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arXiv:1002.2697

The Free Will Theorem and the Flash Ontology implicitly assume the Before-Before Experiment and thereby imply free will. Comment on a note by Nicolas Gisin in arXiv:1002.1392v1

Antoine Suárez

Published Feb 13, 2010• 2 citations
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Abstract

It is argued that both the "Free Will Theorem" (FWT) and the "relativistic GRW model with Flash Ontology" (rGRWf) hiddenly assume the result of the before-before experiment, and for this reason both FWT and rGRWf imply free will in the world outside free experimenters.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1002.2697

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