A quantum key distribution protocol, based on the quantum dense encoding in entangled states, is presented. In this protocol, we introduce an encoding process to encode,two classical bits information into one of the four one-qubit unitary operations implemented by Alice and the Bell states measurement implemented by Bob in stead of direct measuring the previously shared Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs by both of the distant parties, Alice and Bob Considering the practical application we can get the conclusion that our protocol has some advantages. It not only simplifies the measurement which may induce potential errors, but also improves the effectively transmitted rate of the generated qubits by the raw key. Here we also discuss eavesdropping attacks against the scheme and the channel loss.
A scheme for three-party quantum secret sharing of a private key is presented with single photons. The agent Bob first prepares a sequence of single photons with two biased bases and then sends them to the boss Alice who checks the security of the transmission with measurements and produces some decoy photons by rearranging the orders of some sample photons. Alice encodes her bits with two unitary operations on the photons and then sends them to the other agent. The security of this scheme is equivalent to that in the modified Bennett–Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol. Moreover, each photon can carry one bit of the private key and the intrinsic efficiency for qubits and the total efficiency both approach the maximal value 100% when the number of the bits in the key is very large.
We experimentally demonstrate a quantum key distribution protocol using entangled photon pairs in orbital angular momentum (OAM). Here Alice uses a fixed phase hologram to modulate her OAM state on one photon with a spatial light modulator (SLM), while Bob uses the designed N different phase holograms for his N-based keys on the other photon with his SLM. With coincidences, Alice can fully retrieve the keys sent by Bob without reconciliation. We report the experiment results with N = 3 and OAM eigenmodes |ℓ = ±1〉, and discuss the security from the light path and typical attacks.
Quantum key distribution schemes which employ encoding on vacuum-one-photon qubits are capable of transferring more information bits per particle than the standard schemes employing polarization or phase coding. We calculate the maximum number of classical bits per particle that can be securely transferred when the key distribution is performed with the BB84 and B92 protocols, respectively, using the vacuum-one-photon qubits. In particular, we show that for a generalized B92 protocol with the vacuum-one-photon qubits, a maximum of two bits per particle can be securely transferred. We also demonstrate the advantage brought about by performing a generalized measurement that is optimized for unambiguous discrimination of the encoded states: the parameter range where the transfer of two bits per particle can be achieved is dramatically enhanced as compared to the corresponding parameter range of projective measurements.
In this paper we present quantum key distribution protocol that, instead of single qubits, uses mesoscopic coherent states of light
∣α⟩ to encode bit values of a randomly generated key. Given the reference value
α∈C, and a string of phase rotations each randomly taken from a set of
2M equidistant phases, Alice prepares a quantum state given by a product of coherent states of light, such that a complex phase of each pulse is rotated by the corresponding phase rotation. The encoding of
i-th bit of the key
r=r1…rℓ is done by further performing phase rotation
riπ (with
ri=0,1) on the
i-th coherent state pulse. In order to protect the protocol against the man-in-the-middle attack, we introduce a verification procedure, and analyse the protocol's security using the Holevo bound. We also analyse the possibility of beam splitting-like and of collective attacks, showing the impossibility of the former and, in the case of our protocol, the inadequacy of the latter. While we cannot prove full perfect security against the most general attacks allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics, our protocol achieves faster quantum key distribution, over larger distances and with lower costs, than the single-photon counterparts, maintaining at least practical security against the current and the near future technologies.