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arXiv:quant-ph/9702037

The quantum cryptography and the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states

Won Young Hwang, In Gyu Koh, Yeong Deok Han

Published Feb 19, 1997• 1 citation
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Abstract

We discuss the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states in connection with the quantum cryptography. We show that checking a ratio of null one to signal is essential in detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal states quantum cryptography. We prove that it is not needed in the case of the four states quantum cryptography.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/9702037

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We discuss the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states in connection with the quantum cryptography. We show that checking a ratio of null one to signal is essential in detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal states quantum cryptography. We prove that it is not needed in the case of the four states quantum cryptography.
All existing quantum cryptosystems use nonorthogonal states as the carriers of information. Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, and, therefore, can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel. Orthogonal states are not used in quantum cryptography, since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. We present a cryptographic scheme based on orthogonal states, which also assures the detection of any eavesdropper.
Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used eavesdropping checking methods: one is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal single-particle states as decoy states, and determine whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel by comparing the states obtained by measurements with the original states; The other is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal entangled states and use their entanglement correlations to judge whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel. In this paper, we theoretically demonstrate how quantum cryptography can utilize these two eavesdropping checking methods to resist entanglement-measurement attacks. We take the quantum cryptography protocols based on maximally entangled states as examples to demonstrate the proof process, transitioning from qubit-based protocols to qudit-based ones.
Roa et al. showed that quantum state discrimination between two nonorthogonal quantum states does not require quantum entanglement but quantum dissonance only. We find that quantum coherence can also be utilized for unambiguous quantum state discrimination. We present a protocol and quantify the required coherence for this task. We discuss the optimal unambiguous quantum state discrimination strategy in some cases. In particular, our work illustrates an avenue to find the optimal strategy for discriminating two nonorthogonal quantum states by measuring quantum coherence.
Although it is known that any two nonorthogonal pure states can constitute a secure quantum cryptosystem, the generalization of this scheme to the use of two mixed states is not trivial. It is shown here that even if a condition corresponding to the nonorthogonality in the pure-state case is satisfied, the mixed-state cryptosystem is still vulnerable to attack by an eavesdropper. A necessary and sufficient condition for the secure communication is derived. It states that the two mixed states must be connected by a rotation operator with a nonorthogonal angle.
Quantum state elimination measurements tell us what states a quantum system does not have.This is different from state discrimination, where one tries to determine what the state of a quantum system is rather than what it is not.Apart from being of fundamental interest, quantum state elimination may find uses in quantum communication and quantum cryptography.We consider unambiguous quantum state elimination for two or more qubits, where each qubit can be in one of two possible states.Optimal measurements for eliminating one and two states out of four two-qubit states are given.We also prove that if we want to maximize the average number of eliminated overall N-qubit states, then individual measurements on each qubit are optimal.
We discuss several methods for unambiguous state discrimination of N symmetric coherent states using linear optics and photodetectors. One type of measurement is shown to be optimal in the limit of small photon numbers for any N. For the special case of N=4N=4N=4 this measurement can be fruitfully used by the receiving end (Bob) in an implementation of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol using faint laser pulses. In particular, if Bob detects only a single photon the procedure is equivalent to the standard measurement that he would have to perform in a single-photon implementation of BB84, if he detects two photons Bob will unambiguously know the bit sent to him in 50% of the cases without having to exchange basis information, and if three photons are detected, Bob will know unambiguously which quantum state was sent.