The nondistributivity of compound quantum mechanical propositions leads to a theorem that rules out the possibility of microscopic deterministic hidden variables, the Logical No-Go Theorem. We observe that there appear in fact two distinct nondistributivity relations in the derivation: one with a semantics governed by an empirical conjunctive syntax, the other composed of conjunctive primitives in the quantum mechanical probability calculus. We venture to speculate how the two come to be confused in the derivation of the theorem.
The nondistributivity of compound quantum mechanical propositions leads to a theorem that rules out the possibility of microscopic deterministic hidden variables, the Logical No-Go Theorem. We observe that there appear in fact two distinct nondistributivity relations in the derivation: one with a semantics governed by an empirical conjunctive syntax, the other composed of conjunctive primitives in the quantum mechanical probability calculus. We venture to speculate how the two come to be confused in the derivation of the theorem.
Quantum logic has been introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann as an attempt to base the logical primitives, the propositions and the relations and operations among them, on quantum theoretical entities, and thus on the related empirical evidence of the quantum world. We give a brief outline of quantum logic, and some of its algebraic properties, such as nondistributivity, whereby emphasis is given to concrete experimental setups related to quantum logical entities. A probability theory based on quantum logic is fundamentally and sometimes even spectacularly different from probabilities based on classical Boolean logic. We give a brief outline of its nonclassical aspects; in particular violations of Boole-Bell type consistency constraints on joint probabilities, as well as the Kochen-Specker theorem, demonstrating in a constructive, finite way the scarcity and even nonexistence of two-valued states interpretable as classical truth assignments. A more complete introduction of the author can be found in the book "Quantum Logic" (Springer, 1998)
The paper argues that far from challenging-or even refuting-Bohm's quantum theory, the no-hidden-variables theorems in fact support the Bohmian ontology for quantum mechanics. The reason is that (i) all measurements come down to position measurements; and (ii) Bohm's theory provides a clear and coherent explanation of the measurement outcome statistics based on an ontology of particle positions, a law for their evolution and a probability measure linked with that law. What the no-hidden-variables theorems teach us is that (i) one cannot infer the properties that the physical systems possess from observables; and that (ii) measurements, being an interaction like other interactions, change the state of the measured system.
The thesis investigates the possibility of a classical semantics for quantum propositional structures. A classical semantics is defined as a set of mappings each of which is (i) bivalent, i.e., the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) is assigned to each proposition, and (ii) truth-functional, i.e., the logical operations are preserved. In addition, this set must be "full", i.e., any pair of distinct propositions is assigned different values by some mapping in the set. When the propositions make assertions about the properties of classical or of quantum systems, the mappings should also be (iii) "state-induced", i.e., values assigned by the semantics should accord with values assigned by classical or by quantum mechanics. In classical propositional logic, (equivalence classes of) propositions form a Boolean algebra, and each semantic mapping assigns the value 1 to the members of a certain subset of the algebra, namely, an ultrafilter, and assigns 0 to the members of the dual ultraideal, where the union of these two subsets is the entire algebra. The propositional structures of classical mechanics are likewise Boolean algebras, so one can straightforwardly provide a classical semantics, which also satisfies (iii). However, quantum propositional structures are non-Boolean, so it is an open question whether a semantics satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii) can be provided. Von Neumann first proposed (1932) that the algebraic structures of the subspaces (or projectors) of Hilbert space be regarded as the pro-positional structures PQM of quantum mechanics. These structures have been formalized in two ways: as orthomodular lattices which have the binary operations "and", "or", defined among all elements, compatible [symbol omitted] and incompatible [symbol omitted]; and as partial-Boolean algebras which have the binary operations defined among only compatible elements. In the thesis, two basic senses in which these structures are non-Boolean are discriminated. And two notions of truth-functionality are distinguished: truth-functionality [symbols omitted] applicable to the PQM lattices; and truth-functionality [symbol omitted] applicable to both the lattices and partial-Boolean algebras. Then it is shown how the lattice definitions of "and", "or", among incompatibles rule out a bivalent, truth-functional [symbols omitted] semantics for any lattice containing incompatible, elements. In contrast, the Gleason and Kochen-Specker proofs of the impossibility of hidden-variables for quantum mechanics show the impossibility of a bivalent, truth-functional [symbol omitted] semantics for three-or-higher dimensional Hilbert space structures; and the presence of incompatible elements is necessary but is not sufficient to rule out such a semantics. As for (iii), each quantum state-induced expectation-function on a PQM truth-functionally assigns 1 and 0 values to the elements in a ultrafilter and dual ultraideal of PQM³ where, in general the union of an ultrafilter and its dual ultraideal is smaller than the entire structure. Thus it is argued that each expectation-function is the quantum analog of a classical semantic mapping, even though the domain where each expectation-function is bivalent and truth-functional is usually a non-Boolean substructure of PQM. The final portion of the thesis surveys proposals for the introduction of hidden variables into quantum mechanics, proofs of the impossibility of such hidden-variable proposals, and criticisms of these impossibility proofs. And arguments in favour of the partial-Boolean algebra, rather than the orthomodular lattice, formalization of the quantum propositional structures are reviewed.
We discuss quantum conditional probability and its applications to deterministic hidden-variable models. We derive empirical tests corresponding to mathematical no-go proofs, providing rigorous statistical tests based on experimental outcomes. Evidently, it now possible to examine the statistical power of the empirical tests, and place confidence intervals on the parameters that precisely measure the departure of hidden-variable models from quantum experimental outcomes. Moreover, reinterpretation of well-known results in the light of quantum conditional probability provides other experimental demonstrations and no-go proofs: outcomes for the familiar Young double-slit experiment show that there are no deterministic hidden-variable models of the type considered by Kochen and Specker [J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967)] or Bell [Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966)].
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.
In this paper we consider the phenomenon of superpositions in quantum mechanics and suggest a way to deal with the idea in a logical setting from a syntactical point of view, that is, as subsumed in the language of the formalism, and not semantically. We restrict the discussion to the propositional level only. Then, after presenting the motivations and a possible world semantics, the formalism is outlined and we also consider within this schema the claim that superpositions may involve contradictions, as in the case of the Schrödinger's cat, which (it is usually said) is both alive and dead. We argue that this claim is a misreading of the quantum case. Finally, we sketch a new form of quantum logic that involves three kinds of negations and present the relationships among them. The paper is a first approach to the subject, introducing some main guidelines to be developed by a `syntactical' logical approach to quantum superpositions.