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arXiv:quant-ph/9711052 · American Journal of Physics

Nonlocal character of quantum theory?

N. David Mermin

Published Oct 1, 1998• 99 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark) Henry Stapp has presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under suitable conditions “the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time” must “depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time.” I suggest that this conclusion contains an essential ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression “statement referring only to phenomena confined to an earlier time,” when such a statement talks about the outcome of an experiment that was not actually performed. As a result Stapp’s argumentation does not imply that future choices can affect present facts. But it does provide a wonderful and instructively different opportunity to reexamine a central point of Bohr’s famous reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.

DOI
10.1119/1.18990

Related papers

Nonlocal character of quantum theory

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According to a common conception of causality, the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time cannot depend upon which measurement an experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later time. According to a common idea of the theory of relativity this causality condition should be valid in all Lorentz frames. It is shown here that this concept of relativistic causality is incompatible with some simple predictions of quantum theory.

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Comment on “Nonlocal character of quantum theory,” by Henry P. Stapp [Am. J. Phys. 65 (4), 300–304 (1997)]

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A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

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Nonlocality and Bohr's Reply to EPR

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David Mermin's recent paper with the same title as this one makes it clear that his claim to have found a gap in my reasoning rests on his claim that my argument violates a criterion for meaningfulness of counterfactual statements that I myself had set down. I set down no such requirement. But I am willing to accept it as a conservative sufficient condition. This already entails, within my proof, that nature must have a deep structure that extends beyond what actually occurs. It imposes, without appeal to the notion of determinism or hidden variables, constraints connecting, at the macroscopic level, what did occur to what would have occurred if certain quantum choices had gone differently. All the statements in the proof have natural meanings within the context of an examination of that deep structure.

arXiv:quant-ph/9712036•Dec 17, 1997•1 citation

Nonlocality and Bohr's reply to EPR

N. David Mermin

Henry Stapp's commentary (quant-ph/9711060) does not capture the point I was trying to make in my essay (quant-ph/9711052) on how a subtle flaw in his ``proof of quantum nonlocality'' clearly illustrates a central issue in Bohr's reply to EPR. I therefore wish to emphasize what I do and do not say in that essay and even, with some trepidation, what Bohr did and did not say in his reply to EPR.

arXiv:quant-ph/9712003•Dec 1, 1997•4 citations
In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark) Henry Stapp has presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under suitable conditions “the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time” must “depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time.” I suggest that this conclusion contains an essential ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression “statement referring only to phenomena confined to an earlier time,” when such a statement talks about the outcome of an experiment that was not actually performed. As a result Stapp’s argumentation does not imply that future choices can affect present facts. But it does provide a wonderful and instructively different opportunity to reexamine a central point of Bohr’s famous reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.
The article offers a rereading of Bohr’s reply to the argument of A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen (EPR) concerning the incompleteness, or else nonlocality, of quantum mechanics. Bohr shows EPR’s argument to be deficient on their own terms, by virtue of an ambiguity found in their application of the criterion of reality they propose to the phenomena in question. He also offers an alternative interpretation of the EPR experiment itself, the thought experiment proposed by EPR, as part of his overall interpretation of quantum mechanics as complementarity.
According to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohr being its leading voice), the attributes of a physical object (position, momentum, spin, etc.) can be assigned only when they have been measured. Einstein advocated the local realist viewpoint that an object had definite attributes whether they had been measured or not. The Copenhagen school view that measurement actually produces an object’s property would imply that the measurement of one part of an entangled quantum state can instantaneously fix the value of another part, no matter how far the two parts have been separated. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen devised a thought experiment to shine a light on this “spooky action-at-a-distance” feature; its discussion and debate have illuminated the meaning of quantum mechanics (QM). It led later to Bell’s theorem showing that these seemingly philosophical questions can lead to observable results. The experimental vindication of the orthodox theory has sharpened our appreciation of the nonlocal features of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, the counter-intuitive QM picture of objective reality still troubles many, leaving one to wonder whether quantum mechanics is ultimately a complete theory.
David Mermin's recent paper with the same title as this one makes it clear that his claim to have found a gap in my reasoning rests on his claim that my argument violates a criterion for meaningfulness of counterfactual statements that I myself had set down. I set down no such requirement. But I am willing to accept it as a conservative sufficient condition. This already entails, within my proof, that nature must have a deep structure that extends beyond what actually occurs. It imposes, without appeal to the notion of determinism or hidden variables, constraints connecting, at the macroscopic level, what did occur to what would have occurred if certain quantum choices had gone differently. All the statements in the proof have natural meanings within the context of an examination of that deep structure.