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arXiv:quant-ph/0612071 · Physical Review A

Comment on “Quantum string seal is insecure”

Guang Ping He

Published Nov 16, 2007• 5 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

An attack strategy was recently proposed by Chau [Phys. Rev. A 75, 012327 (2007)], which was claimed to be able to break all quantum string seal protocols. Here it will be shown that the attack cannot obtain nontrivial information and escape the detection simultaneously in a class of quantum string seal, including the one proposed by He [Int. J. Quantum Inf. 4, 677 (2006)]. Thus it is insufficient to conclude that all quantum string seals are insecure.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.76.056301

Related papers

Reply to “Comment on ‘Quantum string seal is insecure’ ”

H. F. Chau

In Phys. Rev. A 76, 056301 (2007), He claimed that the proof in my earlier paper [Phys. Rev. A 75, 012327 (2007)] is insufficient to conclude the insecurity of all quantum string seals because my measurement strategy cannot obtain nontrivial information on the sealed string and escape detection at the same time. Here, I clarify that our disagreement comes from our adoption of two different criteria on the minimum amount of information a quantum string seal can reveal to members of the public. I also point out that He did not follow my measurement strategy correctly.

arXiv:0711.2768•Physical Review A•Nov 16, 2007•4 citations

Quantum string seal is insecure

H. F. Chau

A quantum string seal encodes the value of a (bit) string as a quantum state in such a way that everyone can extract a non-negligible amount of available information on the string by a suitable measurement. Moreover, such measurement must disturb the quantum state and is likely to be detected by an authorized verifier. In this way, the intactness of the encoded quantum state plays the role of a wax seal in the digital world. Here we analyze the security of quantum string seal by studying the information disturbance trade-off of a measurement. This information disturbance trade-off analysis extends the earlier results of Bechamann-Pasquinucci, D'Ariano, and Macchiavello [Int. J. Quant. Inform. 3, 435 (2005)] and Chau [Phys. Lett. A 354, 31 (2006)] by concluding that all quantum string seals are insecure. Specifically, we find a way to obtain nontrivial available information on the string that escapes the verifier's detection with at least 50% chance.

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Secure quantum string seal exists

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It was claimed that all quantum string seals are insecure [H. F. Chau, quant-ph/0602099]. However, here it will be shown that for imperfect quantum string seals, the information obtained by the measurement proposed in that reference is trivial. Therefore imperfect quantum string seals can be unconditionally secure.

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Comment on “Quantum key distribution without alternative measurements” [Phys. Rev. A61, 052312 (2000)]

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Comment on “Quantum key distribution for d -level systems with generalized Bell states”

Fei Gao, Fen-Zhuo Guo, Qiaoyan Wen +1 more

In the paper published in Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002), an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for $d$-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.

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An information-theoretic security analysis of quantum string sealing

Masaki Nakanishi, Seiichiro Tani, Shigeru Yamashita

Abstract: A quantum sealing protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol that can detect unsealing of a message. It is known that quantum bit sealing is insecure. However, this does not imply that quantum string sealing is also insecure. So the possibility of quantum string sealing has been studied. In this paper, we propose a quantum sealing protocol and give an information theoretic analysis. We also show that our protocol is almost optimal for uniformly distributed inputs in the sense that the upper bound of information leaks almost matches the trivial lower bound.

•Dec 14, 2007•1 citation
An attack strategy was recently proposed by Chau [Phys. Rev. A 75, 012327 (2007)], which was claimed to be able to break all quantum string seal protocols. Here it will be shown that the attack cannot obtain nontrivial information and escape the detection simultaneously in a class of quantum string seal, including the one proposed by He [Int. J. Quantum Inf. 4, 677 (2006)]. Thus it is insufficient to conclude that all quantum string seals are insecure.
In Phys. Rev. A 76, 056301 (2007), He claimed that the proof in my earlier paper [Phys. Rev. A 75, 012327 (2007)] is insufficient to conclude the insecurity of all quantum string seals because my measurement strategy cannot obtain nontrivial information on the sealed string and escape detection at the same time. Here, I clarify that our disagreement comes from our adoption of two different criteria on the minimum amount of information a quantum string seal can reveal to members of the public. I also point out that He did not follow my measurement strategy correctly.
A quantum string seal encodes the value of a (bit) string as a quantum state in such a way that everyone can extract a non-negligible amount of available information on the string by a suitable measurement. Moreover, such measurement must disturb the quantum state and is likely to be detected by an authorized verifier. In this way, the intactness of the encoded quantum state plays the role of a wax seal in the digital world. Here we analyze the security of quantum string seal by studying the information disturbance trade-off of a measurement. This information disturbance trade-off analysis extends the earlier results of Bechamann-Pasquinucci, D'Ariano, and Macchiavello [Int. J. Quant. Inform. 3, 435 (2005)] and Chau [Phys. Lett. A 354, 31 (2006)] by concluding that all quantum string seals are insecure. Specifically, we find a way to obtain nontrivial available information on the string that escapes the verifier's detection with at least 50% chance.
In the paper published in Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002), an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for ddd-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.
Abstract: A quantum sealing protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol that can detect unsealing of a message. It is known that quantum bit sealing is insecure. However, this does not imply that quantum string sealing is also insecure. So the possibility of quantum string sealing has been studied. In this paper, we propose a quantum sealing protocol and give an information theoretic analysis. We also show that our protocol is almost optimal for uniformly distributed inputs in the sense that the upper bound of information leaks almost matches the trivial lower bound.