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arXiv:quant-ph/9811050 · Annalen der Physik

Early Gedanken experiments of quantum mechanics revisited

Yu Shi

Published Sep 1, 2000• 19 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Abstract The famous gedanken experiments of quantum mechanics have played crucial roles in developing the Copenhagen interpretation. They are studied here from the perspective of standard quantum mechanics, with no ontological interpretation involved. Bohr's investigation of these gedanken experiments, based on the uncertainty relation with his interpretation, was the origin of the Copenhagen interpretation and is still widely adopted, but is shown to be not consistent with the quantum mechanical view. We point out that in most of these gedanken experiments, entanglement plays a crucial role, while its buildup does not change the uncertainty of the concerned quantity in the way thought by Bohr. Especially, in the gamma ray microscope and recoiling double‐slit gedanken experiments, we expose the entanglement based on momentum exchange. It is shown that even in such cases, the loss of interference is only due to the entanglement with other degrees of freedom, while the uncertainty relation argument, which has not been questioned up to now, is not right.

DOI
10.1002/andp.20005120804

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Abstract The famous gedanken experiments of quantum mechanics have played crucial roles in developing the Copenhagen interpretation. They are studied here from the perspective of standard quantum mechanics, with no ontological interpretation involved. Bohr's investigation of these gedanken experiments, based on the uncertainty relation with his interpretation, was the origin of the Copenhagen interpretation and is still widely adopted, but is shown to be not consistent with the quantum mechanical view. We point out that in most of these gedanken experiments, entanglement plays a crucial role, while its buildup does not change the uncertainty of the concerned quantity in the way thought by Bohr. Especially, in the gamma ray microscope and recoiling double‐slit gedanken experiments, we expose the entanglement based on momentum exchange. It is shown that even in such cases, the loss of interference is only due to the entanglement with other degrees of freedom, while the uncertainty relation argument, which has not been questioned up to now, is not right.
Abstract Heisenberg introduced his famous uncertainty relations in a seminal 1927 paper entitled The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics . He motivated his arguments with a gedanken experiment, a gamma ray microscope to measure the position of a particle. A primary result was that, due to the quantum nature of light, there is an inherent uncertainty in the determinations of the particle’s position and momentum dictated by an indeterminacy relation, δ q δ p ∼ h . Heisenberg offered this demonstration as ‘a direct physical interpretation of the [quantum mechanical] equation pq − qp = − i ℏ ’ but considered the indeterminacy relation to be much more than this. He also argued that it implies limitations on the very meanings of position and momentum and emphasised that these limitations are the source of the statistical character of quantum mechanics. In addition, Heisenberg hoped but was unable to demonstrate that the laws of quantum mechanics could be derived directly from the uncertainty relation. In this paper, we revisit Heisenberg’s microscope and argue that the Schrödinger equation for a free particle does indeed follow from the indeterminacy relation together with reasonable statistical assumptions.
I present here a thought experiment which violates the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics “The Copenhagen Interpretation” and Bohr’s complementarity which says that there is no meaning of the state of a particle until it is observed and the act of observation might change it. The experiment consists of a double slit apparatus which is modified by putting a second double slit apparatus between the source and the original apparatus with certain conditions imposed on both the apparatuses using the facts of interference and diffraction. A striking paradox emerges if we consider the arguments of Bohr’s complementarity, i.e. the photon travels through both the paths simultaneously in a double slit apparatus whenever there is interference. It turns out that this paradox can be resolved only if the photon travels through one path even if interference fringes are visible.
The notion of wave–particle duality remains one of the most debated subjects in the history of quantum physics. The most famous debate on the subject occurred between Bohr and Einstein. In this work, we revisit the wave–particle duality in the Bohr–Einstein debate from the viewpoint of the recently established duality-entanglement relation. We show that the duality-entanglement relation can provide a valuable framework for quantitative analysis of the Einstein's gedanken double-slit experiment and clarify some of its fundamental aspects.
This article reconsiders the double-slit experiment by establishing a new type of relationship between it and the concept of entanglement. While the role of entanglement in the double-slit experiment has been considered, this particular relationship appears to have been missed in preceding discussions of the experiment, even by Bohr, who extensively used it to support his argument concerning quantum physics. The main reason for this relationship is the different roles of the diaphragm with slits in two setups, S1 and S2, defining the double-slit experiment as a quantum experiment. In S1, in each individual run of the experiment one can in principle (even if not actually) know throughout which slit the quantum object considered has passed; in S2 this knowledge is in principle impossible, which impossibility is coextensive with the appearance of the interference pattern, once a sufficient number of individual runs of the experiment have taken place. The article offers the following argument based on two new concepts, an "experimentally quantum object" and an "ontologically quantum object." In S1 the diaphragm can be treated as part of an observational arrangement and thus considered as a classical object, while the object passing through one or the other slit is considered as an "ontologically quantum object," defined as an object necessary to establish a quantum phenomenon. By contrast, in S2, the diaphragm can, via the concept of Heisenberg-von-Neumann cut, be treated as an "experimentally quantum object," defined as an object treatable by quantum theory, even while possibly being an ontologically classical object. This interaction is not an observation but a quantum entanglement between these two quantum objects, one ontologically and one experimentally quantum. This argument is grounded in a particular interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum theory, which belongs to the class of interpretations designated here as "reality without realism" (RWR) interpretations. The article also argues that wave-particle complementarity, with which the concept of complementarity is often associated, plays little, if any, role in quantum physics, or in Bohr's thinking, and may be misleading in considering the double-slit experiment, often explained by using this complementarity.
Some typical Gedanken experiments in quantum mechanics are discussed in a modified form involving phenomenological electrodynamics for their explanation. The examples discussed are: (i) a two-slit experiment with photons, the difference from the standard situation being that two dielectric rods are assumed as photon detectors, (ii) a weighing experiment of a light pulse contained within a dielectric medium (a modified version of the Einstein-Bohr experiment) and (iii) a two-slit experiment in a dielectric environment.
The assumptions added by Bohr and concerning the Hilbert space (formed by all solutions of Schroedinger equation) changed fundamentally the original physical interpretation of these solutions proposed earlier by Schroedinger. This new alternative was refused by Einstein on the basis of the EPR Gedankenexperiment, but accepted fully for microscopic reality by scientific community. Both the quantum alternatives were discussed, however, again later. Bell tried to find a possibility how to decide between them; he generalized Einstein's Gedankenexperiment assuming that also spins of two detected particles would be measured. He derived then some inequality for a special combination of four coincidence probabilities, and it was commonly assumed that his inequality held for the original Schroedinger interpretation but not in Bohr's Copenhagen quantum mechanics; without any actual proof having been given. Corresponding experiments were proposed and finished in 1982. The violation of Bell's inequality was then interpreted as decisive victory of Bohr's theory. However, it will be shown that Bell's inequality has been interpreted mistakenly. It has been based always on some assumption that does not hold in any probabilistic theory (i.e., in the given spin experiment) but only in deterministic classical theory. There is not any argument for preferring the Copenhagen quantum mechanics and against Einstein's critical standpoint. Some other consequences will be mentioned, too.