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arXiv:quant-ph/0208031 · Physical Review A

Intermediate states in quantum cryptography and Bell inequalities

Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. Gisin

Published Jun 26, 2003• 22 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Intermediate states are known from intercept/resend eavesdropping in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum cryptographic protocol. But they also play fundamental roles in the optimal eavesdropping strategy on the BB84 protocol and in the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) inequality. We generalize the intermediate states to an arbitrary dimension and consider intercept/resend eavesdropping, optimal eavesdropping on the generalized BB84 protocol and present a generalized Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality for two entangled qudits based on these states.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.67.062310

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Intermediate states are known from intercept/resend eavesdropping in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum cryptographic protocol. But they also play fundamental roles in the optimal eavesdropping strategy on the BB84 protocol and in the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) inequality. We generalize the intermediate states to an arbitrary dimension and consider intercept/resend eavesdropping, optimal eavesdropping on the generalized BB84 protocol and present a generalized Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality for two entangled qudits based on these states.
We construct a Bell inequality from the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality for two qubits that provides a stronger bound on the correlations of entangled states than allowed by the CHSH inequality. The argument involved here can be generalized to nnn qubits. The inequalities obtained are violated by all the generalized Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states of multiqubits.
Bell inequalities, considered within quantum mechanics, can be regarded as nonoptimal witness operators. We discuss the relationship between such Bell witnesses and general entanglement witnesses in detail for the Bell inequality derived by Clauser, Horne, Shimony, and Holt (CHSH) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969)]. We derive bounds on how much an optimal witness has to be shifted by adding the identity operator to make it positive on all states admitting a local hidden variable model. In the opposite direction, we obtain tight bounds for the maximal proportion of the identity operator that can be subtracted from such a CHSH witness, while preserving the witness properties. Finally, we investigate the structure of CHSH witnesses directly by relating their diagonalized form to optimal witnesses of two different classes.
The quantum key distribution protocol BB84, published by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984, describes how two spatially separated parties can generate a random bit string fully known only to them by transmission of single-qubit quantum states. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the protocol introduces disturbance which can be detected by the legitimate parties. In this Master's Thesis a novel modification to the BB84 protocol is analyzed. Instead of sending single particles one-by-one as in BB84, they are grouped and a non-local transformation is applied to each group before transmission. Each particle is sent to the intended receiver, always delaying the transmission until the receiver has acknowledged the previous particle on an authenticated classical channel, restricting eavesdropping to accessing the quantum transmission one particle at a time. Hence, an eavesdropper cannot undo the non-local transformation perfectly. Even if perfect cloning of quantum states was possible the state of the group could not be cloned. We calculate the maximal information on the established key provided by an intercept-resend attack and the induced disturbance for different transformations. We observe that it is possible to significantly reduce the eavesdropper's maximal information on the key--to one eighth of that in BB84 for a fixed, reasonable amount of disturbance. We also show that the individual access to the particles poses a fundamental restriction to the eavesdropper, and discuss a novel attack type against the proposed protocol.
Quantum cryptography offers possibilities to distribute keys securely by relying on the principles of quantum mechanics. This paper presents repeatable simulations of two well-known quantum key distribution protocols, BB84 and E91, and examines how eavesdropping, noise, and transmission losses affect their security. The simulations are carried out using the Qiskit framework. A theoretical analysis of the expected quantum bit error rate (QBER) under ideal conditions and during an intercept–resend attack is included. The Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) parameter is also evaluated for the entanglement-based protocol. The results show error rates close to zero without attack, an increase to about 25\% under eavesdropping, and reduced correlations in the presence of attacks or losses. For the E91 protocol, the CHSH parameter exceeds the classical bound (S >2) in the entangled scenario and drops below the classical limit (S <= 2) in the attack case.
In the cryptographic context, an earlier unexplored application of the temporal version of the Bell-type inequality is shown here in the device-independent (DI) scenario. This is done by using the Leggett-Garg inequality (LGI) to demonstrate the security against eavesdropping in a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. This typically involves a higher dimensional attack against which the standard BB84 protocol is insecure. For this purpose, we invoke an appropriate form of LGI. While the key generation is done by the usual Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) method, the security check against device attacks is provided by testing for the violation of the particular form of LGI used here.