Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:quant-ph/0206170

Quantum Cryptography Based On Bell Inequalities for Three-Dimensional System

Dagomir Kaszlikowski, Kelken Chang, Daniel K. L. Oi, L. C. Kwek, Oh, C. H.

Published Jun 24, 2002• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We present a crytographic protocol based upon entangled qutrit pairs. We analyse the scheme under a symmetric incoherent attack and plot the region for which the protocol is secure and compare this with the region of violations of certain Bell inequalities.
DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0206170

Related papers

Quantum cryptography based on qutrit Bell inequalities

Dagomir Kaszlikowski, Daniel K. L. Oi, Matthias Christandl +4 more

We present a cryptographic protocol based upon entangled qutrit pairs. We analyze the scheme under a symmetric incoherent attack and plot the region for which the protocol is secure and compare this with the region of violations of certain Bell inequalities.

Physical Review A•Jan 21, 2003•76 citations

Experimental quantum cryptography with qutrits

Simon Gröblacher, Thomas D. Jennewein, Alipasha Vaziri +2 more

We produce two identical keys using, for the first time, entangled trinary quantum systems (qutrits) for quantum key distribution. The advantage of qutrits over the normally used binary quantum systems is an increased coding density and a higher security margin. The qutrits are encoded into the orbital angular momentum of photons, namely Laguerre–Gaussian modes with azimuthal index l + 1, 0 and −1, respectively. The orbital angular momentum is controlled with phase holograms. In an Ekert-type protocol the violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with a qutrit error rate of approximately 10%.

arXiv:quant-ph/0511163•New Journal of Physics•May 26, 2006•415 citations

Security aspects of quantum cryptography with D-dimensional systems

Chiara Macchiavello, D. Bruss

We analyse the security of quantum key distribution with three-dimensional systems, and show that this scheme is more advantageous against symmetric attacks than protocols using two-dimensional states. We generalize the resulting optimal eavesdropping transformation to cryptographic systems with arbitrary dimensions.

Journal of Modern Optics•Jan 1, 2003•2 citations

An Attack to Quantum Cryptography from Space

Igor Vasil'evich Volovich

The promise of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes is based on the use of quantum effects in the spin space. We point out that in fact in many current quantum cryptography protocols the space part of the wave function is neglected. However exactly the space part of the wave function describes the behaviour of particles in ordinary real three-dimensional space. As a result such schemes can be secure against eavesdropping attacks in the abstract spin space but could be insecure in the real three-dimensional space. We discuss an approach to the security of quantum key distribution in space by using Bell's inequality and a special preparation of the space part of the wave function.

arXiv:quant-ph/0012054•Dec 13, 2000•3 citations

Quantum cryptography with trinary quantum systems

Radjabov Telman Dadayevich, U.A. Rasulev

We try to create the cryptographic scheme of producing two identical keys using, for the first time, entangled trinary quantum systems for quantum key distribution. The advantage of trinary quantum systems over the normally used binary quantum systems is an increased coding density and a higher security margin. The trinary quantum systems are encoded into the orbital angular momentum of photons, namely Laguerre -Gaussian modes with azimuthally index 1 +1, 0 and -1, respectively. The orbital angular momentum is controlled with phase holograms. In an Ekert-type protocol the violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with a trinary quantum system error rate of approximately 10%.

International Conference in Central Asia on Internet•Sep 1, 2007•0 citations

A qutrit quantum key distribution protocol using Bell inequalities with larger violation capabilities

Zoé Amblard, François Arnault

The Ekert quantum key distribution protocol [1] uses pairs of entangled qubits and performs checks based on a Bell inequality to detect eavesdropping. The 3DEB protocol [2] uses instead pairs of entangled qutrits to achieve better noise resistance than the Ekert protocol. It performs checks based on a Bell inequality for qutrits named CHSH-3 and found in [3, 4]. In this paper, we present a new protocol, which also uses pairs of entangled qutrits, but gaining advantage of a Bell inequality which achieves better noise resistance than the one used in 3DEB. The latter inequality is called here hCHSH-3 and was discovered in [5]. For each party, the hCHSH-3 inequality involves four observables already used in CHSH-3 but also two products of observables which do not commute. We explain how the parties can measure the observables corresponding to these products and thus are able to check the violation of hCHSH-3. In the presence of noise, this violation guarantees the security against a local Trojan horse attack. We also designed a version of our protocol which is secure against individual attacks.

Quantum Information and Computation•Nov 1, 2015•0 citations
We produce two identical keys using, for the first time, entangled trinary quantum systems (qutrits) for quantum key distribution. The advantage of qutrits over the normally used binary quantum systems is an increased coding density and a higher security margin. The qutrits are encoded into the orbital angular momentum of photons, namely Laguerre–Gaussian modes with azimuthal index l + 1, 0 and −1, respectively. The orbital angular momentum is controlled with phase holograms. In an Ekert-type protocol the violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with a qutrit error rate of approximately 10%.
The promise of secure cryptographic quantum key distribution schemes is based on the use of quantum effects in the spin space. We point out that in fact in many current quantum cryptography protocols the space part of the wave function is neglected. However exactly the space part of the wave function describes the behaviour of particles in ordinary real three-dimensional space. As a result such schemes can be secure against eavesdropping attacks in the abstract spin space but could be insecure in the real three-dimensional space. We discuss an approach to the security of quantum key distribution in space by using Bell's inequality and a special preparation of the space part of the wave function.
We try to create the cryptographic scheme of producing two identical keys using, for the first time, entangled trinary quantum systems for quantum key distribution. The advantage of trinary quantum systems over the normally used binary quantum systems is an increased coding density and a higher security margin. The trinary quantum systems are encoded into the orbital angular momentum of photons, namely Laguerre -Gaussian modes with azimuthally index 1 +1, 0 and -1, respectively. The orbital angular momentum is controlled with phase holograms. In an Ekert-type protocol the violation of a three-dimensional Bell inequality verifies the security of the generated keys. A key is obtained with a trinary quantum system error rate of approximately 10%.
The Ekert quantum key distribution protocol [1] uses pairs of entangled qubits and performs checks based on a Bell inequality to detect eavesdropping. The 3DEB protocol [2] uses instead pairs of entangled qutrits to achieve better noise resistance than the Ekert protocol. It performs checks based on a Bell inequality for qutrits named CHSH-3 and found in [3, 4]. In this paper, we present a new protocol, which also uses pairs of entangled qutrits, but gaining advantage of a Bell inequality which achieves better noise resistance than the one used in 3DEB. The latter inequality is called here hCHSH-3 and was discovered in [5]. For each party, the hCHSH-3 inequality involves four observables already used in CHSH-3 but also two products of observables which do not commute. We explain how the parties can measure the observables corresponding to these products and thus are able to check the violation of hCHSH-3. In the presence of noise, this violation guarantees the security against a local Trojan horse attack. We also designed a version of our protocol which is secure against individual attacks.