Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent area of Quantum Key Distribution. To reduce the probability of an afterpulse, these detectors are usually equipped with a circuitry that disables the trigger for a certain time after a positive detection event, known as dead time. If the acquisition system connected to the detector is not properly designed, efficiency issues arise when the triggering rate is faster than the inverse of detector's dead-time. Moreover, when this happens with two or more detectors used in coincidence, a security risk called "self-blinding" can jeopardize the distribution of a secret quantum key. In this paper we introduce a trigger-disabling circuitry based on an FPGA-driven feedback loop, so to avoid the above-mentioned inconveniences. In the regime of single-photon-attenuated light, the electronics dynamically accept a trigger only after detectors' complete recovery from dead-time. This technique proves useful to work with detectors at their maximum speed and to increase the security of a quantum key distribution setup.
Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent area of Quantum Key Distribution. To reduce the probability of an afterpulse, these detectors are usually equipped with a circuitry that disables the trigger for a certain time after a positive detection event, known as dead time. If the acquisition system connected to the detector is not properly designed, efficiency issues arise when the triggering rate is faster than the inverse of detector's dead-time. Moreover, when this happens with two or more detectors used in coincidence, a security risk called "self-blinding" can jeopardize the distribution of a secret quantum key. In this paper we introduce a trigger-disabling circuitry based on an FPGA-driven feedback loop, so to avoid the above-mentioned inconveniences. In the regime of single-photon-attenuated light, the electronics dynamically accept a trigger only after detectors' complete recovery from dead-time. This technique proves useful to work with detectors at their maximum speed and to increase the security of a quantum key distribution setup.
In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.
Quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols that rely on coincidence events registered with two or more detectors are prone to detector saturation effects due to detector dead times. In particular, systems using avalanche photodiodes may incur a reduction in the achievable secret key rate. We demonstrate a detector gating scheme tuned to mitigate these effects but keep the detectors in an otherwise free-running mode. When a first detector is inactive due to a previous detection, other unfavorable detection events in a second detector are blocked, as they would not contribute to the key but just lead to another dead time. We implement this method by synchronizing the detectors’ dead time in our time-bin entanglement QKD system and demonstrate its feasibility for various fiber link distances and detector settings, increasing the sifted key rate by up to 78% with no significant change in the quantum bit error rate.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with information theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper. In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking, has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD systems is a pressing challenge in QKD. In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs (SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from the user. We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally, backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated InGaAs APDs that don't possess self-differencing circuitry.
In our experiment, two InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APD) were used in the quantum key distribution (QKD) system for single-photon detection at telecom communication wavelength (1310/1550 nm). By using properly designed passive-quenching circuit, the photo-detection efficiency of the APD could reach 10% at 1550 nm. In order to decrease the dark count rate efficiently, we designed a coincident counting circuits for single-photon detection. Before the APD signals were sent to the signal processing circuit, the avalanche signals were amplified and shaped into the TTL pulses. In order to obtain an accurate and efficient data acquisition and to transfer synchronically several signals such as the TTL signals and pulses from Random generators, we designed a signal processing circuit with the parallel port whose speed limitation is about 100Kb/s. In our experiments of single-photon interference and quantum cryptography, the electronic designs presented us satisfactory performance and results. To achieve much higher speed for the data acquisition, we also employed the Universal Serial Bus System (USB2.0) to interface our single-photon avalanche detectors and random generators used in our QKD system, which was believed to improve the performance of QKD such as the key distribution speed.
This dissertation is the result of research which, although electrical and computer engineering in nature, also aims to improve the performance of many systems in the field of quantum information. For example, random number generators are used in almost all areas of science, and the initial portion of this work details the theory, design, and characterization of two photon-arrival-time quantum random number generators (QRNGs). After the QRNGs were completed, it was realized that their performance was severely limited both by the maximum detection rate of the single-photon detectors used, and the precision at which the arrival times could be resolved. The single-photon detectors used for both QRNGs are single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs), devices which when operated below their breakdown voltage can create a macroscopic amount of current (an avalanche) in response to a single incident photon. Some of this charge can become trapped in defects or impurities; if this trapped charge is released when the SPAD is active, a secondary ‘false’ detection event, or ‘afterpulse’ can occur. To lower the afterpulse probability to reasonable levels (< 1%), we attempted to reduce the amount of avalanche charge by halting its growth promptly with high-speed electronics, so that defects have a lower probability of becoming populated in the first place. Initial results show reductions in afterpulse probability by up to a factor of 12, corresponding to a ~20% decrease in dead time, a value that could be improved further. We developed an FPGA-based time-to-digital converter system for use specifically with SPADs, achieving a time-bin resolution of 100 ps, with lower dead time and higher maximum detection rate than all currently available detection systems. This further allowed for the creation of a new higher-order SPAD characterization technique, which was identified previously unknown subtleties to SPAD operation. Finally, we developed an ultra-low-latency QRNG, which was used in one of the recent loophole-free demonstrations of quantum nonlocality. The final latency was below 2.5 ns, to our knowledge the lowest latency QRNG to date. Of special interest, however, is our subsequent exploration into the characterization of its bit-probability drift using atomic clock stability techniques. By employing the Allan deviation and implementing precision feedback, the additional frequency drift caused by environmental fluctuations is reduced such that the resulting bit stream can pass cryptographic random number tests for sample sizes up to 5 Gb. This system is currently intended for the NIST random-number beacon, a world-wide trusted source of random bits.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD), rooted in quantum mechanics, offers information-theoretic security. However, practical systems open security threats due to imperfections, notably bright-light blinding attacks targeting single-photon detectors. Here, we propose a concise, robust defense strategy for protecting single-photon detectors in QKD systems against blinding attacks. Our strategy uses a dual approach: detecting the bias current of the avalanche photodiode (APD) to defend against continuous-wave blinding attacks, and monitoring the avalanche amplitude to protect against pulsed blinding attacks. By integrating these two branches, the proposed solution effectively identifies and mitigates a wide range of bright light injection attempts, significantly enhancing the resilience of QKD systems against various bright-light blinding attacks. This method fortifies the safeguards of quantum communications and offers a crucial contribution to the field of quantum information security.