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arXiv:1111.2189

Decoherence and Ontology (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love FAPP)

David Wallace

Published Jun 24, 2010• 84 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues for the view that the Everett (‘many worlds’) interpretation is nothing more or less than a literal reading of the formalism of unitary quantum mechanics. The central component of this story is decoherence: the process by which the evolution of the quantum state acquires a branching structure. The chapter gives a conceptual introduction to decoherence and its conceptual role, emphasizing the significance of its effects on the dynamics of degrees of freedom which are undergoing decoherence. It then argues that, although the branching structure generated by decoherence is ‘for all practical purposes’ in the sense that it is not part of the microscopic formalism of quantum theory, nonetheless it is a perfectly real, observer-independent feature of reality — it is emergent from that microscopic formalism in a way very familiar from many other parts of science.

DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0002

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Abstract This chapter argues for the view that the Everett (‘many worlds’) interpretation is nothing more or less than a literal reading of the formalism of unitary quantum mechanics. The central component of this story is decoherence: the process by which the evolution of the quantum state acquires a branching structure. The chapter gives a conceptual introduction to decoherence and its conceptual role, emphasizing the significance of its effects on the dynamics of degrees of freedom which are undergoing decoherence. It then argues that, although the branching structure generated by decoherence is ‘for all practical purposes’ in the sense that it is not part of the microscopic formalism of quantum theory, nonetheless it is a perfectly real, observer-independent feature of reality — it is emergent from that microscopic formalism in a way very familiar from many other parts of science.
Abstract This introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.
The aim of this chapter is to explain how the ‘many worlds’ of the Everett interpretation can emerge from the underlying physics of quantum theory, without being put in by hand at the microscopic level. The discussion is conceptually focussed: in the main the chapter is concerned with sketching the way in which higher-level ontology emerges, in general, from lower-level scientific theories. When this general framework is applied to quantum theory in particular, the chapter shows that it leads to a continual branching of physical reality at the emergent, macroscopic level.
Abstract This chapter investigates the formation and propagation of wave function “branches” through the process of entanglement with the environment. While this process is particularly important to some recent articulations of the Everett or “many-worlds” interpretation, it is a consequence of unitary dynamics, and hence significant to many if not all approaches to quantum theory. In this chapter we thus take a largely neutral stance on interpretation to investigate the shared consequences of unitary evolution. A highly idealized model of a locally interacting system and environment is described and investigated in several situations in which branching occurs, including those involving Bell inequality violating correlations; we illustrate how any nonlocality is compatible with the locality of the dynamics. Although branching is particularly important for many-worlds quantum theory, we take a neutral stance here, simply tracing out the consequences of a unitary dynamics. The overall goals are to provide a simple, concrete realization of the quantum physics of branch formation, and especially to emphasize the compatibility of branching with relativity; the chapter is intended to illuminate matters both for foundational work and for the application of quantum theory to non-isolated systems.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.