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arXiv:1012.3222

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Quantum Determinism

Vladimir S. Mashkevich

Published Dec 15, 2010• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The Principle of Sufficient Reason implies determinism. An explicit indeterministic quantum jump dynamics is constructed, which may be naturally transformed into a deterministic one. A consistent application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason results in a canonical deterministic dynamics.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1012.3222

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