for Hilbert space dimension d = 2, but also showed that any deterministic ψ-epistemic theory must be “measurement contextual” in dimensions 3 and higher. Last year, the topic attracted renewed attention, when Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR) showed that any ψ-epistemic theory must “behave badly under tensor product.” In this paper, we prove that even without the Kochen-Specker or PBR assumptions, there are no ψ-epistemic theories in dimensions d ≥ 3 that satisfy two reasonable conditions: (1) symmetry under unitary transformations and (2) “maximum nontriviality” (meaning that the probability distributions corresponding to any two nonorthogonal states overlap). This no-go theorem holds if the ontic space is either the set of quantum states or the set of unitaries. The proof of this result, in the general case, uses some measure theory and differential geometry. On the other hand, we also show the surprising result that without the symmetry restriction, one can construct maximally nontrivial ψ-epistemic theories in every finite dimension d.
Contextuality is a key distinguishing feature between classical and quantum physics. It expresses a fundamental obstruction to describing quantum theory using classical concepts. In turn, understood as a resource for quantum computation, it is expected to hold the key to quantum advantage. Yet, despite its long recognised importance in quantum foundations and, more recently, in quantum computation, the structural essence of contextuality has remained somewhat elusive - different frameworks address different aspects of the phenomenon, yet their precise relationship often remains unclear. This issue already looms large at the level of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem: while traditional proofs proceed by showing the nonexistence of valuations, the notion of state-independent contextuality in the marginal approach allows to prove contextuality from seemingly weaker assumptions. In the light of this, and at the absence of a unified mathematical framework for Kochen-Specker contextuality, the original algebraic approach has been widely abandoned, in favour of the study of contextual correlations. Here, we reinstate the algebraic perspective on contextuality. Concretely, by building on the novel concept of context connections, we reformulate the algebraic relations between observables originally postulated by Kochen and Specker, and we explicitly demonstrate their consistency with the notion of state-independent contextuality. In the present paper, we focus on the new conceptual ideas and discuss them in the concrete setting of spin-1 observables, specifically those in the example of [S. Yu and C.H. Oh, Phys. Rev. Lett., 108, 030402 (2012)]; in a companion paper, we generalise these ideas, obtain a complete characterisation of Kochen-Specker contextuality and provide a detailed comparison with the related notions of contextuality in the marginal and graph-theoretic approach.