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arXiv:1106.0825 · Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics

Security of Post-selection based Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution against Arbitrary Attacks

Nathan Walk, Timothy C. Ralph, Thomas Symul, Ping Koy Lam

Published Jan 1, 2011• 2 citations
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Abstract

We analyse the security and performance of a continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol using post selection, deriving results that are unconditionally secure in the sense of no longer restricting the eavesdroppers attack.
DOI
10.1364/cleo_at.2011.jtuc4

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In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian attacks in the presence of this excess noise.
In realistic continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols, an eavesdropper may exploit the additional Gaussian noise generated during transmission to mask her presence. We present a theoretical framework for a post-selection based protocol which explicitly takes into account excess Gaussian noise. We derive a quantitative expression of the secret key rates based on the Levitin and Holevo bounds. We experimentally demonstrate that the post-selection based scheme is still secure against both individual and collective Gaussian attacks in the presence of this excess noise.