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arXiv:quant-ph/0308166

No "No-Go"

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Aug 29, 2003• 0 citations
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Abstract

In spite of the very common opinion we show that QM is not complete and that it is possible to create prequantum models providing finer description of physical reality than QM. There exists (at least in theoretical models) dispersion free states and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle can be violated. Thus in spite of all ``No-Go'' theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell) we found a realist basis of quantum mechanics. I think that our model would totally satisfy A. Einstein who was sure that QM is not complete and a finer description is possible.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0308166

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In spite of the very common opinion we show that QM is not complete and that it is possible to create prequantum models providing finer description of physical reality than QM. There exists (at least in theoretical models) dispersion free states and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle can be violated. Thus in spite of all ``No-Go'' theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell) we found a realist basis of quantum mechanics. I think that our model would totally satisfy A. Einstein who was sure that QM is not complete and a finer description is possible.
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory. THE COMPLETENESS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS Although the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (Section 20.4) and the lack of absolute predictive power are an inherent feature of quantum mechanics, there have been attempts to preserve an in principle completely deterministic structure for physics. Even classically, in a macroscopic sample of gas there are so many molecules that it would be hopeless, as a practical matter, to predict the future locations of all these molecules from Newton's laws of motion.
We present critical arguments against individual interpretation of Bohr's complementarity and Heisenberg's uncertainty principles. Statistical interpretation of these principles is discussed in the contextual framework. We support the possibility to use Statistical Contextual Realist Interpretation of quantum formalism. In spite of all {\bf no-go} theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell,...), recently (quant-ph/0306003 and 0306069) we constructed a realist basis of quantum mechanics. In our model both classical and quantum spaces are rough images of the fundamental {\bf prespace.} Quantum mechanics cannot be reduced to classical one. Both classical and quantum representations induce reductions of prespace information.
We present critical arguments against individual interpretation of Bohr’s complementarity and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles. Statistical interpretation of these principles is discussed in the contextual framework. We support the possibility to use Statistical Contextual Realist Interpretation of quantum formalism. In spite of all no-go theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell,...), recently (quant-ph/0306003 and 0306069) we constructed a realist basis of quantum mechanics. In our model both classical and quantum spaces are rough images of the fundamental prespace. Quantum mechanics cannot be reduced to classical one. Both classical and quantum representations induce reductions of prespace information. ”Often we enter the unknown edifice of a new scientific discipline through a lesser gate that leads us into a side passage. It may take us a long while to find our way to the main portal and to view the whole structure in its proper perspective”. E. Schrödinger 1