It is pointed out that two separated quantum channels and three classical authenticated channels are sufficient resources to achieve detectable broadcast.
It is well-known that n players, connected only by pairwise secure channels, can achieve Byzantine agreement only if the number t of cheaters satisfies t < n/3, even with respect to computational security. However, for many applications it is sufficient to achieve detectable broadcast. With this primitive, broadcast is only guaranteed when all players are non-faulty ("honest"), but all non-faulty players always reach agreement on whether broadcast was achieved or not. We show that detectable broadcast can be achieved regardless of the number of faulty players (i.e., for all t < n). We give a protocol which is unconditionally secure, as well as two more efficient protocols which are secure with respect to computational assumptions, and the existence of quantum channels, respectively.These protocols allow for secure multi-party computation tolerating any t < n, assuming only pairwise authenticated channels. Moreover, they allow for the setup of public-key infrastructures that are consistent among all participants --- using neither a trusted party nor broadcast channels.Finally, we show that it is not even necessary for players to begin the protocol at the same time step. We give a "detectable Firing Squad" protocol which can be initiated by a single user at any time and such that either all honest players end up with synchronized clocks, or all honest players abort.
We design and experimentally validate quantum circuits that prepare a quantum resource state which, when combined with authenticated classical communication, enables a protocol for detectable Byzantine broadcast and detectable Byzantine consensus. For the broadcast version of the problem, we propose an efficient leader-follower quantum circuit that prepares this resource state with depth O(logn), using O(n) two-qubit gates and O(n) ancillary qubits. We also develop a majority-based leader-selection scheme, for the consensus version of the problem; the scheme is based on the same leaderfollower quantum circuit and on coherent Hamming-weight computation, which prepares a fictitious leader qubit directly from any initial network state specified by the participant parties. The resulting fictitious leader state is then used as input to the leader-follower circuit to prepare a resource state consistent with majority voting on a common basis, thereby enabling detectable Byzantine consensus. In particular, we prove that, when supplemented with authenticated classical channels for the communication of quantum measurement outputs, the resulting protocols achieve detectable Byzantine broadcast and detectable Byzantine consensus, respectively. Under correct operation, all correct parties output the same value, namely the leader's value or the majority value. In the presence of Byzantine parties or quantum circuit deviations, all correct parties detect the inconsistency and abort. Furthermore, we demonstrate the feasibility of the approach through a proofof-principle implementation on an IBM quantum processor.
Distributed systems -- spanning cloud computing, edge networks, and federated databases -- rely on classical cryptographic channels whose security rests on computational hardness assumptions increasingly threatened by advances in quantum computing. Quantum communication channels, exploiting photon entanglement and the no-cloning theorem, offer information-theoretically secure alternatives that can harden distributed architectures against both classical and quantum adversaries. This paper proposes the Quantum-Secured Distributed Architecture (QSDA) framework, which integrates quantum communication channels -- specifically Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), quantum secret sharing (QSS), and quantum Byzantine agreement (QBA) -- into five canonical distributed system primitives: authenticated broadcast, distributed consensus, secret sharing, leader election, and distributed locking. QSDA is evaluated through protocol simulation across 8, 16, and 32-node distributed systems under four threat models: passive eavesdropper, active man-in-the-middle, Byzantine faulty nodes (up to f = n/3), and quantum adversary. Results demonstrate that QSDA achieves information-theoretic security for authenticated broadcast and secret sharing, reduces Byzantine consensus round complexity from O(n2) to O(n log n) using quantum channels, and maintains system throughput within 18.4% of classical baseline despite quantum channel overhead. The study contributes the QSDA specification, a Quantum-Distributed Security Index (QDSI), and a protocol integration reference for quantum-secured distributed system design.