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arXiv:1008.3661

A Logical Proof of the Free Will Theorem

Iégor Reznikoff

Published Aug 21, 2010• 3 citations
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Abstract

We give a purely logical proof of the J. Conway and S. Kochen Free Will theorem concerning undeterminacy in Quantum Mechanics (Notices of the AMS, February 2009, Vol. 56/2, p. 226). The logical method seems to be very powerful.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1008.3661

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Conway and Kochen have presented a "free will theorem" (Notices of the AMS 56, pgs. 226-232 (2009)) which they claim shows that "if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles." In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition "MIN" motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is not correct, while for deterministic models it is not new.
I begin with description of quantum entanglement and its relevance to the EPR-type experiments, which played a decisive role in rejecting determinism and hidden-variable theories. Thereby I prove the closely-related Kochen-Specker paradox, on which also the main object of my paper, the recently published Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem, is founded. It is being shown there, on the basis of three physical axioms, following from the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, that if the choice for a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. Therefor the response of the particles can be seen as free. In conclusion I mention some critical remarks on the theorem, expressed in subsequent responses to the original article.