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arXiv:0910.2645

Unconditionally Secure Quantum Bit Commitment Using Neutron Double-Slit Interference

Chi-Yee Cheung

Published Oct 14, 2009• 1 citation
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Abstract

Using a neutron double-slit setup, we construct a quantum bit commitment scheme in which time development of quantum states plays an essential role. Our scheme evades the widely accepted no-go theorem by the fact that it is neither possible to stop the time evolution of spreading wave packets, nor is it possible to evolve them backward in time. Moreover, for unstable particles such as neutrons, one cannot delay detecting their positions indefinitely, or they would disintegrate spontaneously and escape detection. We find that using non-stationary states instead of stationary ones, unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.0910.2645

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There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.

•Jan 1, 1996•172 citations
Using a neutron double-slit setup, we construct a quantum bit commitment scheme in which time development of quantum states plays an essential role. Our scheme evades the widely accepted no-go theorem by the fact that it is neither possible to stop the time evolution of spreading wave packets, nor is it possible to evolve them backward in time. Moreover, for unstable particles such as neutrons, one cannot delay detecting their positions indefinitely, or they would disintegrate spontaneously and escape detection. We find that using non-stationary states instead of stationary ones, unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is possible.
Using unstable particles (such as neutrons and muons) as qubits, we propose a quantum bit commitment protocol that is humanly impossible to break. Neutrons and muons decay by emitting neutrinos which carry away quantum information, but their interaction with matter is so weak that it would take an astronomically-sized machine just to catch them, not to mention performing controlled unitary operations on them. As a result quantum information is lost, and cheating is not possible even if the participants had access to the most powerful quantum computers that could ever be built. Therefore, for all practical purposes, our new protocol is as good as unconditionally secure.
We construct a quantum bit commitment scheme using a double-slit setup similar to Wheeler's delayed choice experiment. Bob sends photons toward the double-slit, and Alice commits by determining either the slit from which each photon emerges (for b=0b=0b=0), or its landing position on a screen (for b=1b=1b=1). Since the photon's wave front expands at the speed of light, Alice cannot delay the detection indefinitely, or it would very soon be out of her control no matter how much resources she has.
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.