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arXiv:quant-ph/9907004

Quantum Probability from Decision Theory?

J. Finkelstein

Published Jul 1, 1999• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Deutsch has recently (in quant-ph/9906015) offered a justification, based only on the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory and of classical decision theory, for the use of the standard quantum probability rules. In this note, this justification is examined.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9907004

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In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the ‘probabilistic predictions of quantum theory’ from the ‘non–probabilistic axioms of quantum theory’ and the ‘nonprobabilistic part of classical decision theory.’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non–probabilistic axioms is already sufficient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason's theorem, relying on fewer assumptions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
In a recent paper, Deutsch claims to derive the `probabilistic predictions of quan-tum theory ’ from the `non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory ’ and the `non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory. ’ We show that his derivation includes a crucial hidden assumption that vitiates the force of his argument. Furthermore, we point out that in classical decision theory a standard set of non-probabilistic axioms is already su ¯ cient to endow possible outcomes with a natural probability structure. Within that context we argue that Gleason’s theorem, relying on fewer assump-tions than Deutsch, provides a compelling derivation of the quantum probability law.
ABSTRACT: David Deutsch has a forthcoming article called “Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions " in which he claims to derive the standard probabilistic interpretation of the wavefunction from non-probabilistic considerations. In this note, I try to develop his argument in a classical context, to see whether the same ideas can generate probabilistic conclusions from nonprobabilistic assumptions in a more general way. While my answer is negative, the attempt pinpoints the parts of Deutsch’s quantum mechanical argument that must rely on special features of the formalism (assuming that his proof is correct). 1. No Probabilities In, No Probabilities Out? You cannot derive an ‘ought ’ from an ‘is’. And I believe that it was Popper (1959) who once said, in response to those who think that randomness can be defined nonprobabilistically, that one cannot derive a probabilistic conclusion from non-probabilistic premises. Yet this is exactly what Deutsch (to appear) claims for quantum mechanical probabilities. Historically in the development of quantum theory, the Schrödinger
A major problem facing no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in the tradition of Everett is how to understand the probabilistic axiom of quantum mechanics (the Born rule) in the context of a deterministic theory in which every outcome of a measurement occurs. Deutsch claims to derive a decision-theoretic analogue of the Born rule from the non-probabilistic part of quantum mechanics and some non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, and hence concludes that no probabilistic axiom is needed. I argue that Deutsch’s derivation begs the question.
An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch's own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason's Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from `probability'. Some consequences of (Everettian) quantum mechanics for decision theory itself are also discussed.