We demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for a high key generation rate using weak coherent pulses. We discuss the required features of the optical key components of the system

Optical Fiber Communication ConferenceJan 1, 20060 citations

Practical quantum key distribution protocol without monitoring signal disturbance

Sasaki Toshihiko, Y. Yamamoto, Koashi Masato

May 22, 20140 citations

arXiv:quant-ph/0506097 · Applied Physics Letters

Fast and simple one-way quantum key distribution

Damien Stucki, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin, Valerio Scarani, Hugo Zbinden

Published Nov 1, 2005• 331 citations

arXiv HTML PDF

Abstract

DOI: 10.1063/1.2126792

Related papers

Fast and simple one-way Quantum Key Distribution

Damien Stucki, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin +2 more

We present and demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses to obtain a high key generation rate. The key is obtained by a simple time-of-arrival measurement on the dataline; the presence of an eavesdropper is checked by an interferometer on an additional monitoring line. The setup is experimentally simple; moreover, it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus featuring a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bit per qubit.We present and demonstrate a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses to obtain a high key generation rate. The key is obtained by a simple time-of-arrival measurement on the dataline; the presence of an eavesdropper is checked by an interferometer on an additional monitoring line. The setup is experimentally simple; moreover, it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus featuring a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bit per qubit.

Jan 1, 2005135 citations

Coherent one-way quantum key distribution

Damien Stucki, Sylvain Fasel, Nicolas Gisin +2 more

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) consists in the exchange of a secrete key between two distant points [1]. Even if quantum key distribution systems exist and commercial systems are reaching the market [2], there are still improvements to be made: simplify the construction of the system; increase the secret key rate. To this end, we present a new protocol for QKD tailored to work with weak coherent pulses and at high bit rates [3]. The advantages of this system are that the setup is experimentally simple and it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus resulting in a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bits per qubit. After having successfully tested the feasibility of the system [3], we are currently developing a fully integrated and automated prototype within the SECOQC project [4]. We present the latest results using the prototype. We also discuss the issue of the photon detection, which still remains the bottleneck for QKD.Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) consists in the exchange of a secrete key between two distant points [1]. Even if quantum key distribution systems exist and commercial systems are reaching the market [2], there are still improvements to be made: simplify the construction of the system; increase the secret key rate. To this end, we present a new protocol for QKD tailored to work with weak coherent pulses and at high bit rates [3]. The advantages of this system are that the setup is experimentally simple and it is tolerant to reduced interference visibility and to photon number splitting attacks, thus resulting in a high efficiency in terms of distilled secret bits per qubit. After having successfully tested the feasibility of the system [3], we are currently developing a fully integrated and automated prototype within the SECOQC project [4]. We present the latest results using the prototype. We also discuss the issue of the photon detection, which still remains the bottleneck for QKD.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIEMay 4, 200730 citations

Towards practical and fast Quantum Cryptography

Nicolas Gisin, G. Ribordy, Hugo Zbinden +3 more

We present a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses. The key is obtained by a very simple time-of-arrival measurement on the data line; an interferometer is built on an additional monitoring line, allowing to monitor the presence of a spy (who would break coherence by her intervention). Against zero-error attacks (the analog of photon-number-splitting attacks), this protocol performs as well as standard protocols with strong reference pulses: the key rate decreases only as the transmission $t$ of the quantum channel. We present also two attacks that introduce errors on the monitoring line: the intercept-resend, and a coherent attack on two subsequent pulses. Finally, we sketch several possible variations of this protocol.We present a new protocol for practical quantum cryptography, tailored for an implementation with weak coherent pulses. The key is obtained by a very simple time-of-arrival measurement on the data line; an interferometer is built on an additional monitoring line, allowing to monitor the presence of a spy (who would break coherence by her intervention). Against zero-error attacks (the analog of photon-number-splitting attacks), this protocol performs as well as standard protocols with strong reference pulses: the key rate decreases only as the transmission $t$ of the quantum channel. We present also two attacks that introduce errors on the monitoring line: the intercept-resend, and a coherent attack on two subsequent pulses. Finally, we sketch several possible variations of this protocol.

arXiv:quant-ph/0411022Nov 3, 200458 citations

Enhancing practical security of quantum key distribution with a few decoy states

Jim Harrington, Ettinger, J. Mark, Richard Hughes +1 more

Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two distant parties. Of concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially strong photon number splitting attack by an eavesdropper, but the decoy state method can detect this attack with current technology, yielding a high rate of secret bits. In this Letter, we develop rigorous security statements in the case of finite statistics with only a few decoy states, and we present the results of simulations of an experimental setup of a decoy state protocol that can be simply realized with current technology.Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two distant parties. Of concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially strong photon number splitting attack by an eavesdropper, but the decoy state method can detect this attack with current technology, yielding a high rate of secret bits. In this Letter, we develop rigorous security statements in the case of finite statistics with only a few decoy states, and we present the results of simulations of an experimental setup of a decoy state protocol that can be simply realized with current technology.

arXiv:quant-ph/0503002Mar 1, 200533 citations

Components for quantum cryptography

Hugo Zbinden, G. Ribordy, Damien Stucki

Optical Fiber Communication ConferenceJan 1, 20060 citations

Practical quantum key distribution protocol without monitoring signal disturbance

Sasaki Toshihiko, Y. Yamamoto, Koashi Masato

Quantum cryptograph exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to provide a secure way to exchange private information. Such an exchange requires a common random bit sequence, called a key, to be shared secretly between the sender and the receiver. The basic idea behind quantum key distribution (QKD) has widely been understood as the property that any attempt to distinguish encoded quantum states causes a disturbance in the signal. As a result, implementation of a QKD protocol involves an estimation of the experimental parameters influenced by the eavesdropper’s intervention, which is achieved by randomly sampling the signal. If the estimation of many parameters with high precision is required, the portion of the signal that is sacrificed increases, thus decreasing the efficiency of the protocol. Here we propose a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle. The sender encodes a bit sequence onto non-orthogonal quantum states and the receiver randomly dictates how a single bit should be calculated from the sequence. The eavesdropper, who is unable to learn the whole of the sequence, cannot guess the bit value correctly. An achievable rate of secure key distribution is calculated by considering complementary choices between quantum measurements of two conjugate observables. We found that a practical implementation using a laser pulse train achieves a key rate comparable to a decoy-state QKD protocol, an often-used technique for lasers. It also has a better tolerance of bit errors and of finite-sized-key effects. We anticipate that this finding will give new insight into how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics can be related to secure communication, and will facilitate the simple and efficient use of conventional lasers for QKD.Quantum cryptograph exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to provide a secure way to exchange private information. Such an exchange requires a common random bit sequence, called a key, to be shared secretly between the sender and the receiver. The basic idea behind quantum key distribution (QKD) has widely been understood as the property that any attempt to distinguish encoded quantum states causes a disturbance in the signal. As a result, implementation of a QKD protocol involves an estimation of the experimental parameters influenced by the eavesdropper’s intervention, which is achieved by randomly sampling the signal. If the estimation of many parameters with high precision is required, the portion of the signal that is sacrificed increases, thus decreasing the efficiency of the protocol. Here we propose a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle. The sender encodes a bit sequence onto non-orthogonal quantum states and the receiver randomly dictates how a single bit should be calculated from the sequence. The eavesdropper, who is unable to learn the whole of the sequence, cannot guess the bit value correctly. An achievable rate of secure key distribution is calculated by considering complementary choices between quantum measurements of two conjugate observables. We found that a practical implementation using a laser pulse train achieves a key rate comparable to a decoy-state QKD protocol, an often-used technique for lasers. It also has a better tolerance of bit errors and of finite-sized-key effects. We anticipate that this finding will give new insight into how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics can be related to secure communication, and will facilitate the simple and efficient use of conventional lasers for QKD.

May 22, 20140 citations

t

of the quantum channel. We present also two attacks that introduce errors on the monitoring line: the intercept-resend, and a coherent attack on two subsequent pulses. Finally, we sketch several possible variations of this protocol.