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arXiv:quant-ph/0603230 · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE

Post-quantum key exchange protocols

Xiangdong Li, Lin Leung, Andis Chi-Tung Kwan, Xiaowen Zhang, Dammika Kahanda, Michael Anshel

Published May 5, 2006• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

If an eavesdropper Eve is equipped with quantum computers, she can easily break the public key exchange protocols used today. In this paper we will discuss the post-quantum Diffie-Hellman key exchange and private key exchange protocols.
DOI
10.1117/12.665685

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The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol introduced in 1976 allows two users, Alice and Bob, to establish a shared secret key K over insecure communication channels. With the rise of quantum computers, the protocol is in danger of becoming easily breakable. In response, several modified versions of Diffie-Hellman have been proposed claiming to be resistant to attacks performed by quantum computers. \n \nTwo such protocols and use of a semidirect product creating a modified version of a Discrete Logarithm problem to provide security for Alice and Bob. \n \nRegardless of choosing a tropical semiring or a free nilpotent p-group, these protocols prove not only vulnerable to quantum attacks, but they can be attacked by a classical computer. By exploiting each of the platforms, an eavesdropper Eve needs only to figure out how to mimic Alice's contribution to the shared secret key without needing to copy Alice's exact operations. By doing so, Eve can efficiently recover the shared secret key K.