Popper conceived an experiment whose analysis led to a result that he deemed absurd. Popper wrote that his reasoning was based on the Copenhagen interpretation and therefore invalidated the latter. Actually, Popper's argument involves counterfactual reasoning and violates Bohr's complementarity principle. The absurdity of Popper's result only confirms Bohr's approach.
Popper conceived an experiment whose analysis led to a result that he deemed absurd. Popper wrote that his reasoning was based on the Copenhagen interpretation and therefore invalidated the latter. Actually, Popper's argument involves counterfactual reasoning and violates Bohr's complementarity principle. The absurdity of Popper's result only confirms Bohr's approach.
Popper invented a thought experiment that is alleged to test the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum mechanics, though not the theory itself. In particular it is alleged to test the application of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to indirect measurements. The experiment is similar to the EPR thought experiment, but it suffers from some technical flaws. These flaws are examined to see if they affect the validity of the argument; so long as they can be alleviated by technical means, the argument retains its force. The experiment has been recently instantiated, with some resolutions of these technical flaws. The results, on face value seem to vindicate Popper and to indicate a violation of the uncertainty principle. Nevertheless, Kim and Shih, who carried out the experiment, give their own interpretation that suggests that the principle should be considered intact but that the correct way to understand the results is to adopt a new metaphysics. Others suggest different reasons why the results do not amount to a violation of the uncertainty principle. Despite a variety of responses, which are carefully examined, the general point that an interpretation cannot alter the empirical basis of a theory is shown to be true. The importance of Rigolid's work in this connection is emphasized.
A thought experiment, proposed by Karl Popper, which has been experimentally realized recently, is critically examined. A basic flaw in Popper's argument which has also been prevailing in subsequent debates, is pointed out. It is shown that Popper's experiment can be understood easily within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. An alternate experiment, based on discrete variables, is proposed, which constitutes Popper's test in a clearer way. It refutes the argument of absence of nonlocality in quantum mechanics.
A thought experiment, proposed by Karl Popper, which has been experimentally realized recently, is critically examined. A basic flaw in Popper's argument which has also been prevailing in subsequent debates, is pointed out. It is shown that Popper's experiment can be understood easily within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. An alternate experiment, based on discrete variables, is proposed, which constitutes Popper's test in a clearer way. It refutes the argument of absence of nonlocality in quantum mechanics.
Karl Popper, though not trained as a physicist and embarrassed early in his career by a physics error pointed out by Einstein and Bohr, ultimately made substantial contributions to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. As was often the case, Popper initially formulated his position by criticizing the views of others—in this case Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. Underlying Popper’s criticism was his belief that, first, the “standard interpretation” of quantum mechanics, sometimes called the Copenhagen interpretation, abandoned scientific realism and second, the assertion that quantum theory was “complete” (an assertion rejected by Einstein among others) amounted to an unfalsifiable claim. Popper insisted that the most basic predictions of quantum mechanics should continue to be tested, with an eye towards falsification rather than mere adding of decimal places to confirm atory experiments. His persistent attacks on the Copenhagen interpretation were aimed not at the uncertainty principle itself and the formalism from which it was derived, but at the acceptance by physicists of an unclear epistemology and ontology that left critical questions unanswered.
INTRODUCTION In his essay ‘Quantum Mechanics Without “the Observer”’ (in [20], 7–44), Popper criticizes the Copenhagen Interpretation and suggests construing the quantum theory as a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). The uncertainty relations, he says, set ‘limits to the statistical dispersion … of the results of sequences of experiments’ ([20], 20) and not to what can be said about individual systems. Some strange features of orthodox microphysics are due either to a misinterpretation of probability, involving some ‘very simple mistakes’ ([20], 42); or else they are a straightforward consequence of the fact that the quantum theory is a statistical theory. For example, ‘the reduction of the wave packet … has nothing to do with quantum theory: it is a trivial feature of probability theory’ ([20], 37). The idea of probability that is presupposed in all these arguments, however, is Popper's propensity interpretation. Adopting this interpretation suffices for making clear what the quantum theory really is: a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). This is Popper's position as I understand it. This position, it seems to me, is attractive enough as long as one does not carry the analysis too far. But it breaks down when confronted with all the facts which Bohr wanted to take into account. Altogether Popper's criticism and his alternative proposals once more reveal the strong points of the Copenhagen philosophy, and especially of the ideas of Niels Bohr. Today it is very difficult to find a satisfactory account of these ideas.