The decoherent (consistent) histories formalism has been proposed as a means of eliminating measurements as a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics. In this formalism, probabilities can be assigned to any description which satisfies a particular consistency condition. The formalism, however, admits incompatible descriptions which cannot be combined, unlike classical physics. This seems to leave an ambiguity in the choice of the description. I argue that this ambiguity is removed by considering the observer as a physical system.
The decoherent (consistent) histories formalism has been proposed as a means of eliminating measurements as a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics. In this formalism, probabilities can be assigned to any description which satisfies a particular consistency condition. The formalism, however, admits incompatible descriptions which cannot be combined, unlike classical physics. This seems to leave an ambiguity in the choice of the description. I argue that this ambiguity is removed by considering the observer as a physical system.
In the consistent histories approach to quantum theory probabilities are assigned to histories subject to a consistency condition of negligible interference. The approach has the feature that a given physical situation admits multiple sets of consistent histories that cannot in general be united into a single consistent set, leading to a number of counterintuitive or contrary properties if propositions from different consistent sets are combined indiscriminately. An alternative viewpoint is proposed in which multiple consistent sets are classified according to whether or not there exists any unifying probability for combinations of incompatible sets which replicates the consistent histories result when restricted to a single consistent set. A number of examples are exhibited in which this classification can be made, in some cases with the assistance of the Bell, Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt, or Leggett-Garg inequalities together with Fine's theorem. When a unifying probability exists logical deductions in different consistent sets can in fact be combined, an extension of the ``single framework rule.'' It is argued that this classification coincides with intuitive notions of the boundary between classical and quantum regimes and in particular, the absence of a unifying probability for certain combinations of consistent sets is regarded as a measure of the ``quantumness'' of the system. The proposed approach and results are closely related to recent work on the classification of quasiprobabilities and this connection is discussed.
Abstract: The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechani-cal framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that different realms can be mutually incom-patible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary ” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational prob-lems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. 1
The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism attempts to construct a quantum framework which can be used without the need to introduce observers external to the studied system. The prime motivation in mind is the application of the formalism to the universe as a whole. In order to achieve this, CH maintains that a formulation of quantum mechanics should allow for the assignment of probabilities to alternative histories of a system. Therefore, it provides an observer-independent criterion to decide which sets of histories can be given probabilities and states rules to determine them. The framework establishes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account of a system. Furthermore, the version of CH first presented in [1, 2] proposes an "evolutionary" explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work critically evaluates claims to the effect that the formalism offered in [1, 2] solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, it is pointed out that the interpretation of the proposed framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. The claim of this work is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality.
We study a formulation of quantum mechanics in which the central notion is that of a quantum-mechanical history---a sequence of events at a succession of times. The primary aim is to identify sets of ``decoherent'' (or ``consistent'') histories for the system. These are quantum-mechanical histories suffering negligible interference with each other, and, therefore, to which probabilities may be assigned. These histories may be found for a given system using the so-called decoherence functional. When the decoherence functional is exactly diagonal, probabilities may be assigned to the histories, and all probability sum rules are satisfied exactly. We propose a condition for approximate decoherence, and argue that it implies that most probability sum rules will be satisfied to approximately the same degree. We also derive an inequality bounding the size of the off-diagonal terms of the decoherence functional. We calculate the decoherence functional for some simple one-dimensional systems, with a variety of initial states. For these systems, we explore the extent to which decoherence is produced using two different types of coarse graining. The first type of coarse graining involves imprecise specification of the particle's position. The second involves coupling the particle to a thermal bath of harmonic oscillators and ignoring the details of the bath (the Caldeira-Leggett model). We argue that both types of coarse graining are necessary in general. We explicitly exhibit the degree of decoherence as a function of the temperature of the bath, and of the width to within which the particle's position is specified. We study the diagonal elements of the decoherence functional, representing the probabilities for the possible histories of the system. To the extent that the histories decohere, we show that the probability distributions are peaked about the classical histories of the system, with the distribution of their initial positions and momenta given by a smeared version of the Wigner function. We discuss this result in connection with earlier uses of the Wigner function in this context. We find that there is a certain amount of tension between the demands of decoherence and peaking about classical paths.
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.
A system of quantum reasoning for a closed system is developed by treating nonrelativistic quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory. The sample space corresponds to a decomposition, as a sum of orthogonal projectors, of the identity operator on a Hilbert space of histories. Provided a consistency condition is satisfied, the corresponding Boolean algebra of histories, called a framework, can be assigned probabilities in the usual way, and within a single framework quantum reasoning is identical to ordinary probabilistic reasoning. A refinement rule, which allows a probability distribution to be extended from one framework to a larger (refined) framework, incorporates the dynamical laws of quantum theory. Two or more frameworks which are incompatible because they possess no common refinement cannot be simultaneously employed to describe a single physical system. Logical reasoning is a special case of probabilistic reasoning in which (conditional) probabilities are 1 (true) or 0 (false). As probabilities are only meaningful relative to some framework, the same is true of the truth or falsity of a quantum description. The formalism is illustrated using simple examples, and the physical considerations which determine the choice of a framework are discussed. \textcopyright{} 1996 The American Physical Society.