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arXiv:quant-ph/9911024

Comment on "Non-contextual hidden variables and physical measurements"

Adán Cabello

Published Nov 6, 1999• 6 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Kent's conclusion that ``non-contextual hidden variable theories cannot be excluded by theoretical arguments of the Kochen-Specker type once the imprecision in real world experiments is taken into account'' [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3755 (1999)], is criticized. The Kochen-Specker theorem just points out that it is impossible even conceive a hidden variable model in which the outcomes of all measurements are pre-determined; it does not matter if these measurements are performed or not, or even if these measurements can be achieved only with finite precision.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9911024

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Kent's conclusion that ``non-contextual hidden variable theories cannot be excluded by theoretical arguments of the Kochen-Specker type once the imprecision in real world experiments is taken into account'' [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3755 (1999)], is criticized. The Kochen-Specker theorem just points out that it is impossible even conceive a hidden variable model in which the outcomes of all measurements are pre-determined; it does not matter if these measurements are performed or not, or even if these measurements can be achieved only with finite precision.
Meyer [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3751 (1999)] recently showed that the Kochen-Specker theorem, which demonstrates the impossibility of a deterministic hidden variable description of ideal spin measurements on a spin 1 particle, can be effectively nullified if only finite precision measurements are considered. We generalize this result: one can ascribe consistent outcomes to a dense subset of the set of projection valued measurements, or to a dense subset of the set of positive operator valued measurements, on any finite dimensional system. Hence no Kochen-Specker-like contradiction can rule out hidden variable theories indistinguishable from quantum theory by finite precision measurements in either class.
It is proven that any hidden variable theory of the type proposed by Meyer [Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3751 (1999)], Kent [ibid. 83, 3755 (1999)], and Clifton and Kent [Proc. R. Soc. London, Ser. A 456, 2101 (2000)] leads to experimentally testable predictions that are in contradiction with those of quantum mechanics. Therefore, it is argued that the existence of dense Kochen-Specker-colorable sets must not be interpreted as a nullification of the physical impact of the Kochen-Specker theorem once the finite precision of real measurements is taken into account.
It has recently been questioned whether the Kochen-Specker theorem is relevant to real experiments, which by necessity only have finite precision. We give an affirmative answer to this question by showing how to derive hidden-variable theorems that apply to real experiments, so that noncontextual hidden variables can indeed be experimentally disproved. The essential point is that for the derivation of hidden-variable theorems one does not have to know which observables are really measured by the apparatus. Predictions can be derived for observables that are defined in an entirely operational way.
One of the statements one would hear pretty early in any quantum mechanics course is that for quantum particles there are properties which do not have definite values. For example, if we measure |+〉 in standard basis, the best we can do to describe the outcome is to say, that with probability 1/2 we will get 0 and with probability 1/2 we will get 1. Yet one could wonder, is this really the way things are or is it just because our description of this quantum particle is incomplete, but in fact there are some hidden variables inside every quantum system that contain enough information to tell the outcome of measurement (see Fig. 1). However, many people disdain the idea of hidden variables, so there has been rather long history of theorems that forbid theories involving hidden variables. Usually if one wants to prove some no hidden variables theorem he has to assume something about the hidden variables theories he is going to forbid. One of such assumptions is non-contextuality, which means that the outcome we get after measuring with an observable is the same regardless of what other observables we choose to measure at the same time. The first theorem forbidding hidden variables theories is due to von Neumann in 1932. Then for a third of a century everyone cited von Neumann’s work carelessly, till Bell in 1966 indicated that there was an unreasonable assumption in von Neumann’s proof and urged for further examination of the problem (see [6] and [1] for more historical details). Bell also constructed a hidden variables model for one qubit that could assign the outcome of any observable in a way consistent with quantum mechanics. He also proved two theorems that forbid non-contextual hidden variables theories using counterexamples with larger quantum systems. Yet surprisingly he himself thought that hidden variables do exists and considered these theorems only as characterizations of the hidden variables theory we should look for. In this essay we will discuss several versions of one of the two Bell’s theorems. The theorem we will consider was also independently proven by Kochen and Specker in 1967 (see [5]), hence it is called Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. For shortness and in order not to mix this theorem with another Bell’s theorem from now on we will refer to it as Kochen-Specker theorem. We will be interested in proving several versions of this theorem and the following lemma will turn out to be of great use:
Recently a new impulse has been given to the experimental investigation of contextuality. In this paper we show that for a widely used definition of contextuality there can be no decisive experiment on the existence of contextuality. To this end, we give a clear presentation of the hidden variable models due to Meyer, Kent and Clifton (MKC), which would supposedly nullify the Kochen-Specker Theorem. Although we disagree with this last statement, the models play a significant role in the discussion on the meaning of contextuality. In fact, we introduce a specific MKC-model of which we show that it is non-contextual and completely in agreement with quantum mechanical predictions. We also investigate the possibility of other definitions of non-contextuality --with an emphasis on operational definitions-- and argue that any useful definition relies on the specification of a theoretical framework. It is therefore concluded that no experimental test can yield any conclusions about contextuality on a metaphysical level.