Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1007.4321

'Which Multiverse?': Some FAQ

M. Dugić, J. Jeknić-Dugić

Published Jul 25, 2010• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, we pointed out the possible inconsistency in the very foundations of the Everett MWI (or a Multiverse) theory. Here, we place some emphasis on the very basic notions underlying our conclusion yet motivated by certain, recently raised clever observations in this regard.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1007.4321

Related papers

The Multiverse Interpretation

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Feb 17, 2014•1 citation

Some remarks on the mathematical structure of the multiverse

McKenzie, Alan

The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum entanglement experiments is at best incomplete, since the intermediate state induced by collapse of the wave function apparently depends upon the inertial rest frame in which the experiment is observed. While the Many Worlds Interpretation of Everett, MWI, avoids the issue of wave function collapse, it, too, is a casualty of the special theory of relativity. This requires all events in the universe, past, present and future, to be unique, as in the block universe picture, which rules out Everett style branching. The benefits of MWI may be retained, however, by postulating a multiverse of discrete, parallel, block universes which are identical to each other up to certain points in the MWI trunk before they diverge according to the MWI branching. The quantum probability of an event then emerges from the number of parallel universes in which the event happens divided by the total number of universes. This means that the total number of such universes is finite. Such a picture is more easily envisaged by thinking of it as a purely mathematical structure, as in the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis proposed by Tegmark. However, while Tegmark wished to avoid contamination from Goedelian self referential knots, not only does such contamination appear to be inevitable, it brings an unexpected benefit. The mathematical hierarchy required by the enigmatic footnote 48a in the paper by Goedel leads to an explanation for a unitary evolution of deterministic quantum rules across the multiverse while accounting for quantum uncertainty within an individual universe. Other aspects of this structure, called here the Plexus, are discussed, including awareness of existence and other questions raised by the hypothesis.

arXiv:1602.04247•Feb 6, 2016•4 citations

Which Multiverse?

M. Dugić, J. Jeknić-Dugić

The complex (composite) systems such as the Universe allow the different decompositions into subsystems. The Everett's Many Times Interpretation (MWI) heavily relies on the occurrence of decohernce that should provide the classical reality for the Worlds. However, applying the occurrence of decoherence as the sufficient condition for the classical reality of the open systems, one seems obliged to consider the different decomposition equally (classically) realistic. But this leads to an inconsistency of the Everett's MWI in its very foundations: why the decomposition as we perceive it should be the only one realistic?

arXiv:1004.0148•Mar 31, 2010•2 citations

Metaphysical Indeterminacy in the Multiverse

Claudio Calosi, Jessica Wilson

Synthese Library/Synthese library•Jan 1, 2022•5 citations

A Quantum Multiverse Model

MARCELO DE OLIVEIRA SOUZA

•Aug 11, 2025•0 citations

Why Ze is not Many-Worlds

Jaba Tkemaladze

This paper presents a definitive refutation of the recurring conjecture that the Ze framework constitutes a variant of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics. Through a systematic, point-by-point analysis, we demonstrate that the two are radically orthogonal paradigms, separated by irreconcilable differences in their foundational principles. While both reject the notion of a fundamental wavefunction collapse, MWI responds by positing an ever-branching multiverse where all quantum possibilities are ontologically real. In stark contrast, the Ze framework, grounded in the principles of active inference and free energy minimization, preserves a single-world ontology. It reinterprets quantum superpositions as manifestations of unresolved epistemic model conflict within an adaptive system, and "measurement" as the physical process of forced localization, where a definite history crystallizes. The analysis conclusively distinguishes Ze from MWI across critical dimensions: the nature of alternatives (ontological worlds vs. epistemic models), the process of definiteness (subjective branching vs. objective optimization), the role of the observer (covert privilege vs. its elimination), and the capacity for empirical prediction. We conclude that Ze is not an interpretation of quantum formalism but a broader theory of how adaptive systems, from particles to brains, resolve uncertainty, thereby offering a monistic, parsimonious, and empirically grounded alternative to the inflationary ontology of the multiverse.

Longevity Horizon•Jan 14, 2026•7 citations
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum entanglement experiments is at best incomplete, since the intermediate state induced by collapse of the wave function apparently depends upon the inertial rest frame in which the experiment is observed. While the Many Worlds Interpretation of Everett, MWI, avoids the issue of wave function collapse, it, too, is a casualty of the special theory of relativity. This requires all events in the universe, past, present and future, to be unique, as in the block universe picture, which rules out Everett style branching. The benefits of MWI may be retained, however, by postulating a multiverse of discrete, parallel, block universes which are identical to each other up to certain points in the MWI trunk before they diverge according to the MWI branching. The quantum probability of an event then emerges from the number of parallel universes in which the event happens divided by the total number of universes. This means that the total number of such universes is finite. Such a picture is more easily envisaged by thinking of it as a purely mathematical structure, as in the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis proposed by Tegmark. However, while Tegmark wished to avoid contamination from Goedelian self referential knots, not only does such contamination appear to be inevitable, it brings an unexpected benefit. The mathematical hierarchy required by the enigmatic footnote 48a in the paper by Goedel leads to an explanation for a unitary evolution of deterministic quantum rules across the multiverse while accounting for quantum uncertainty within an individual universe. Other aspects of this structure, called here the Plexus, are discussed, including awareness of existence and other questions raised by the hypothesis.
The complex (composite) systems such as the Universe allow the different decompositions into subsystems. The Everett's Many Times Interpretation (MWI) heavily relies on the occurrence of decohernce that should provide the classical reality for the Worlds. However, applying the occurrence of decoherence as the sufficient condition for the classical reality of the open systems, one seems obliged to consider the different decomposition equally (classically) realistic. But this leads to an inconsistency of the Everett's MWI in its very foundations: why the decomposition as we perceive it should be the only one realistic?
This paper presents a definitive refutation of the recurring conjecture that the Ze framework constitutes a variant of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics. Through a systematic, point-by-point analysis, we demonstrate that the two are radically orthogonal paradigms, separated by irreconcilable differences in their foundational principles. While both reject the notion of a fundamental wavefunction collapse, MWI responds by positing an ever-branching multiverse where all quantum possibilities are ontologically real. In stark contrast, the Ze framework, grounded in the principles of active inference and free energy minimization, preserves a single-world ontology. It reinterprets quantum superpositions as manifestations of unresolved epistemic model conflict within an adaptive system, and "measurement" as the physical process of forced localization, where a definite history crystallizes. The analysis conclusively distinguishes Ze from MWI across critical dimensions: the nature of alternatives (ontological worlds vs. epistemic models), the process of definiteness (subjective branching vs. objective optimization), the role of the observer (covert privilege vs. its elimination), and the capacity for empirical prediction. We conclude that Ze is not an interpretation of quantum formalism but a broader theory of how adaptive systems, from particles to brains, resolve uncertainty, thereby offering a monistic, parsimonious, and empirically grounded alternative to the inflationary ontology of the multiverse.