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arXiv:quant-ph/0312044

Partiality in physics

Bob Coecke, Keye Martin

Published Dec 4, 2003• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We revisit the standard axioms of domain theory with emphasis on their relation to the concept of partiality, explain how this idea arises naturally in probability theory and quantum mechanics, and then search for a mathematical setting capable of providing a satisfactory unification of the two.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0312044

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This paper develops some ideas from previous work (coauthored, mostly with C.J.Isham). In that work, the main proposal is to assign as the value of a physical quantity in quantum theory (or classical physics), not a real number, but a certain kind of set (a sieve) of quantities that are functions of the given quantity. The motivation was in part physical---such a valuation illuminates the Kochen-Specker theorem; in part mathematical---the valuations arise naturally in the theory of presheaves; and in part conceptual---the valuations arise from applying to propositions about the values of physical quantities some general axioms governing partial truth for any kind of proposition. In this paper, I give another conceptual motivation for the proposal. I develop (in Sections 2 and 3) the notion of a topos (of which presheaves give just one kind of example); and explain how this notion gives a satisfactory general framework for making sense of the idea of partial truth. Then I review (in Section 4) how our proposal applies this framework to the case of physical theories.
Quantum mechanics is usually described in the terminology of probability theory even though the properties of the probability spaces associated with it are fundamentally different from the standard ones of probability theory. For example, Kolmogorov's axioms are not general enough to encompass the non-commutative situations that arise in quantum theory. There have been many attempts to generalise these axioms to meet the needs of quantum mechanics. The focus of these attempts has been the observation, first made by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936), that the propositions associated with a quantum-mechanical system do not form a Boolean σ-algebra. There is almost universal agreement that the probability space associated with a quantum-mechanical system is given by the set of subspaces of a separable Hilbert space, but there is disagreement over the algebraic structure that this set represents. In the most popular model for the probability space of quantum mechanics the propositions are assumed to form an orthocomplemented lattice (Mackey (1963), Jauch (1968)). The fundamental concept here is that of a partial order, that is a binary relation that is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. The partial order is interpreted as embodying the logical concept of implication in the set of propositions associated with the physical system. Although this model provides an acceptable mathematical expression of the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics in that the subspaces of a separable Hilbert space give a representation of an ortho-complemented lattice, it has several deficiencies which will be discussed later.
The standard ways classical logic and mathematics deal with the concept of indiscernibility (indistinguishability), with special emphasis to the concept of indiscernibility in a structure are considered. The aim is to emphasize that in asserting that ‘two’ objects of a certain domain (generally, a non empty set) are the same object, one becomes committed to the axioms of set theory, since the structures where these concepts are expressed are generally taken as set theoretical constructs. Some of the consequences of these points to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory are then investigated.