11 Indifference principles and quantum mechanics
Michael G. Titelbaum
Abstract Adam Elga argues that in certain cases when an agent cannot tell which of many subjectively indistinguishable experiences she is currently having, she should assign equal credence to being in each. This chapter derives instances of that indifference principle from the Certainty-Loss Framework (CLF) proposed and defended in this book, then defends those instances against criticisms from Brian Weatherson. Next, the chapter applies CLF to cases involving personal fission or cloning. Finally, the chapter uses CLF to examine how agents should assign degrees of belief to the outcomes of various quantum experiments if the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true. If the Everettian interpretation can make sense of nonextreme degrees of belief about quantum outcomes to begin with, then CLF provides plausible results about how those degrees of belief should update over time.
•Dec 20, 2012•0 citations