We explore some implications of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics (QM) is universal, i.e., that QM does not merely describe information accessible to observers, but that it also describes the observers themselves. From that point of view, "free will" (FW) - the ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial conditions - is merely an illusion. As a consequence, by entangling a part of brain (responsible for the illusion of FW) with a distant particle, one may create nonlocal correlations that can be interpreted as superluminal signals. In addition, if FW is an illusion, then QM on a closed timelike curve can be made consistent even without the Deutch nonlinear consistency constraint.
We explore some implications of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics (QM) is universal, i.e., that QM does not merely describe information accessible to observers, but that it also describes the observers themselves. From that point of view, "free will" (FW) - the ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial conditions - is merely an illusion. As a consequence, by entangling a part of brain (responsible for the illusion of FW) with a distant particle, one may create nonlocal correlations that can be interpreted as superluminal signals. In addition, if FW is an illusion, then QM on a closed timelike curve can be made consistent even without the Deutch nonlinear consistency constraint.
Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be weakly compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.
Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.
The basic question in the long-standing debate about free will (FW) is not whether FW can be demonstrated to exist nor even whether it exists, but instead how to define it scientifically. If FW is not dismissed as an illusion nor identified with a variety of unpredictability, then logical paradoxes arise that make FW elusive to define. We resolve these paradoxes through a model of FW, in which FW is a new causal primitive empowered to override physical causality under guidance. We develop a simple mathematical realization of this model, that when applied to quantum theory, suggests that the exercise of FW corresponds to a nonlinear POVM causing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, these deviations would stand in conflict with known conservation laws and invariance principles, implying that the brain, the presumed seat of FW, may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice it will be difficult to distinguish these deviations from quantum and neural noise, and statistical fluctuations. We indicate possible neurobiological and neurological tests, implications and applications of our proposed model.
We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.
If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly certain preliminary goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which it can be achieved or not by the one who determines the goal. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior.The choice is usually linked to very complicated systems such as human brain or society and even often associated with consciousness. In its background, the material world is deterministic and absolutely devoid of choice. However, quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world, in the only way, in which it can exist: All exists in the “phase transition” of the present between the uncertain future and the well-ordered past. Thus the present is forced to choose in order to be able to transform the coherent state of future into the well-ordering of past. The concept of choice as if suggests that there is one who chooses. However quantum mechanics involves a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature.There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors, Conway and Kochen, and according to them: “Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity” “The import of the free will theorem is that it is not only current quantum theory, but the world itself that is non-deterministic, so that no future theory can return us to a clockwork universe”.Those theorems can be considered as a continuation of the so-called theorems about the absence of “hidden variables” in quantum mechanics.
General Relativity (GR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM) are the theories dependent on the observer/detector so they are not the theories of the independent from observer Nature. In GR it follows from the fact that each act of observation (the photon-detector interaction via exchanges of the invisible superluminal particles responsible for quantum entanglement i.e. there are exchanged the spin-1 entanglons) sets the speed of light in “vacuum” c in relation to the detector (the speed c is in relation to the emitter or a last-interaction object - sometimes it is a detector). In QM it results from the fact that we cannot observe the entanglons directly and because time of observation lasts much longer than the time of exchanges of the invisible superluminal entanglons so there appear wavefunctions, superposition of states, and probabilities to find a particle in different states. Simultaneity of different states of the same particle is an illusion that appears only in the theories dependent on the observer. There must be in existence a more fundamental theory, which should be a theory of Nature independent on the observer - it is the Scale-Symmetric Theory (SST). SST leads to the initial conditions applied in GR and QM and shows that these theories are dependent on the observer. Moreover, SST shows that we cannot unify GR and QM within the same methods. SST shows that Nature behaves classically in a deterministic way but it does not mean that the free will is not in existence.