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Philosophy Compass

GRW: A Case Study in Quantum Ontology

Peter J. Lewis

Published Feb 16, 2006• 54 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract This article provides an overview of the philosophical literature on the GRW theory of quantum mechanics, and argues for a particular position regarding that literature. Much of the literature is ontological; it attempts to defend a conception of what the world is like according to the GRW theory against perceived competitors. I argue that there is no real debate here, since these supposedly conflicting positions are better regarded as alternative and compatible ways of describing the world of the GRW theory.

DOI
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2005.00009.x

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Abstract This article provides an overview of the philosophical literature on the GRW theory of quantum mechanics, and argues for a particular position regarding that literature. Much of the literature is ontological; it attempts to defend a conception of what the world is like according to the GRW theory against perceived competitors. I argue that there is no real debate here, since these supposedly conflicting positions are better regarded as alternative and compatible ways of describing the world of the GRW theory.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
Abstract We consider Wigner’s proposal for solving the quantum measurement problem. His solution involves a strong mind-body dualism, but it is also possible to provide a purely physical collapse solution to the quantum measurement problem. To this end, we consider the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics and three ways one might interpret it: GRWr, GRWm, and GRWf. These ways of interpreting the theory differ in the metaphysical commitments one makes and, hence, in how one explains one’s measurement records and hence one’s experience. This provides an introduction to the notions of an empirical ontology and a primitive ontology. We consider some of the comparative virtues and vices of the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics.
Two views on the direction of time can be distinguished-primitivism and non-primitivism. According to the former, time's direction is an in-built, fundamental property of the physical world. According to the latter, time's direction is a derivative property of a fundamentally directionless reality. In the literature, non-primitivism has been widely supported since most (if not all) our fundamental dynamical laws are time-reversal invariant. In this paper, I offer a way out to the primitivist. I argue that we do have good grounds to support a primitive direction of time in the quantum realm. The rationale depends on exploiting the metaphysical and dynamical underdetermination of quantum theories to make a case in favor of primitivism. In particular, primitivism can be grounded in spontaneous collapse theories (e.g., GRW and CSL). The specific sense in which these theories capture a primitive direction of time is that, when the ontology of the theory is seriously taken into account, it does not remain invariant under time reversal. In taking GRW with a matter-density field (GRWm), I will argue that primitivism about the direction of time can be defended in the quantum case.