The noise in optical source preparation needs to be characterized for the security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). Two feasible schemes, based on either an active optical switch or a passive beamsplitter, are proposed to monitor the variance of the source noise. We derive the security bounds for both schemes against collective attacks in the asymptotical limit and find that the passive scheme performs better. The finite-size effect is also discussed briefly for both schemes.
The noise in optical source preparation needs to be characterized for the security of practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD). Two feasible schemes, based on either an active optical switch or a passive beamsplitter, are proposed to monitor the variance of the source noise. We derive the security bounds for both schemes against collective attacks in the asymptotical limit and find that the passive scheme performs better. The finite-size effect is also discussed briefly for both schemes.
How to guarantee the practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system has been an important issue in the quantum cryptography applications. In contrast to the previous practical security strategies, which focus on the intercept-resend attack or the Gaussian attack, we investigate the practical security strategy based on a general attack, i.e., an arbitrated individual attack or collective attack on the system by Eve in this paper. The low bound of intensity disturbance of the local oscillator signal for eavesdropper successfully concealing herself is obtained, considering all noises can be used by Eve in the practical environment. Furthermore, we obtain an optimal monitoring condition for the practical CVQKD system so that legitimate communicators can monitor the general attack in real-time. As examples, practical security of two special systems, i.e., the Gaussian modulated coherent state CVQKD system and the middle-based CVQKD system, are investigated under the intercept-resend attacks.
We proposed a passive continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) using a locally generated local oscillator (LLO) at reception. Different from the LLO-based Gaussian-modulated coherent-state quantum key distribution, our protocol is implemented by taking advantage of a multimode thermal source, beam splitters, optical attenuators, and homodyne detectors rather than the amplitude and phase modulators, which could be a cost-effective solution for LLO-based CVQKD. We adopt a general LLO noise model to analyze the performance of our protocol. That is to say, our consideration for noise in the proposed scheme contains the excess noise caused by passive state preparation, the phase noise, and the photon-leakage noise from the reference path. Because our protocol waives the necessity of the use of amplitude and phase modulators, there is no need to bear the effect of modulation noise caused by finite dynamics. Simulation results show that the improvement of the mode-overlap coefficient can suppress the excess noise caused by passive state preparation and thus enhance the performance of our protocol. Because lower relative phase drift and the photon-leakage noise can be obtained by using the multiplexing technique, we can still achieve reasonable performance of our protocol with the mode-overlap coefficient values which are very close to the experimental reference. Furthermore, we perform the finite-size analysis for the proposed protocol, which is more practical than that achieved in the asymptotic limit. This work confirms the feasibility of passive CVQKD implemented in the LLO configuration within the metropolitan area.
We perform security analysis of a passive continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) protocol by considering the finite-size effect. In the passive CV-QKD scheme, Alice utilizes thermal sources to passively make preparation of quantum state without Gaussian modulations. With this technique, the quantum states can be prepared precisely to match the high transmission rate. Here, both asymptotic regime and finite-size regime are considered to make a comparison. In the finite-size scenario, we illustrate the passive CV-QKD protocol against collective attacks. Simulation results show that the performance of passive CV-QKD protocol in the finite-size case is more pessimistic than that achieved in the asymptotic case, which indicates that the finite-size effect has a great influence on the performance of the single-mode passive CV-QKD protocol. However, we can still obtain a reasonable performance in the finite-size regime by enhancing the average photon number of the thermal state.
We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse. We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme. Moreover, using simulations, we have considered four real-life imperfections: Additional loss introduced by the "plug & play" structure, inefficiency of the intensity monitor, noise of the intensity monitor, and statistical fluctuation introduced by finite data size. Our simulation results show that the passive estimate of an untrusted source remains useful in practice, despite these four imperfections. Also, we have performed preliminary experiments, confirming the utility of our proposal in real-life applications. Our proposal makes it possible to implement the "plug & play" QKD with the security guaranteed, while keeping the implementation practical.
We present a passive approach to the security analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an untrusted source. A complete proof of its unconditional security is also presented. This scheme has significant advantages in real-life implementations as it does not require fast optical switching or a quantum random number generator. The essential idea is to use a beam splitter to split each input pulse. We show that we can characterize the source using a cross-estimate technique without active routing of each pulse. We have derived analytical expressions for the passive estimation scheme. Moreover, using simulations, we have considered four real-life imperfections: additional loss introduced by the 'plug&play' structure, inefficiency of the intensity monitor noise of the intensity monitor, and statistical fluctuation introduced by finite data size. Our simulation results show that the passive estimate of an untrusted source remains useful in practice, despite these four imperfections. Also, we have performed preliminary experiments, confirming the utility of our proposal in real-life applications. Our proposal makes it possible to implement the 'plug&play' QKD with the security guaranteed, while keeping the implementation practical.
Abstract Source monitoring is a matter of vital importance for continuous-variable quantum key distribution (QKD), since it is the first barrier to ensure the practical security. In a practical scenario, the difficulty arises with the existence of the laser intensity fluctuation, which not only contributes to the source noise but also causes the deviation of source monitoring result. We first illustrate the effect of the relative intensity noise (RIN) on the ultimate security by explicitly showing the parameter estimation procedure, and find that the secret key rate is overestimated in this situation. To defend the continuous-variable QKD system against potential attacks utilizing this impairment to conceal itself, a source monitoring scheme is devised by adopting the seminal one-time shot-noise unit calibration approach into the monitor module. It is shown that by using the practical source monitoring scheme the impact of the RIN can be modeled and monitored in real time to circumvent an overestimated secret key rate. This scheme also lowers the system complexity thus is suitable for widespread application.