The problem of defining the boundary conditions for the universe is considered here in the framework of a classical dynamical theory, pointing out that a measure on boundary conditions must be included in the theory in order to explain the statistical regularities of evolution. It is then suggested that quantum statistical regularities also could derive from this measure. An explicit definition of such a measure is proposed, using both a simplified model of the universe based on classical mechanics and the non-relativistic quantum mechanics formalism. The peculiarity of such a measure is that it does not apply to the initial conditions of the universe, i.e. to the initial positions and momenta of particles, but to their initial and final positions, from which the path is derived by means of the least action principle. This formulation of the problem is crucial and it is supported by the observation that it is incorrect to liken the determination of the boundary conditions of the universe to the preparation of a laboratory system, in which the initial conditions of the system are obviously determined. Some possible objections to this theory are then discussed. Specifically, the EPR paradox is discussed, and it is explained by showing that, in general, a measure on the boundary conditions of the universe generates preinteractive correlations, and that in the presence of such correlations Bell's inequality can no longer be proven true. Finally, it is shown that if one broadens the dynamical scheme of the theory to encompass phenomena such as particle decay and annihilation, the least action principle allows for an indeterministic evolution of the system.
The problem of defining the boundary conditions for the universe is considered here in the framework of a classical dynamical theory, pointing out that a measure on boundary conditions must be included in the theory in order to explain the statistical regularities of evolution. It is then suggested that quantum statistical regularities also could derive from this measure. An explicit definition of such a measure is proposed, using both a simplified model of the universe based on classical mechanics and the non-relativistic quantum mechanics formalism. The peculiarity of such a measure is that it does not apply to the initial conditions of the universe, i.e. to the initial positions and momenta of particles, but to their initial and final positions, from which the path is derived by means of the least action principle. This formulation of the problem is crucial and it is supported by the observation that it is incorrect to liken the determination of the boundary conditions of the universe to the preparation of a laboratory system, in which the initial conditions of the system are obviously determined. Some possible objections to this theory are then discussed. Specifically, the EPR paradox is discussed, and it is explained by showing that, in general, a measure on the boundary conditions of the universe generates preinteractive correlations, and that in the presence of such correlations Bell's inequality can no longer be proven true. Finally, it is shown that if one broadens the dynamical scheme of the theory to encompass phenomena such as particle decay and annihilation, the least action principle allows for an indeterministic evolution of the system.
If the quantum mechanical description of reality is not complete and a hidden variable theory is possible, what arises is the problem to explain where the rates of the outcomes of statistical experiments come from, as already noticed by Landé and Popper. In this paper this problem is investigated, and a new "paradigm" about the nature of dynamical and statistical laws is proposed. This paradigm proposes some concepts which contrast with the usual intuitive view of evolution and of physical law, such as: initial conditions could play no privileged role in determining the evolution of the universe; the statistical distribution of the particles emitted by a source could depend on the future interactions of the particles; indeterministic trajectories can be defined by the least action principle. This paradigm is applied to the analysis of the two-slit experiment and of the EPR paradox, and a coherent picture for these phenomena is proposed; this new picture shows how the well known difficulties in completing the quantum mechanical description of reality could be overcome.
Quantum mechanics is traditionally formulated in terms of postulates inferred from experimentalobservations. Here we propose that the statistical regularities of quantum mechanics arise as macro-scopic manifestations of stochastic fluctuations of dynamical parameters in microscopic systems gen-erated by a non-inertial physical background. Although the specific nature of this background mayvary, the universality of quantum statistics is ensured by invariant properties of stochastic dynam-ics - analogous to the role of the equivalence principle in general relativity - and by the existence ofa fundamental action scale, Planck constant h. By extending classical mechanics to include higher-order derivatives induced by non-inertial fuctuations and imposing a stability condition on admissibletrajectories, the minimal action scale h naturally emerges. In this framework quantum mechanicsappears as an effective statistical description of systems embedded in a fluctuating non-inertial envi-ronment while preserving all standard predictions of the theory.
A measurement-independent formulation of quantum mechanics called ‘regular histories’ (RH) is presented, able to reproduce the predictions of the standard formalism without the need to for a quantum-classical divide or the presence of an observer. It applies to closed systems and features no wave-function collapse. Weights are assigned only to histories satisfying a criterion called ‘regularity’. As the set of regular histories is not closed under the Boolean operations this requires a new con- cept of weight, called ‘likelihood’. Remarkably, this single change is enough to overcome many of the well-known obstacles to a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bell’s theorem, which makes essential use of probabilities, places no constraints on the locality properties of a theory based on likelihoods. Indeed, RH is both counter- factually definite and free from action-at-a-distance. Moreover, in RH the meaningful histories are exactly those that can be witnessed at least in principle. Since it is especially difficult to make sense of the concept of probability for histories whose occurrence is intrinsically indeterminable, this makes likelihoods easier to justify than probabilities. Interaction with the environment causes the kinds of histories relevant at the macroscopic scale of human experience to be witnessable and indeed to generate Boolean algebras of witnessable histories, on which likelihoods reduce to ordinary probabilities. Further- more, a formal notion of inference defined on regular histories satisfies, when restricted to such Boolean algebras, the classical axioms of implication, explaining our perception of a largely classical world. Even in the context of general quantum histories the rules of reasoning in RH are remark- ably intuitive. Classical logic must only be amended to reflect the fundamental premise that one cannot meaningfully talk about the occurrence of unwitnessable histories. Crucially, different histories with the same ‘physical content’ can be interpreted in the same way and independently of the family in which they are expressed. RH thereby rectifies a critical flaw of its inspiration, the consistent histories (CH) approach, which requires either an as yet unknown set selection rule or a paradigm shift towards an un- conventional picture of reality whose elements are histories-with-respect-to-a-framework. It can be argued that RH compares favourably with other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics in that it resolves the measurement problem while retaining an essentially classical worldview without parallel universes, a framework-dependent reality or action-at-a-distance.
Abstract Unlike classical mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics does not provide an objective space-time picture of the actual history of a physical system. This paper suggests how the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics can be reformulated, without changing the mathematical content of the theory or its detailed agreement with experiment and without introducing any hidden variables, in order to provide an objective, covariant, Lagrangian description of reality which is deterministic and time-symmetric on the microscopic scale. The basis of this description can be expressed either as an action functional or as a summation over Feynman diagrams or paths. The probability laws associated with the quantum-mechanical measurement process, and the asymmetry in time of the principles of macroscopic causality and of the laws of statistical mechanics, are interpreted as consequences of the particular boundary conditions that apply to the actual universe. The objective interpretation does not include the observer and the measurement process among the fundamental concepts of the theory, but it does entail a revision of our ideas of determinism and of time, since in a Lagrangian theory both initial and final boundary conditions on the action functional are required.
We suggest an interpretation of quantum mechanics, inspired by the ideas of Aharonov et al. of a time-symmetric description of quantum theory. We show that a special final boundary condition for the Universe, may be consistently defined as to determine single classical-like measurement outcomes, thus solving the "measurement problem". No other deviation is made from standard quantum mechanics, and the resulting theory is deterministic (in a two-time sense) and local. Quantum mechanical probabilities are recovered in general, but are eliminated from the description of any single measurement. We call this the Two-time interpretation of quantum mechanics. We analyze ideal measurements, showing how the quantum superposition is, in effect, dynamically reduced to a single classical state via a "two-time decoherence" process. We discuss some philosophical aspects of the suggested interpretation. We also discuss weak measurements using the two-time formalism, and remark that in these measurement situations, special final boundary conditions for the Universe, might explain some unaccounted for phenomena.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.