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arXiv:quant-ph/0607186 · Physical Review Letters

Long-Distance Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution in Optical Fiber

Danna Rosenberg, Jim Harrington, Patrick R. Rice, Philip A. Hiskett, Charles G. Peterson, Richard Hughes, Adriana E. Lita, Sae Woo Nam, J. E. Nordholt

Published Jan 5, 2007• 348 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.

DOI
10.1103/physrevlett.98.010503

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