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arXiv:quant-ph/0310156

Quantum and classical advantage distillation are not equivalent

Dagomir Kaszlikowski, Lim Jenn Yang, L. C. Kwek, Berthold‐Georg Englert

Published Oct 26, 2003• 1 citation
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Abstract

We report that, for the generation of a secure cryptographic key from correlations established through a noisy quantum channel, the quantum and classical advantage distillation procedures are not equivalent, when coherent eavesdropping attacks are duly taken into account. The quantum procedure can tolerate markedly more noise in the channel than the classical procedure.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0310156

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We report that, for the generation of a secure cryptographic key from correlations established through a noisy quantum channel, the quantum and classical advantage distillation procedures are not equivalent, when coherent eavesdropping attacks are duly taken into account. The quantum procedure can tolerate markedly more noise in the channel than the classical procedure.
The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. We show that---for protocols that use quantum channels of any dimension and completely characterize them by state tomography---the noise threshold for classical advantage distillation of a specific kind is substantially lower than the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation if the eavesdropper can perform powerful coherent attacks. In marked contrast, earlier investigations had shown that the thresholds are identical for incoherent attacks on the same classical distillation scheme. It remains an open question whether other schemes for classical advantage distillation have higher thresholds for coherent eavesdropping attacks.
The security of a cryptographic key that is generated by communication through a noisy quantum channel relies on the ability to distill a shorter secure key sequence from a longer insecure one. For an important class of protocols, which exploit tomographically complete measurements on entangled pairs of any dimension, we show that the noise threshold for classical advantage distillation is identical with the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation. As a consequence, the two distillation procedures are equivalent: neither offers a security advantage over the other.
We consider the extraction of shared secret key from correlations that are generated by either a classical or quantum source. In the classical setting, two honest parties (Alice and Bob) use public discussion and local randomness to distill secret key from some distribution pXYZp_{XYZ}pXYZ​ that is shared with an unwanted eavesdropper (Eve). In the quantum settings, the correlations pXYZp_{XYZ}pXYZ​ are delivered to the parties as either an \textit{incoherent} mixture of orthogonal quantum states or as \textit{coherent} superposition of such states; in both cases, Alice and Bob use public discussion and local quantum operations to distill secret key. While the power of quantum mechanics increases Alice and Bob's ability to generate shared randomness, it also equips Eve with a greater arsenal of eavesdropping attacks. Therefore, it is not obvious who gains the greatest advantage for distilling secret key when replacing a classical source with a quantum one. In this paper we first demonstrate that the classical key rate is equivalent to the quantum key rate when the correlations are generated incoherently in the quantum setting. For coherent sources, we next show that the rates are incomparable, and in fact, their difference can be arbitrarily large in either direction. However, we identify a large class of non-trivial distributions pXYZp_{XYZ}pXYZ​ that possess the following properties: (i) Eve's advantage is always greater in the quantum source than in its classical counterpart, and (ii) for the quantum entanglement shared between Alice and Bob in the coherent source, the so-called entanglement cost/squashed entanglement/relative entropy of entanglement can all be computed. With property (ii), we thus present a rare instance in which the various entropic entanglement measures of a quantum state can be explicitly calculated.
We provide a complete proof of the security of quantum cryptography against any eavesdropping attack including coherent measurements even in the presence of noise. Polarization-based cryptographic schemes are shown to be equivalent to EPR-based schemes. We also show that the performance of a noisy channel approaches that of a noiseless one as the error rate tends to zero. (i.e., the secrecy capacity Cs(ε)→Cs(0)C_s (ε) \to C_s (0)Cs​(ε)→Cs​(0) as ε→0ε\to 0ε→0.) One implication of our results is that one can {\it double} the efficiency of a most well-known quantum cryptographic scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard simply by assigning vastly different probabilities to the two conjugate bases.
Realizing secure communication between distant parties is one of the main goals of quantum technology. Although quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security for sharing a secret key, the key rate heavily depends on the level of noise in the quantum channel. To overcome the noise, both quantum and classical techniques exist, i.e., entanglement distillation and classical advantage distillation. So far, these techniques have only been used separately from each other. Herein, we present a two-stage distillation scheme concatenating entanglement distillation with classical advantage distillation. For the advantage distillation, we utilize a fixed protocol, specifically, the repetition code; in the case of entanglement distillation, we employ an enumeration algorithm to find an optimal protocol. We test our scheme for noisy entangled states and demonstrate its quantitative advantage: Our two-stage distillation scheme achieves finite key rates even in a high-noise regime where entanglement distillation or advantage distillation alone cannot afford key sharing. We also calculate the security bounds for relevant QKD protocols with our key-distillation scheme and show that they exceed the previous security bounds on the critical quantum bit error rates with only advantage distillation. Since the advantage distillation part does not introduce further requirements for quantum resources other than those required for entanglement distillation, the proposed scheme is well suited for quantum key distribution tasks with entanglement distribution networks.
We analyze the security of quantum cryptography schemes for d-level systems using 2 or d+1 maximally conjugated bases, under individual eavesdropping attacks based on cloning machines and measurement after the basis reconciliation. We consider classical advantage distillation protocols, that allow to extract a key even in situations where the mutual information between the honest parties is smaller than the eavesdropper's information. In this scenario, advantage distillation protocols are shown to be as powerful as quantum distillation: key distillation is possible using classical techniques if and only if the corresponding state in the entanglement based protocol is distillable.