In order to solve the problem of which is the real logic of Quantum Mechanics (QM), we suggest to study the mutual relationships between the physical theory (as a whole, that is both its experimental part and its theoretical part), its mathematics and its logic. That results to be a more general problem than what is considered by traditional studies on Quantum Logic (QL). These studies focus attention on the problem of the relationship between the experimental part of the physical theory and only its mathematics, from which logic is then derived. The new approach, that we suggest, generalises the interpretation that one of us (A. D.) successfully tested on the foundations of classical physical theories. The foundations of a theory are interpreted in terms of two options on the kind of mathematics, either classical one or constructive one, and the kind of logic, either classical logic or intuitionistic logic. It is remarkable that each theory making use of intuitionistic logic – i. e. L. Carnot’s classical mechanics, S. Carnot’s thermodynamics, Lobacevskij’s non-Euclidean geometry is organised in order to solve an universal problem (expressed by a double negated sentence), rather than in an entirely deductive way; hence, a non-classical logic does not belong exclusively to QM. From an historical and foundational analysis about QM, we conclude that in QM it is the law of double negation and not modular law (introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann without giving physical evidence to it) which fails, i. e. which represents the true difference between Classical Logic (CL) and QL. We have looked for previous works on QL supporting our suggestion; in the past Destouches-Fevrier (1948), Fine (1974), Bell-Hallett (1981), Gauthier (1983), Adelman-Corbett (1995) already defended this thesis on the relevance of double negation law for QL. Under this light, QL results to have the same logic of a classical theory organised in a problematic manner. Hence, QM has to be referred to intuitionistic logic, in the same way every theory which is developed around a fundamental problem, expressed by a double negated sentence, does. In particular, by following the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, we reject the identification of intuitionistic logic with an entirely deductive system; rather, the logical system of QL, as a theory, is organised in such a way to put a crucial problem to be solved. In agreement with this kind of organisation, among the several QM formulations we choose Heisenberg’s formulation, which was ignored by previous authors on QL. This formulation is aimed to solve the problem of quantum measurement, that originates the uncertainty methodological principle. Moreover, it is remarkable that it makes use of an operational mathematics (discrete matrices only). We interpret its characteristic arguing about its principal problem through double negated sentences; it results to be a moving from arguments belonging to non-classical logic expressed by a double negated sentence to the recognition of a suitable mathematics for QM formulation. In sum, QL shows how it is possible to state the relationship between QM and mathematics. This point has been almost ignored by the most traditional approaches to QL, which rather drew it from an a priori mathematics of QM (commonly, Hilbert space). As a verification of our approach, we show that even both Lobachevskij’s geometry and S. Carnot’s thermodynamics argued in order to achieve mathematical formulas expressing the content of the basic double negated sentences of respective theory. In the same way the recent book on QM by T. F. Jordan formalised his matrix mechanics. 1. Logic in classical physics and in Quantum Mechanics An historical analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM) shows that there were at the origin of the theory two distinct formulations: Matrix Mechanics (Heisenberg, 1925) and Wave Mechanics (Schroedinger, 1926). Although Dirac subsumed these two formulations in a comprehensive mathematical framework (Hilbert space), we think that the organisation of the principles is different in Matrix Mechanics from that in Wave Mechanics, and this difference implies different logics. So we think that in order to characterise the logic of QM it is necessary to distinguish between this two formulations. In Matrix Mechanics, Heisenberg’s basic idea was to explain atomic spectra not in terms of atomic orbits (as Old Quantum Theory tried to make), but only by means of the study of experimental data; i. e., frequencies and intensities of light both emitted and absorbed by matter. Through aIn order to solve the problem of which is the real logic of Quantum Mechanics (QM), we suggest to study the mutual relationships between the physical theory (as a whole, that is both its experimental part and its theoretical part), its mathematics and its logic. That results to be a more general problem than what is considered by traditional studies on Quantum Logic (QL). These studies focus attention on the problem of the relationship between the experimental part of the physical theory and only its mathematics, from which logic is then derived. The new approach, that we suggest, generalises the interpretation that one of us (A. D.) successfully tested on the foundations of classical physical theories. The foundations of a theory are interpreted in terms of two options on the kind of mathematics, either classical one or constructive one, and the kind of logic, either classical logic or intuitionistic logic. It is remarkable that each theory making use of intuitionistic logic – i. e. L. Carnot’s classical mechanics, S. Carnot’s thermodynamics, Lobacevskij’s non-Euclidean geometry is organised in order to solve an universal problem (expressed by a double negated sentence), rather than in an entirely deductive way; hence, a non-classical logic does not belong exclusively to QM. From an historical and foundational analysis about QM, we conclude that in QM it is the law of double negation and not modular law (introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann without giving physical evidence to it) which fails, i. e. which represents the true difference between Classical Logic (CL) and QL. We have looked for previous works on QL supporting our suggestion; in the past Destouches-Fevrier (1948), Fine (1974), Bell-Hallett (1981), Gauthier (1983), Adelman-Corbett (1995) already defended this thesis on the relevance of double negation law for QL. Under this light, QL results to have the same logic of a classical theory organised in a problematic manner. Hence, QM has to be referred to intuitionistic logic, in the same way every theory which is developed around a fundamental problem, expressed by a double negated sentence, does. In particular, by following the founder of intuitionism, Brouwer, we reject the identification of intuitionistic logic with an entirely deductive system; rather, the logical system of QL, as a theory, is organised in such a way to put a crucial problem to be solved. In agreement with this kind of organisation, among the several QM formulations we choose Heisenberg’s formulation, which was ignored by previous authors on QL. This formulation is aimed to solve the problem of quantum measurement, that originates the uncertainty methodological principle. Moreover, it is remarkable that it makes use of an operational mathematics (discrete matrices only). We interpret its characteristic arguing about its principal problem through double negated sentences; it results to be a moving from arguments belonging to non-classical logic expressed by a double negated sentence to the recognition of a suitable mathematics for QM formulation. In sum, QL shows how it is possible to state the relationship between QM and mathematics. This point has been almost ignored by the most traditional approaches to QL, which rather drew it from an a priori mathematics of QM (commonly, Hilbert space). As a verification of our approach, we show that even both Lobachevskij’s geometry and S. Carnot’s thermodynamics argued in order to achieve mathematical formulas expressing the content of the basic double negated sentences of respective theory. In the same way the recent book on QM by T. F. Jordan formalised his matrix mechanics. 1. Logic in classical physics and in Quantum Mechanics An historical analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM) shows that there were at the origin of the theory two distinct formulations: Matrix Mechanics (Heisenberg, 1925) and Wave Mechanics (Schroedinger, 1926). Although Dirac subsumed these two formulations in a comprehensive mathematical framework (Hilbert space), we think that the organisation of the principles is different in Matrix Mechanics from that in Wave Mechanics, and this difference implies different logics. So we think that in order to characterise the logic of QM it is necessary to distinguish between this two formulations. In Matrix Mechanics, Heisenberg’s basic idea was to explain atomic spectra not in terms of atomic orbits (as Old Quantum Theory tried to make), but only by means of the study of experimental data; i. e., frequencies and intensities of light both emitted and absorbed by matter. Through a

Jan 1, 20023 citations

Quantum logic and physics

George Svetlichny

International Journal of Theoretical PhysicsSep 1, 19923 citations

Recovering quantum logic within an extended classical framework

Claudio Garola, Sandro Sozzo

We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as \emph{concrete logics} associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory $\mathcal T$ and classical language $\mathcal L$ expressing $\mathcal T$ , an observative sublanguage $L$ of $\mathcal L$ with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in $L$ a derived and theory-dependent notion of \emph{C-truth} (\emph{true with certainty}), defining a \emph{physical preorder} induced by C-truth, and finally selecting a set of sentences that are \emph{verifiable} (or \emph{testable}) according to $\mathcal T$ , on which a \emph{weak complementation} is induced by $\mathcal T$ . The triple consisting of the set of verifiable sentences, physical order and weak complementation is then the desired concrete logic. By applying our procedure we recover a classical logic as the concrete logic associated with classical mechanics and standard quantum logic as the concrete logic associated with quantum mechanics. We also show that our alternative view of standard quantum logic, which can be constructed in a purely formal way, can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Our results then show that some nonstandard logics can be obtained as mathematical structures formalizing the properties of different notions of verifiability in different physical theories. More generally, they strongly support the idea that many nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (\emph{global pluralism}), for they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth (described by Tarski's truth theory).We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and nonclassical logical structures as \emph{concrete logics} associated with physical theories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in choosing, for a given theory $\mathcal T$ and classical language $\mathcal L$ expressing $\mathcal T$, an observative sublanguage $L$ of $\mathcal L$ with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in $L$ a derived and theory-dependent notion of \emph{C-truth} (\emph{true with certainty}), defining a \emph{physical preorder} induced by C-truth, and finally selecting a set of sentences that are \emph{verifiable} (or \emph{testable}) according to $\mathcal T$, on which a \emph{weak complementation} is induced by $\mathcal T$. The triple consisting of the set of verifiable sentences, physical order and weak complementation is then the desired concrete logic. By applying our procedure we recover a classical logic as the concrete logic associated with classical mechanics and standard quantum logic as the concrete logic associated with quantum mechanics. We also show that our alternative view of standard quantum logic, which can be constructed in a purely formal way, can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Our results then show that some nonstandard logics can be obtained as mathematical structures formalizing the properties of different notions of verifiability in different physical theories. More generally, they strongly support the idea that many nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (\emph{global pluralism}), for they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth (described by Tarski's truth theory).

Jan 1, 20139 citations

Interpreting Quantum Mechanics — in the Light of Quantum Logic

Peter Mittelstaedt

Springer eBooksJan 1, 20032 citations

Quantum Theory and Logic

Martin Strauss

Bulletin of the British Society for the History of ScienceOct 1, 19500 citations

The non-standad logic of physics: the case of the Boltzmann-Sinai hard-sphere system

Massimo Tessarotto, Claudio Cremaschini, Claudio Asci +3 more

One of the most challenging and fascinating issues in mathematical and theoretical physics concerns identifying the common logic, if any, which underlies the physical world. More precisely, this involves the search of the possibly-unique axiomatic logical proposition calculus to apply simultaneously both to classical and quantum realms of physics and to be consistent with the corresponding mathematical and filosophysical setups. Based on the recent establishment of quantum logic, which has been shown to apply both to Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Gravity, the crucial remaining step involves the identification of the appropriate axiomatic logical proposition calculus to be associated with Classical Mechanics. In this paper the issue is posed for a fundamental example of Classical Mechanics, which is represented by the so-called Boltzmann-Sinai dynamical system. This is realized by the ensemble of classical smooth hard-spheres, which is set at the basis of Classical Statistical Mechanics and is also commonly regarded as a possible realization of Classical Newtonian Cosmology. Depending on the initial conditions which are prescribed for such a system, its classical state is shown to obey the propositional calculus of non-classical logic. In particular, the latter is expressed by the 3-way Principle of Non-Contradiction, namely the same logical principle that holds for quantum logic. The result therefore permits to question on a mathematical basis the principles of deterministic classical logic and the validity of their character within the domain of Classical Physics. Such a conclusion represents a potential notable innovation in the logical dicotomy true/false, a crucial topic which has crossed millennia through philosophy, logic, mathematics and physics.One of the most challenging and fascinating issues in mathematical and theoretical physics concerns identifying the common logic, if any, which underlies the physical world. More precisely, this involves the search of the possibly-unique axiomatic logical proposition calculus to apply simultaneously both to classical and quantum realms of physics and to be consistent with the corresponding mathematical and filosophysical setups. Based on the recent establishment of quantum logic, which has been shown to apply both to Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Gravity, the crucial remaining step involves the identification of the appropriate axiomatic logical proposition calculus to be associated with Classical Mechanics. In this paper the issue is posed for a fundamental example of Classical Mechanics, which is represented by the so-called Boltzmann-Sinai dynamical system. This is realized by the ensemble of classical smooth hard-spheres, which is set at the basis of Classical Statistical Mechanics and is also commonly regarded as a possible realization of Classical Newtonian Cosmology. Depending on the initial conditions which are prescribed for such a system, its classical state is shown to obey the propositional calculus of non-classical logic. In particular, the latter is expressed by the 3-way Principle of Non-Contradiction, namely the same logical principle that holds for quantum logic. The result therefore permits to question on a mathematical basis the principles of deterministic classical logic and the validity of their character within the domain of Classical Physics. Such a conclusion represents a potential notable innovation in the logical dicotomy true/false, a crucial topic which has crossed millennia through philosophy, logic, mathematics and physics.

arXiv:2412.19716Dec 27, 20240 citations

\mathcal T

and classical language

\mathcal L

expressing

\mathcal T

, an observative sublanguage

L

\mathcal L

with a notion of truth as correspondence, introducing in

L

a derived and theory-dependent notion of \emph{C-truth} (\emph{true with certainty}), defining a \emph{physical preorder} induced by C-truth, and finally selecting a set of sentences that are \emph{verifiable} (or \emph{testable}) according to

\mathcal T

, on which a \emph{weak complementation} is induced by

\mathcal T

. The triple consisting of the set of verifiable sentences, physical order and weak complementation is then the desired concrete logic. By applying our procedure we recover a classical logic as the concrete logic associated with classical mechanics and standard quantum logic as the concrete logic associated with quantum mechanics. We also show that our alternative view of standard quantum logic, which can be constructed in a purely formal way, can be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than absolute. Our results then show that some nonstandard logics can be obtained as mathematical structures formalizing the properties of different notions of verifiability in different physical theories. More generally, they strongly support the idea that many nonclassical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (\emph{global pluralism}), for they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide with the notion of truth (described by Tarski's truth theory).