We study the role of discrete rotational symmetry in the quantum key distribution by generalizing the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984 and Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocols. We observe that discrete rotational symmetry results in the protocol's invariance to continuous rotations, thus leading to a simplified relation between bit and phase error rates and consequently a straightforward security proof.
We study the role of discrete rotational symmetry in the quantum key distribution by generalizing the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984 and Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocols. We observe that discrete rotational symmetry results in the protocol's invariance to continuous rotations, thus leading to a simplified relation between bit and phase error rates and consequently a straightforward security proof.
We prove the unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols using attenuated laser pulses with M different linear polarizations. When M=4, the proof covers the so-called SARG04 protocol [V.~Scarani et al., Phys. Rev.\ Lett. {\bf 92}, 057901 (2004)], which uses exactly the same quantum communication as the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol. For a channel with transmission η, we show that the key rate in SARG04 scales as O(η3/2). When we increase the number of states to M=2k-1 or 2k, the key rate scaling improves as O(η(k+1)/k).
Standard security proofs of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states $\ensuremath{\mid}{0}_{z}⟩$ and $\ensuremath{\mid}{1}_{z}⟩$ can contribute to key generation, and the third state $\ensuremath{\mid}+⟩=(\ensuremath{\mid}{0}_{z}⟩+\ensuremath{\mid}{1}_{z}⟩)∕\sqrt{2}$ is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result in the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol, while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used.
We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote parties to share information-theoretic secret keys. Many QKD protocols assume the phase of encoding state can be continuous randomized from 0 to 2π, which, however, may be questionable in the experiment. This is particularly the case in the recently proposed twin-field (TF) QKD, which has received a lot of attention since it can increase the key rate significantly and even beat some theoretical rate-loss limits. As an intuitive solution, one may introduce discrete-phase randomization instead of continuous randomization. However, a security proof for a QKD protocol with discrete-phase randomization in the finite-key region is still missing. Here, we develop a technique based on conjugate measurement and quantum state distinguishment to analyze the security in this case. Our results show that TF-QKD with a reasonable number of discrete random phases, e.g., 8 phases from {0,π/4,π/2,…,7π/4}, can achieve satisfactory performance. On the other hand, we find the finite-size effects become more notable than before, which implies that more pulses should be emit in this case. More importantly, as a the first proof for TF-QKD with discrete-phase randomization in the finite-key region, our method is also applicable in other QKD protocols.
We present an approach to the unconditional security of quantum key distribution protocols based on the uncertainty principle. The approach applies to every case that has been treated via the argument by Shor and Preskill, and relieve them from the constraints of finding quantum error correcting codes. It can also treat the cases with uncharacterized apparatuses. We derive a secure key rate for the Bennett-Brassard-1984 protocol with an arbitrary source characterized only by a single parameter representing the basis dependence.
Mode-pairing quantum key distribution (MP-QKD) protocol achieves performance beyond the repeaterless rate-transmittance bound and exhibits excellent practicality by avoiding the requirement for difficult global phase locking. However, the source side of MP-QKD still relies on the assumption of continuous phase randomization, an experimentally infeasible requirement in practice. Therefore, the practical security of the protocol cannot be fully guaranteed. In this work, we propose a discrete-phase-randomized mode-pairing quantum key distribution (DPR-MP-QKD) protocol and analyze the basis-dependence of the source side. Then, we introduce a concrete discrete version of the decoy state method that ensures the security of the DPR-MP-QKD protocol. Finally, simulation results indicate that as the number of discrete phases increases, the key rate performance of DPR-MP-QKD progressively approaches that of the continuous case, with convergence achieved at approximately 14 discrete phases. Moreover, our approach drastically lowers the demand for randomness. While conventional continuous phase randomization demands an unlimited supply of random bits, we show that merely a few bits (e.g., 4) are adequate.