I discuss some of the main interpretations given to explain the indeterministic nature of quantum measurements and show that all has some loopholes in one corner or another. I propose an alternative interpretation based on the notion of continued re-creation of the physical properties. The rate at which the system is re-created is a measure of the determinism of the measurements. The existence of uncertainties is better explained through this view, the meaning of incompatible observables becomes clearer and with the notion of re-creation and the origin of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle becomes more vivid.
I discuss some of the main interpretations given to explain the indeterministic nature of quantum measurements and show that all has some loopholes in one corner or another. I propose an alternative interpretation based on the notion of continued re-creation of the physical properties. The rate at which the system is re-created is a measure of the determinism of the measurements. The existence of uncertainties is better explained through this view, the meaning of incompatible observables becomes clearer and with the notion of re-creation and the origin of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle becomes more vivid.
Classical physics is generally regarded as deterministic, as opposed to quantum mechanics that is considered the first theory to have introduced genuine indeterminism into physics. We challenge this view by arguing that the alleged determinism of classical physics relies on the tacit, metaphysical assumption that there exists an actual value of every physical quantity, with its infinite predetermined digits (which we name principle of infinite precision). Building on recent information-theoretic arguments showing that the principle of infinite precision (which translates into the attribution of a physical meaning to mathematical real numbers) leads to unphysical consequences, we consider possible alternative indeterministic interpretations of classical physics. We also link those to well-known interpretations of quantum mechanics. In particular, we propose a model of classical indeterminism based on finite information quantities (FIQs). Moreover, we discuss the perspectives that an indeterministic physics could open (such as strong emergence), as well as some potential problematic issues. Finally, we make evident that any indeterministic interpretation of physics would have to deal with the problem of explaining how the indeterminate values become determinate, a problem known in the context of quantum mechanics as (part of) the ``quantum measurement problem.'' We discuss some similarities between the classical and the quantum measurement problems, and propose ideas for possible solutions (e.g., ``collapse models'' and ``top-down causation'').
1) We shall discuss what modern interpretations say about the Heisenberg's uncertainties. These interpretations explain that a quantity begins to 'lose' meaning when a conjugate property begins to 'acquire' definite meaning. We know that a quantity losing meaning means that it has no fixed value and has an uncertainty . In this paper we look deeper into this interpretation and the outcome reveals more evidence of the quantity losing meaning. Newer insights appear. 2) We consider two extreme cases of hypothetical processes nature undergoes, without interference by a measurement: One, a system collapses to an energy eigenstate under the influence of a Hamiltonian instantaneously at a time t. This is thus what would happen if we would measure the system's energy. Next, when a particle becomes localised to a point at a time t0 under the influence of a Hamiltonian. This is thus what would happen if we would measure the system's position. We shall prove that both these situations cannot arise under ordinary circumstances and thus measurement processes cannot be modelled by physical Hamiltonians.
Unsolved controversies about uncertainty relations and quantum measurements still persists nowadays. They originate around the shortcomings regarding the conventional interpretation of uncertainty relations. Here we show that the respective shortcomings disclose veridic and unavoidable facts which require the abandonment of the mentioned interpretation. So the primitive uncertainty relations appear as being either thought fictions or fluctuations formulae. Subsequently we reveal that the conventional approaches of quantum measurements are grounded on incorrect premises. We propose a new approach in which : (i) the quantum observables are considered as generalized stochastic variables, (ii) the view is focused only on the pre-existent state of the measured system, without any interest for the collapse of the respective state, (iii) a measurement is described as an input-output transformation which modify the probability density and current but preserve the expressions of the operators. The measuring uncertainties are evaluated as changes in the probabilistic estimators of observables. Related to different observables we do not find reasons of principle neither for uncertainties-connections nor for measuring compatibility/incompatibility.
Since all experiments are subjected to the laws of quantum mechanics, the invalidity of the law of causality is definitively proved by quantum mechanics. (Heisenberg, 1927, p. 197, trans. in Stern, 1969, p. 132) THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINISM If quantum mechanics is correct, on whatever interpretation, there are experimental setups such that no amount of observational knowledge of the initial system could possibly predict the outcome. An electron goes through a magnetic field in the Stern-Gerlach experiment in a superposed spin state | up > + | down >. It will take an upward or downward path through the magnetic field, and if quantum mechanics is correct, no observation of its physical configuration prior to the performance of this kind of experiment can possibly reveal which it will be. The standard indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics has it that not only can no observation of the prior physical properties of the system, including of the electron, allow us to predict the outcome of the experiment, but that the system lacks any physical properties, observable or not, such that were they known ahead of time, we would know what the outcome is. In other words, on this interpretation, two quantum mechanical systems that start with exactly the same intrinsic properties can behave in different ways. This is indeterminism. It is seen as challenging the PSR for exactly the reason libertarian free will is, but more deeply because the defender of libertarian free will can allow for indeterministic explanations involving the reasons for one action rather than another.
The status of the uncertainty relations varies between the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The aim of the current paper is to explore their meanings within a certain neo-Everettian many worlds interpretation. We will also look at questions that have been linked with the uncertainty relations since Heisenberg's uncertainty principle: those of joint and repeated measurement of non-commuting (or otherwise `incompatible') observables. This will have implications beyond the uncertainty relations, as we will see the fundamentally different way in which statistical statements are interpreted in the neo-Everett theory that we use.
Abstract Uses a historical approach to explore the extent to which quantum theory mandates indeterminism. Drawing on important examples in the history of physics, it discusses explicitly the crucial distinction – often overlooked in the philosophical literature – between indeterminacy of physical quantities and causal indeterminism. It pursues at a more sophisticated level, issues raised in Ch. 2 concerning determinism and indeterminism in modern science. It concludes that quantum indeterminacy is an objective feature of the world, but that the jury is still out regarding quantum indeterminism.