arXiv:1002.2285 · Laser Physics

Effects of depolarizing quantum channels on BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography protocols

Y. -C. Jeong, Y. S. Kim, Y. -H. Kim

Published Jun 23, 2011• 21 citations

Abstract

We report experimental studies on the effect of the depolarizing quantum channel on weak-pulse BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography. The experimental results show that, in real world conditions in which channel depolarization cannot be ignored, BB84 should perform better than SARG04 under the most general eavesdropping attack.

DOI: 10.1134/s1054660x11150126

Related papers

Effects depolarizing quantum channels on BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography

Youn-Chang Jeong, Yong‐Su Kim, Yoon-Ho Kim

We have studied experimentally the effect of a depolarizing quantum channel on polarization-encode weak pulse BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography. Experimental results show that, in real world conditions in which channel depolarization cannot be ignored, BB84 is more robust than SARG04 on the effect of the depolarizing quantum channel.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIEJul 29, 20100 citations

An experimental comparison of BB84 and SARG04 quantum key distribution protocols

Youn-Chang Jeong, Yong‐Su Kim, Yoon-Ho Kim

SARG04 uses the same quantum states and the same measurement bases with BB84 protocol, but SARG04 can generate secret keys from two-photon pulses when BB84 cannot. We report the implementation of BB84 and SARG04 protocols using a polarization-encoded weak coherent pulse with an optical fiber quantum channel. We have experimentally investigated the secret key rate of BB84 and SARG04 protocols, and BB84 gave a higher secret key rate than SARG04.

Laser Physics LettersJun 27, 201412 citations

Robustness of quantum cryptography: SARG04 key-distribution protocol

Dmitry Anatolevich Kronberg, S. N. Molotkov

The SARG04 protocol is aimed at the improvement of the robustness of the main protocols in quantum cryptography (primarily, BB84 and B92) against the PNS attack in the case of the application of weak coherent pulses instead of the one-particle signals. An optimal attack of eavesdropper on the transmitted key is explicitly constructed for arbitrary angles between the basis states. A critical error up to which the key distribution is possible and the length of the final key are determined.

Laser PhysicsApr 1, 200911 citations

Analysis of the one-decoy-state SARG04 quantum cryptography protocol in the presence of afterpulse effects

Hu Nian, Ya-Feng Nie, Chun-Mei Zhang +1 more

Abstract The SARG04 quantum key distribution protocol can offer greater robustness against photon number splitting attacks than the BB84 protocol that is implemented with weak pulses. In this paper, we propose a tight key analysis for the SARG04 protocol, by considering the one-decoy method and investigating its performance under the influence of a detector afterpulse. Our results demonstrate that an increase in block size leads to a slight increase in both the secure key rate and the maximum transmission distance. Importantly, the detector afterpulse plays a crucial role in practical applications and has a more pronounced effect on the SARG04 protocol compared to the BB84 protocol.

Communications in Theoretical PhysicsMar 28, 20243 citations

Weak-pulse implementation of SARG04 quantum cryptography protocol in free space

Youn-Chang Jeong, Kwan Young Hong, Yong‐Su Kim +1 more

We report a weak-pulse implementation of SARG04 quantum cryptography protocol in free-space. The shifted key generation rate of 22 k bit per second and quantum bit error rate of 4% have been demonstrated. We have also studied the long-distance capability of the QKD system by adding optical losses to the quantum channel.

Conference on Lasers and Electro-OpticsMay 1, 20081 citation

Performance of BB84 without decoy states under varying announcement structures

Zhiyao Wang, Aodhán Corrigan, Norbert Lütkenhaus

In phase-randomized weak coherent pulse (WCP) implementations of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) BB84 protocol, the decoy method is often used to compensate BB84's vulnerability against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. However, this typically introduces extra complexities and requirements on experimental devices. In this paper, we are therefore interested in phase-randomized WCP implementations without the decoy method. We examine the performance of three QKD protocols with different classical announcement structures, namely BB84, SARG04, and No Public Announcement of Basis (NPAB) BB84, using numerical security proof techniques. We compare secure key rates of the three protocols in asymptotic and finite-size regimes for lossy and noisy channels. The three protocols show different relative advantages depending on the channel behaviour. Canonical BB84 shows robustness against errors and depolarization, SARG04 demonstrates resilience against high loss channels, and NPAB BB84 shows potential advantages against physical misalignment between QKD devices.

quant-pharXiv:2603.22448Physical Review AMar 25, 20260 citations