Difficulties and discomfort with the interpretation of quantum mechanics are due to differences in language between it and classical physics. Analogies to The Special Theory of Relativity, which also required changes in the basic worldview and language of non-relativistic classical mechanics, may help in absorbing the changes called for by quantum physics. There is no need to invoke extravagances such as the many worlds interpretation or specify a central role for consciousness or neural microstructures. The simple, but basic, acceptance that what is meant by the state of a physical system is different in quantum physics from what it is in classical physics goes a long way in explaining its seeming peculiarities.
Difficulties and discomfort with the interpretation of quantum mechanics are due to differences in language between it and classical physics. Analogies to The Special Theory of Relativity, which also required changes in the basic worldview and language of non-relativistic classical mechanics, may help in absorbing the changes called for by quantum physics. There is no need to invoke extravagances such as the many worlds interpretation or specify a central role for consciousness or neural microstructures. The simple, but basic, acceptance that what is meant by the state of a physical system is different in quantum physics from what it is in classical physics goes a long way in explaining its seeming peculiarities.
Despite scholarly consensus on the empirical facts, ever since its inception in the 1920s there has been deep disagreement about how to interpret quantum theory. “To interpret a physical theory is to say what the world would be like, if the theory were true.” All scientific theories require interpretation, since strictly speaking what they describe are our experiences of the world rather than the world itself. Thus, whether we are trying to explain or merely describe the world, we are always engaged in inference. To make inferences we need a context for interpretation. For any given claim this context is provided locally by related theories, more broadly by disciplinary paradigms, and ultimately by worldview claims about the nature of reality. The challenge in interpreting scientific theories is to integrate them into this hierarchy of knowledge. Usually this is not too difficult. New theories often require adjustments to nearby theories, but in doing so we can rely on paradigms to make them cohere. More rarely paradigmatic assumptions are themselves challenged, but in that case scientists can fall back on their worldview to make sense of the needed changes. By implication, the most difficult interpretive problems arise when our worldview is called into question, which leaves us without any frame of reference on which to fall back. Quantum theory poses a worldview problem. Prior to the quantum revolution the classical worldview could not be tested scientifically and so it was essentially metaphysical. Even though it corresponded to our experience of material objects, we lacked proof that it adequately represented the deep structure of reality. By giving us access to that deep structure for the first time, quantum mechanics made it possible to do such a test, or “experimental metaphysics.” Unfortunately, the results seemed to contradict classical assumptions, at least on the sub-atomic level.
Introduction Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one. My more immediate aim here is to give the social scientific reader an introductory understanding of the experimental findings of quantum theory, its key concepts, and the debates about its interpretation. The discussion assumes no prior knowledge of quantum physics and makes no use of mathematics. Quantum theory without equations might seem like an oxymoron, and certainly reading this Part will not enable anyone to use quantum theory. But to a perhaps surprising degree it is possible to understand quantum theory without being able to use it. Its findings can be communicated in ordinary language, and the same goes for its main concepts and interpretive debates. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a virtual cottage industry of books on quantum theory for a lay audience. Most are written by physicists, and many are quite good. However, it is not just popular treatments that do without equations: much of the professional philosophical literature does as well. (I draw on both kinds of literature below.) Philosophers of physics are trained to understand the math, of course, which is necessary for a full appreciation of the issues.
Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, perhaps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, namely that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. If interpreting quantum mechanics means answering the question, "How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true?", there seems to be no way around it.
Since the beginning, quantum mechanics has raised major foundational and interpretative problems. Foundational research has been an important factor in the development of quantum cryptography, quantum information theory and, perhaps one day, practical quantum computers. Many believe that, in turn, quantum information theory has bearing on foundational research. This is largely related to the so-called epistemic view of quantum states, which maintains that the state vector represents information on a system and has led to the suggestion that quantum theory needs no interpretation. I will argue that this and related approaches fail to take into consideration two different explanatory functions of quantum mechanics, namely that of accounting for classically unexplainable correlations between classical phenomena and that of explaining the microscopic structure of classical objects. If interpreting quantum mechanics means answering the question, “How can the world be for quantum mechanics to be true?”, there seems to be no way around it.
The form of quantum mechanics is established ahead of of a system of physics interpretation,which is a realistic possibility premise for the group explained of quantum mechanics.But quantum mechanics and the classical physics language system contain different noumenon suppose.It is intrinsically different between the classical physics which describes the macro world and quantum mechanism which describes the micro world in the function mechanism,particle abstract,the probability application.Thus,the concept of classical physics language describing the micro-world will be no adaptation in essence,just as using Euclidean geometry can not explain non-Euclidean geometry.In this context,we believe there is no any interpretation system which is better than the Copenhagen School on the whole,though it has some shortage.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.