We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.
We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.
It is a frequent assumption that—via superluminal information transfers—superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a ‘no-go’ theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell’s theorem, we argue that Bell employed both interpretations, and that he finally adopted the operational position which is associated often with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie–Bohm theory. This position we refer to as “effective non-signalling”. By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as “axiomatic non-signalling”. In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between “axiomatic” and “effective” non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, whereby we distinguish between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems: (1) Non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) Non-signification-control (NSC) theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. Effective non-signalling prevents the instantaneous, i.e., superluminal, transfer of message-encoded information through the controlled use—by a sender-receiver pair —of informationally-correlated detection events, e.g., in EPR-type experiments. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet—at the same time—effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.
Abstract Particles cannot travel faster than the speed of light, nor can information. Nonetheless, this assumption has been frequently questioned over the years. This includes radical proposals like tachyons that can be observed in particle accelerators to more subtle ideas like studying superluminal causation to find classical explanations for quantum correlations. Most recently, it has been argued (Dragan and Ekert 2020 New J. Phys. 22 033038) that in a world with superluminal observers local determinism is impossible, linking the two pillars of physics-quantum theory and relativity-suggesting that the latter serves as the foundation for the former. Motivated by this approach, in this work, we extend the framework of quantum reference frames to incorporate superluminal Lorentz transformations. We apply this conceptual result to examine an apparent paradox where particles acquire negative energies after undergoing a superluminal Lorentz boost and propose a resolution within our framework. A consequence of this resolution is that different observers no longer agree whether a particle is incoming or outgoing or in a superposition of the two. We further find a similar apparent paradox for the entropy and/or temperature under superluminal Lorentz boosts and resolve it in an analogous fashion. Finally, we discuss Bell experiments under superluminal quantum reference frame transformations, showing that the involved probabilities still remain conserved. By applying the toolbox of quantum reference frames, we start charting an unexplored territory of superpositions between sub-and-superluminal quantum observers which gives rise to new conceptual questions.
Does "epistemic non-signalling" ensure the peaceful coexistence of special relativity and quantum nonlocality? The possibility of an affirmative answer is of great importance to deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics given recent developments towards generalizations of Bell's theorem. By generalizations of Bell's theorem we here mean efforts that seek to demonstrate the impossibility of any deterministic theories to obey the predictions of Bell's theorem, including not only local hidden-variables theories (LHVTs) but, critically, of nonlocal hidden-variables theories (NHVTs) also, such as de Broglie-Bohm theory. Naturally, in light of the well-established experimental findings from quantum physics, whether or not a deterministic approach to quantum mechanics, including an emergent quantum mechanics, is logically possible, depends on compatibility with the predictions of Bell's theorem. With respect to deterministic NHVTs, recent attempts to generalize Bell's theorem have claimed the impossibility of any such approaches to quantum mechanics. The present work offers arguments showing why such efforts towards generalization may fall short of their stated goal. In particular, we challenge the validity of the use of the non-signalling theorem as a conclusive argument in favor of the existence of free randomness, and therefore reject the use of the non-signalling theorem as an argument against the logical possibility of deterministic approaches. We here offer two distinct counter-arguments in support of the possibility of deterministic NHVTs: one argument exposes the circularity of the reasoning which is employed in recent claims, and a second argument is based on the inconclusive metaphysical status of the non-signalling theorem itself. We proceed by presenting an entirely informal treatment of key physical and metaphysical assumptions, and of their interrelationship, in attempts seeking to generalize Bell's theorem on the basis of an ontic, foundational interpretation of the non-signalling theorem. We here argue that the non-signalling theorem must instead be viewed as an epistemic, operational theorem i.e. one that refers exclusively to what epistemic agents can, or rather cannot, do. That is, we emphasize that the non-signalling theorem is a theorem about the operational inability of epistemic agents to signal information. In other words, as a proper principle, the non-signalling theorem may only be employed as an epistemic, phenomenological, or operational principle. Critically, our argument emphasizes that the non-signalling principle must not be used as an ontic principle about physical reality as such, i.e. as a theorem about the nature of physical reality independently of epistemic agents e.g. human observers. One major reason in favor of our conclusion is that any definition of signalling or of non-signalling invariably requires a reference to epistemic agents, and what these agents can actually measure and report. Otherwise, the non-signalling theorem would equal a general "no-influence" theorem. In conclusion, under the assumption that the non-signalling theorem is epistemic (i.e. "epistemic non-signalling"), the search for deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics, including NHVTs and an emergent quantum mechanics, continues to be a viable research program towards disclosing the foundations of physical reality at its smallest dimensions.
In an earlier paper the author expounded an interferometer scheme to communicate classical data over an entangled quantum channel. We return to this concept to show that the laws of Quantum Mechanics are not violated and that the device is able to affect the statistical blend of the quantum states (and that this can be detected) but not the statistics - i.e. the physics of observables. The ideas of superluminal information transfer, discussed in the previous paper, are taken forward to develop a notion of absolute space, time and motion with relativistic effects ascribed to motion through an absolute reference frame - as the logical consequences dictate, permeated with a material causing the 'relativistic' effects. The reciprocal nature of the Lorentz Transform is shown to fail under superluminal signalling - one frame will be absolutely time dilated and length contacted; thus a full 'Ether Transformation' (though this cannot be a group) and a velocity addition law are derived, the Twin's Paradox is reconsidered. It would seem, in Special Relativity at least, that the phenomenological effects of motion are placed in an absolute, logical, materialistic setting, rather than a confusing relative one that, perhaps, allows no further inspection of just 'what it is' causing the effects. The author then discusses whether this programme can be carried forward into General Relativity with the space-time distortions ascribable to changes in the properties of the ether but on the whole describable in 3-space.
It may well be that a relativistic version of the theory, while Lorentz invariant and local at the observational level, may be necessarily non-local and with a preferred frame (or aether) at the fundamental level. – John Bell [1] Introduction Bell's theorem establishes a contradiction between locality (and a few other assumptions) and certain predictions of quantum mechanics [2]. There have been two main issues surrounding the deep implications of this celebrated theorem. The first issue is basic, and it concerns whether the theorem really establishes that nonlocality is a necessary feature of any empirically viable theory and hence a feature of nature itself. One aspect of the issue concerns exactly what the underlying assumptions of Bell's theorem are. For example, some argue that these assumptions include the assumption of counterfactual definiteness [3–5], while others disagree [6–8]. The other aspect of the issue concerns which assumption should be dropped due to the resulting contradiction. Some believe that standard quantum mechanics may avoid nonlocality by denying counterfactual definiteness [3–5]. The second issue is much deeper, and it concerns how to make sense of the strange nonlocality when assuming that Bell's theorem establishes that our world is nonlocal. In particular, it has yet to be determined whether such quantum nonlocality is compatible with the theory of relativity, e.g., whether the nonlocality requires the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame [7, 9, 10]. It seems that “there is a preferred frame of reference, and in this preferred frame of reference things do go faster than light … Behind the apparent Lorentz invariance of the phenomena, there is a deeper level which is not Lorentz invariant” [11]. But it also seems possible that the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame is an illusion, since it cannot be detected according to standard quantum mechanics. A more subtle issue is whether quantum nonlocality permits superluminal signaling. It is widely thought that the answers to these questions will lead to a deeper understanding of Bell's theorem and quantum nonlocality. In this paper, we will present a new analysis of quantum nonlocality and its apparent incompatibility with relativity.
Quantum theory shows that natural laws cannot be understood as ruling single events since the latter occur randomly. Nevertheless, the physical world shows everywhere order whose source cannot be represented by the latter. It is shown that this order is due to the presence of quantum correlations. Since their e↵ect is to reduce the space of the possible events, they can be considered as causal factors. However, being correlations, they do not display the dynamic character that would be required in order to produce a determinate e↵ect. This is why they need additional local factors in order to concur to the production of a certain event. If not so, this would even imply a violation of Einstein’s locality since correlations could be used by themselves to transmit superluminal signals. Due to such a character of correlation, they can be understood as kind of potential reality needing actual (and local) context to be e↵ective. This allows also a distinction that is classically unknown between locality and globality. Such a distinction solves the important problem of measurement showing that ultimately we have irreversible local processes while globally everything is still reversible. In particular, it is a shift of information that can explain this local phenomenon. In fact, quantum systems are essentially information and also the measurement process is ultimately a dealing with information: information processing (preparing a system), information sharing (coupling a system with an apparatus) and information selection (detecting). State, observable and property appear as equivalence classes of these three procedures, respectively. Finally, the distinction between interpreted and uninterpreted ontology is considered in a Kantian perspective, but it is also shown that the approach supported here is rather a critical realism.