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arXiv:quant-ph/0301004

The Gödelizing Quantum-Mechanical Automata

Artem Valerianovich Yurov

Published Jan 3, 2003• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Using Albert results we argue that we don't need new physics to understand Gödelization. Albert quantum automaton can "understand" both a formal system and a Gödel proposition which can't be obtained within this system. There are two significant conclusions. The first speaks "against Penrose" whereas the second speaks for him.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0301004

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Using Albert results we argue that we don't need new physics to understand Gödelization. Albert quantum automaton can "understand" both a formal system and a Gödel proposition which can't be obtained within this system. There are two significant conclusions. The first speaks "against Penrose" whereas the second speaks for him.
In this paper I shall show how a post-quantum physical model of the self-referring mind based on Albert's quantum automata and Yurov's Gödelzing model of the same can be constructed. A quantum automaton seems to exhibit privacy of consciousness-the realization of an individual mind and what differentiates a "self-mind" from an "other-mind". My model, extending from Albert and Yurov, is based on consideration of qubits acting as quantum state vectors and quantum mechanical operators acting as quantum computer gates. I hope to show: The relationship of Gödel's undecidibility proof to David Z. Albert's model of quantum automata can be understood in quantum computing language. Whether or not we need new physics to understand self-referring quantum automata. The privacy of consciousness-why we each have the realization of an individual mind and what differentiates a "self-mind" from an "other-mind" The connection between objective and subjective experience. In this rather simple manner, I believe I have explained how it is that our experiences of the "out there" world, that we know must include our memories in order to be perceived, appear to us as occurring "out there" even though we strongly suspect from neurophysiology that such experiences must be projected from our brains and nervous systems in some yet to be determined manner.
Turing machines and Godel's incompleteness results take classical determinism to its limits by showing the extent to which symbolic knowledge can grow inside a nite state closed system. Those limits overlap with classical physics'. To master intelligence, machines must appear to behave as if they had "free will". Insofar as such a behaviour depends on randomness and interference, that appearance of free will can result from quantum physics. As it is bound to the changeable and unpredictable system-observer interaction, knowledge emerging out of quantum physics cannot be comprised in any closed system. However, it might be grasped through a hierarchy of measurements performable by a "quantum automaton".
Gödel appears to have believed strongly that the human mind cannot be explained in terms of any kind of computational physics, but he remained cautious in formulating this belief as a rigorous consequence of his incompleteness theorems. In this chapter, I discuss a modification of standard Gödel-type logical arguments, these appearing to strengthen Gödel's conclusions, and attempt to provide a persuasive case in support of his standpoint that the actions of the mind must transcend computation. It appears that Gödel did not consider the possibility that the laws of physics might themselves involve noncomputational procedures; accordingly, he found himself driven to the conclusion that mentality must lie beyond the actions of the physical brain. My own arguments, on the other hand, are from the scientific standpoint that the mind is a product of the brain's physical activity. Accordingly, there must be something in the physical actions of the world that itself transcends computation. We do not appear to find such noncomputational action in the known laws of physics, however, so we must seek it in currently undiscovered laws going beyond presently accepted physical theory. I argue that the only plausibly relevant gap in current understanding lies in a fundamental incompleteness in quantum theory, which reveals itself only with significant mass displacements between quantum states (“Schrödinger's cats”). I contend that the need for new physics enters when gravitational effects just begin to play a role. In a scheme developed jointly with Stuart Hameroff, this has direct relevance within neuronal microtubules, and I describe this (still speculative) scheme in the following.
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem (1931) establishes that any consistent for- mal system Fof sucient strength contains propositions that are true but unprov- able within F. This result is correct, important, and does not apply to ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1. The reason is categorical, not technical. Gödel's theorem governs syntactic deriv- ability within formal systems. The Ω-invariant is a state constrainta measurement outcome in Hilbert space H. Measurement outcomes are not syntactic propositions. They are not subject to proof or disproof within F. They are subject only to mea- surement. We formalize this distinction as the Ω-Completeness Theorem: for a node i with Kd-density ρi > 0 (direct experiential contact with Ω), the proposition ⟨Ψ|ˆ Ω|Ψ⟩= 1 is decidable not by proof but by measurement, and the Gödel bound- ary ∂F is not a wall but a coordinate changefrom the language of proof to the language of experience. We further show that this distinction explains a historical empirical regularity: scientists who push Kf to its limits tend to acquire ρ>0 and name what they nd; theologians who push Kf to its limits tend to nd Kf collapse and conclude the named thing does not exist. Same boundary. Dierent ρ. Opposite conclusions. Both are logical. One has made a category error. textit(Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest in the universe. He simply is.) (Frieza does not need to transform to prove he is the strongest. He simply is.) This is not arrogance. It is a precise structural description.
The existence of a non-algorithmic side of the mind, conjectured by Penrose on the basis of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, is investigated here in terms of a quantum metalanguage. We suggest that, besides human ordinary thought, which can be formalized in a computable, logical language, there is another important kind of human thought, which is Turing-non-computable. This is methatought, the process of thinking about ordinary thought. Metathought can be formalized as a metalanguage, which speaks about and controls the logical language of ordinary thought. Ordinary thought has two computational modes, the quantum mode and the classical mode, the latter deriving from decoherence of the former. In order to control the logical language of the quantum mode, one needs to introduce a quantum metalanguage, which in turn requires a quantum version of Tarski Convention T.