Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1207.4467 · Security and Communication Networks

Information geometric security analysis of differential phase‐shift quantum key distribution protocol

Laszlo Gyongyosi, Sándor Imre

Published Jun 19, 2012• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the information‐theoretical security of the of Differential Phase Shift (DPS) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol, using efficient computational information geometric algorithms. The protocol was introduced for practical reasons, since the earlier QKD schemes were too complicated to implement in practice. The DPS QKD protocol can be an integrated part of current network security applications; hence its practical implementation is much easier with the current optical devices and optical networks. The proposed algorithm could be a very valuable tool to answer the still open questions related to the security bounds of the DPS QKD protocol. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DOI
10.1002/sec.542

Related papers

Security of differential phase shift QKD from relativistic principles

Martin Sandfuchs, Michael Haberland, V. Vilasini +1 more

The design of quantum protocols for secure key generation poses many challenges: On the one hand, they need to be practical concerning experimental realisations. On the other hand, their theoretical description must be simple enough to allow for a security proof against all possible attacks. Often, these two requirements are in conflict with each other, and the differential phase shift (DPS) QKD protocol exemplifies these difficulties: It is designed to be implementable with current optical telecommunication technology, which, for this protocol, comes at the cost that many standard security proof techniques do not apply to it. After about 20 years since its invention, this work presents the first full security proof of DPS QKD against general attacks, including finite-size effects. The proof combines techniques from quantum information theory, quantum optics, and relativity. We first give a security proof of a QKD protocol whose security stems from relativistic constraints. We then show that security of DPS QKD can be reduced to security of the relativistic protocol. In addition, we show that coherent attacks on the DPS protocol are, in fact, stronger than collective attacks. Our results have broad implications for the development of secure and reliable quantum communication technologies, as they shed light on the range of applicability of state-of-the-art security proof techniques.

arXiv:2301.11340•Quantum•Jan 27, 2025•15 citations

A MATLAB-based modelling and simulation package for DPS-QKD

Anuj Sethia, Anindita Banerjee

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious technology utilizing quantum information science for provable secure communication. However, owing to the technological limitations and device non-idealities it is important to analyse the system performance critically and carefully define the implementation security. With an acceleration in the commercial adoption of QKD, a simulation toolkit is requisite to evaluate the functional architecture of QKD protocols. We present a simulation framework to model practical implementation of differential phase shift (DPS) QKD. The detailed device-level modelling and analysis capabilities of the present toolkit based on Simulink and MATLAB have the potential to provide a universal toolkit for practical design and implementation of generalized QKD protocols. Further, the absence of any modelling framework for DPS QKD and its simplistic optical schematic made it an obvious choice for the authors. We are hopeful that this work will pave way for simulating other QKD protocols from the DPR family.

arXiv:2107.07306•Journal of Modern Optics•Mar 2, 2022•12 citations

Information-theoretic security proof of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocol based on complementarity

Akihiro Mizutani, Toshihiko Sasaki, Go Kato +2 more

Abstract We prove the information-theoretic security of the differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in the asymptotic regime based on the complementarity approach (arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)). Our security proof provides a slightly better key generation rate compared to the one derived in the previous security proof in (arXiv:1208.1995 (2012)) that is based on the Shor–Preskill approach (Shor and Preskill 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441). This improvement is obtained because the complementarity approach can employ more detailed information on Alice’s sending state in estimating the leaked information to an eavesdropper. Moreover, we remove the necessity of the numerical calculation that was needed in the previous analysis to estimate the leaked information. This leads to an advantage that our security proof enables us to evaluate the security of the DPS protocol with any block size. This paper highlights one of the fundamental differences between the Shor–Preskill and the complementarity approaches.

arXiv:1705.00171•Quantum Science and Technology•Oct 18, 2017•17 citations

Finite-key security analysis of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

Akihiro Mizutani, Yuki Takeuchi, Kiyoshi Tamaki

Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the major QKD protocols that can be implemented with a simple setup using a laser source and a passive detection unit. Recently, an information-theoretic security proof of this protocol was established by Mizutani et al. [npj Quantum Inf. 5, 87 (2019)], assuming an infinitely large number of emitted pulses. To implement the DPS protocol in a real-life world, it is indispensable to analyze the security with the finite number of emitted pulses. The extension of the security proof to the finite-size regime requires the accommodation of the statistical fluctuations to determine the amount of privacy amplification. In doing so, Azuma's inequality is often employed, but unfortunately we show that in the case of the DPS protocol, this results in a substantially low key rate. This low key rate is due to a loose estimation of the sum of probabilities regarding three-photon emission whose probability of occurrence is very small. The main contribution of our work is to show that this obstacle can be overcome by exploiting the recently found novel concentration inequality, Kato's inequality. As a result, the key rate of the DPS protocol is drastically improved. For instance, assuming typical experimental parameters, a 3-Mbit secret key can be generated over 77 km for 8.3 hours, which shows the feasibility of DPS QKD under a realistic setup.

arXiv:2301.09844•Physical Review Research•May 30, 2023•18 citations

Recent development of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution

LI He-ping

Quantum-key-distribution(QKD) has been studied as an ultimate method for secure communications.Here we review the recent progress on differential-phase shift(DPS) QKD.The principle of the DPS-QKD protocol is explained,and the security against the Photon-number splitting(PNS) and the sequential attack strategy is discussed briefly.The current application in various field and the prospect of QKD is referred.

Jiguang zazhi•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

DPS Quantum Key Distribution System

Kyo Inoue

Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is one scheme of quantum key distribution whose security is based on the quantum nature of lightwave. This protocol features simplicity, a high key creation rate, and robustness against photon-number-splitting attacks. We describe DPS-QKD in this paper, including its setup and operation, eavesdropping against DPS-QKD, system performance, and modified systems to improve the system performance.

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences•Jan 1, 2010•1 citation
ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the information‐theoretical security of the of Differential Phase Shift (DPS) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol, using efficient computational information geometric algorithms. The protocol was introduced for practical reasons, since the earlier QKD schemes were too complicated to implement in practice. The DPS QKD protocol can be an integrated part of current network security applications; hence its practical implementation is much easier with the current optical devices and optical networks. The proposed algorithm could be a very valuable tool to answer the still open questions related to the security bounds of the DPS QKD protocol. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
The design of quantum protocols for secure key generation poses many challenges: On the one hand, they need to be practical concerning experimental realisations. On the other hand, their theoretical description must be simple enough to allow for a security proof against all possible attacks. Often, these two requirements are in conflict with each other, and the differential phase shift (DPS) QKD protocol exemplifies these difficulties: It is designed to be implementable with current optical telecommunication technology, which, for this protocol, comes at the cost that many standard security proof techniques do not apply to it. After about 20 years since its invention, this work presents the first full security proof of DPS QKD against general attacks, including finite-size effects. The proof combines techniques from quantum information theory, quantum optics, and relativity. We first give a security proof of a QKD protocol whose security stems from relativistic constraints. We then show that security of DPS QKD can be reduced to security of the relativistic protocol. In addition, we show that coherent attacks on the DPS protocol are, in fact, stronger than collective attacks. Our results have broad implications for the development of secure and reliable quantum communication technologies, as they shed light on the range of applicability of state-of-the-art security proof techniques.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious technology utilizing quantum information science for provable secure communication. However, owing to the technological limitations and device non-idealities it is important to analyse the system performance critically and carefully define the implementation security. With an acceleration in the commercial adoption of QKD, a simulation toolkit is requisite to evaluate the functional architecture of QKD protocols. We present a simulation framework to model practical implementation of differential phase shift (DPS) QKD. The detailed device-level modelling and analysis capabilities of the present toolkit based on Simulink and MATLAB have the potential to provide a universal toolkit for practical design and implementation of generalized QKD protocols. Further, the absence of any modelling framework for DPS QKD and its simplistic optical schematic made it an obvious choice for the authors. We are hopeful that this work will pave way for simulating other QKD protocols from the DPR family.
Abstract We prove the information-theoretic security of the differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol in the asymptotic regime based on the complementarity approach (arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)). Our security proof provides a slightly better key generation rate compared to the one derived in the previous security proof in (arXiv:1208.1995 (2012)) that is based on the Shor–Preskill approach (Shor and Preskill 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441). This improvement is obtained because the complementarity approach can employ more detailed information on Alice’s sending state in estimating the leaked information to an eavesdropper. Moreover, we remove the necessity of the numerical calculation that was needed in the previous analysis to estimate the leaked information. This leads to an advantage that our security proof enables us to evaluate the security of the DPS protocol with any block size. This paper highlights one of the fundamental differences between the Shor–Preskill and the complementarity approaches.
Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the major QKD protocols that can be implemented with a simple setup using a laser source and a passive detection unit. Recently, an information-theoretic security proof of this protocol was established by Mizutani et al. [npj Quantum Inf. 5, 87 (2019)], assuming an infinitely large number of emitted pulses. To implement the DPS protocol in a real-life world, it is indispensable to analyze the security with the finite number of emitted pulses. The extension of the security proof to the finite-size regime requires the accommodation of the statistical fluctuations to determine the amount of privacy amplification. In doing so, Azuma's inequality is often employed, but unfortunately we show that in the case of the DPS protocol, this results in a substantially low key rate. This low key rate is due to a loose estimation of the sum of probabilities regarding three-photon emission whose probability of occurrence is very small. The main contribution of our work is to show that this obstacle can be overcome by exploiting the recently found novel concentration inequality, Kato's inequality. As a result, the key rate of the DPS protocol is drastically improved. For instance, assuming typical experimental parameters, a 3-Mbit secret key can be generated over 77 km for 8.3 hours, which shows the feasibility of DPS QKD under a realistic setup.