Einstein initially objected to the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics—the idea that God is playing at dice. Later he changed his ground, and focussed instead on the point that the Copenhagen Interpretation leads to what Einstein saw as the abandonment of physical realism. We argue here that Einstein’s initial intuition was perfectly sound, and that it is precisely the fact that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the root of all the controversies regarding its interpretation. Probability is an intrinsically logical concept. This means that the quantum state has an essentially logical significance. It is extremely difficult to reconcile that fact with Einstein’s belief, that it is the task of physics to give us a vision of the world apprehended sub specie aeternitatis. Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a simple choice: either to follow Einstein in looking for a theory which is not probabilistic at the fundamental level, or else to accept that physics does not in fact put us in the position of God looking down on things from above. There is a widespread fear that the latter alternative must inevitably lead to a greatly impoverished, positivistic view of physical theory. It appears to us, however, that the truth is just the opposite. The Einsteinian vision is much less attractive than it seems at first sight. In particular, it is closely connected with philosophical reductionism.
Einstein initially objected to the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics—the idea that God is playing at dice. Later he changed his ground, and focussed instead on the point that the Copenhagen Interpretation leads to what Einstein saw as the abandonment of physical realism. We argue here that Einstein’s initial intuition was perfectly sound, and that it is precisely the fact that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the root of all the controversies regarding its interpretation. Probability is an intrinsically logical concept. This means that the quantum state has an essentially logical significance. It is extremely difficult to reconcile that fact with Einstein’s belief, that it is the task of physics to give us a vision of the world apprehended sub specie aeternitatis. Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a simple choice: either to follow Einstein in looking for a theory which is not probabilistic at the fundamental level, or else to accept that physics does not in fact put us in the position of God looking down on things from above. There is a widespread fear that the latter alternative must inevitably lead to a greatly impoverished, positivistic view of physical theory. It appears to us, however, that the truth is just the opposite. The Einsteinian vision is much less attractive than it seems at first sight. In particular, it is closely connected with philosophical reductionism.
Einstein initially objected to the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics— the idea that God is playing at dice. Later he changed his ground, and focussed instead on the point that the Copenhagen Interpretation leads to what Einstein saw as the abandonment of physical realism. We argue here that Einstein’s initial intuition was perfectly sound, and that it is precisely the fact that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the root of all the controversies regarding its interpretation. Probability is an intrinsically logical concept. This means that the quantum state has an essentially logical significance. It is extremely difficult to reconcile that fact with Einstein’s belief, that it is the task of physics to give us a vision of the world apprehended sub specie aeternitatis. Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a simple choice: either to follow Einstein in looking for a theory which is not probabilistic at the fundamental level, or else to accept that physics does not in fact put us in the position of God looking down on things from above. There is a widespread fear that the latter alternative must inevitably lead to a greatly impoverished,
Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality.
Abstract Everyone familiar with modern physics knows that Einstein’s attitude regarding quantum mechanics was one of skepticism. No biography of him fails to mention his saying that God does not throw dice. He was indeed given to such utterances (as I know from experience), and stronger ones, such as ‘It seems hard to look in God’s cards. But I cannot for a moment believe that He plays dice and makes use of “telepathic” means (as the current quantum theory alleges He does)’ [E1]. However, remarks such as these should not create the impression that Einstein had abandoned active interest in quantum problems in favor of his quest for a unified field theory. Far from it. In fact, even in the search for a unified theory, the quantum riddles were very much on his mind, as I shall discuss in Chapter
Considered by Einstein as “the fundamental dice-game”, the quantum-mechanical description of quantum objects in the real world is controversial. According to Einstein’s understanding of the physical world, the quantum-mechanical description is incomplete, but rendering quantum mechanics complete might be possible. Derived by resorting to a hidden-variable theory, Bell inequalities attempted to render quantum mechanics complete somehow. Unfortunately, the attempts all failed. More unfortunately, the failure and the widely accepted but erroneous interpretation of the failure resulted in giving up either or both of locality and realism, the two fundamental hypotheses for scientific research, and hence opened the door to so-called quantum information technologies. Consequently, quantum information technologies all stem from “the fundamental dice-game”. Based on an important mathematical fact irrelevant to any issue about measurement instruments or accuracies of measurement outcomes, namely, precise space and time coordinates are practically unattainable by measurements, which reflects a general principle regarding the nature of measurements (henceforth principle of measurements), this paper reports the following findings: (a) Einstein’s understanding of the physical world is correct. (b) Without resorting to any hidden-variable theory, rendering quantum mechanics complete is possible while keeping the mathematical setting for quantum mechanics (i.e., Hilbert space) essentially unchanged; therefore, eligible applications of quantum mechanics, which are all irrelevant to “the fundamental dice-game”, will also remain unchanged. (c) As fictitious results in “the fundamental dice-game” based on the problematic postulate of quantum superposition in current quantum theory, quantum information technologies are all physically unrealizable. A very regrettable conclusion then follows inevitably from the above findings: An extremely huge amount of time, effort, funding, and investment in realizing physically unrealizable quantum information technologies has been wasted because of “the fundamental dice-game”, which has seriously damaged science!
Albert Einstein's comment that ‘God does not play dice’ sums up the way many people react when they first encounter the ideas discussed in the previous chapters. How can it be that some future events are not completely determined by the way things are at present? How can a cause have two or more possible effects? If the choice of future events is not determined by natural laws does it mean that some supernatural force (God?) is involved wherever a quantum event occurs? Questions of this kind trouble many students of physics, though most get used to the conceptual problems, say ‘Nature is just like that’ and apply the ideas of quantum physics to their study or research without worrying about their fundamental truth or falsity. Some, however, never get used to the, at least apparent, contradictions. Others believe that the fundamental processes underlying the basic physics of the universe must be describable in deterministic, or at least realistic, terms and are therefore attracted by hidden-variable theories. Einstein was one of those. He stood out obstinately against the growing consensus of opinion in the 1920s and 30s that was prepared to accept indeterminism and the lack of objective realism as a price to be paid for a theory that was proving so successful in a wide variety of practical situations. Ironically, however, Einstein's greatest contribution to the field was not some subtle explanation of the underlying structure of quantum physics but the exposure of yet another surprising consequence of quantum theory.
Albert Einstein's comment that ‘God does not play dice’ sums up the way many people react when they first encounter the ideas discussed in the previous chapters. How can it be that some future events are not completely determined by the way things are at present? How can a cause have two or more possible effects? If the choice of future events is not determined by natural laws does it mean that some supernatural force (God?) is involved wherever a quantum event occurs? Questions of this kind trouble many students of physics, though most get used to the conceptual problems, say ‘Nature is just like that’ and apply the ideas of quantum physics to their study or research without worrying about their fundamental truth or falsity. Some, however, never get used to the, at least apparent, contradictions. Others believe that the fundamental processes underlying the basic physics of the universe must be describable in deterministic, or at least realistic, terms and are therefore attracted by hidden-variable theories. Einstein was one of those. He stood out obstinately against the growing consensus of opinion in the 1920s and 30s that was prepared to accept indeterminism and the lack of objective realism as a price to be paid for a theory that was proving so successful in a wide variety of practical situations. Ironically, however, Einstein's greatest contribution to the field was not some subtle explanation of the underlying structure of quantum physics but the exposure of yet another surprising consequence of quantum theory.