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arXiv:quant-ph/0608028 · Physics Letters A

On the security of Y-00 under fast correlation and other attacks on the key

Horace P. Yuen, Ranjith Nair

Published Jan 2, 2007• 23 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.physleta.2006.12.033

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A quantum stream cipher by Yuen 2000 protocol (so-called Y00 protocol or $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\eta}$ scheme) consisting of linear feedback shift register of short key is very attractive in implementing secure 40 Gbits/s optical data transmission, which is expected as a next-generation network. However, a basic model of the Y00 protocol with a very short key needs a careful design against fast correlation attacks as pointed out by Donnet et al. This Brief Report clarifies an effectiveness of irregular mapping between running key and physical signals in the driver for selection of $M$-ary basis in the transmitter, and gives a design method. Consequently, quantum stream cipher by the Y00 protocol with our mapping has immunity against the proposed fast correlation attacks on a basic model of the Y00 protocol even if the key is very short.

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In our previous work, it was demonstrated that the attacker could not pin-down the correct keys to start the Y00 protocol with a probability of one under the assistance of unlimitedly long known-plaintext attacks and optimal quantum measurements on the attacker's quantum memory. However, there were several assumptions that the Y00 system utilized linear-feedback shift registers as pseudo-random-number generators, and a fast correlation attack was disabled by irregular mapping on the Y00 systems. This study generalizes such an attack to remove the assumptions of the previous work. The framework of the security analyses of this study reiterates two well-known results from the past: (1) Y00 systems would be cryptanalyzed when the system is not designed well; (2) the system is possibly information-theoretically secure when the system is designed well, although the attacker's confidence in the correct key increases over time but the success probability of key recovery does not reach unity in finite time; (3) the breach probability of the shared keys increases with time. Hence, a key-refreshment procedure for the Y00 protocol is provided herein. Such security analyses are important not only in key refreshment but also in initial key agreement.
Physical layer security protocols exploit inviolable physical laws at the signal level for providing guarantees on secrecy of communications. These protocols invariably involve randomized encoding at the transmitter, for which an ideal random number generator is typically assumed in the literature. In this work, we study the impact of using weak Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNGs) in physical layer security protocols for coding and forward key distribution over Binary Symmetric and Gaussian wiretap channels. In the case of wiretap channel coding, we study fast correlation attacks that aim to retrieve the initial seed used in the PRNGs. Our results show that randomized coset encoding, which forms an important part of wiretap channel coding, provides useful robustness against fast correlation attacks. In the case of single-round or forward key distribution over a Gaussian wiretap channel, the bits from a PRNG are nonlinearly transformed to generate Gaussian-distributed pseudo random numbers at the transmitter. In such cases, we design modified versions of the fast correlation attacks accounting for the effects of the nonlinear transformation and soft input. We observe that, even for moderately high memory, the success probability of the modified fast correlation attacks become the same as that of a random guess in many cases.
A quantum stream cipher by Yuen 2000 protocol (so-called Y00 protocol or $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\eta}$ scheme) consisting of linear feedback shift register of short key is very attractive in implementing secure 40 Gbits/s optical data transmission, which is expected as a next-generation network. However, a basic model of the Y00 protocol with a very short key needs a careful design against fast correlation attacks as pointed out by Donnet et al. This Brief Report clarifies an effectiveness of irregular mapping between running key and physical signals in the driver for selection of MMM-ary basis in the transmitter, and gives a design method. Consequently, quantum stream cipher by the Y00 protocol with our mapping has immunity against the proposed fast correlation attacks on a basic model of the Y00 protocol even if the key is very short.