In this paper, I try once again to cause some good-natured trouble. The issue remains, when will we ever stop burdening the taxpayer with conferences devoted to the quantum foundations? The suspicion is expressed that no end will be in sight until a means is found to reduce quantum theory to two or three statements of crisp physical (rather than abstract, axiomatic) significance. In this regard, no tool appears better calibrated for a direct assault than quantum information theory. Far from a strained application of the latest fad to a time-honored problem, this method holds promise precisely because a large part--but not all--of the structure of quantum theory has always concerned information. It is just that the physics community needs reminding. This paper, though taking quant-ph/0106166 as its core, corrects one mistake and offers several observations beyond the previous version. In particular, I identify one element of quantum mechanics that I would not label a subjective term in the theory--it is the integer parameter D traditionally ascribed to a quantum system via its Hilbert-space dimension.
In this paper, I try once again to cause some good-natured trouble. The issue remains, when will we ever stop burdening the taxpayer with conferences devoted to the quantum foundations? The suspicion is expressed that no end will be in sight until a means is found to reduce quantum theory to two or three statements of crisp physical (rather than abstract, axiomatic) significance. In this regard, no tool appears better calibrated for a direct assault than quantum information theory. Far from a strained application of the latest fad to a time-honored problem, this method holds promise precisely because a large part--but not all--of the structure of quantum theory has always concerned information. It is just that the physics community needs reminding. This paper, though taking quant-ph/0106166 as its core, corrects one mistake and offers several observations beyond the previous version. In particular, I identify one element of quantum mechanics that I would not label a subjective term in the theory--it is the integer parameter D traditionally ascribed to a quantum system via its Hilbert-space dimension.
In this paper, I try to cause some good-natured trouble. The issue is, when will we ever stop burdening the taxpayer with conferences devoted to the quantum foundations? The suspicion is expressed that no end will be in sight until a means is found to reduce quantum theory to two or three statements of crisp physical (rather than abstract, axiomatic) significance. In this regard, no tool appears better calibrated for a direct assault than quantum information theory. Far from a strained application of the latest fad to a time-honoured problem, this method holds promise precisely because a large part—but not all—of the structure of quantum theory has always concerned information. It is just that the physics community needs reminding.
Our purpose in this chapter is to present the key concepts of quantum mechanics in the language of Hilbert spaces. The reader who has not previously met the physical ideas motivating quantum mechanics, and some of the more elementary applications of Schrödinger's equation, is encouraged to read any of a number of excellent texts on the subject such as [1–4]. Otherwise, the statements given here must to a large extent be taken on trust – not an altogether easy thing to do, since the basic assertions of quantum theory are frequently counterintuitive to anyone steeped in the classical view of physics. Quantum mechanics is frequently presented in the form of several postulates, as though it were an axiomatic system such as Euclidean geometry. As often presented, these postulates may not meet the standards of mathematical rigour required for a strictly logical set of axioms, so that little is gained by such an approach. We will do things a little more informally here. For those only interested in the mathematical aspects of quantum mechanics and the role of Hilbert space see [5–8]. Many of the standard applications, such as the hydrogen atom, will be omitted here as they can be found in all standard textbooks, and we leave aside the enormous topic of measurement theory and interpretations of quantum mechanics. This is not to say that we need be totally comfortable with quantum theory as it stands. Undoubtedly, there are some philosophically disquieting features in the theory, often expressed in the form of socalled paradoxes.
What are the information processing capabilities of physical systems?As recently as the first half of the 20 th century this question did not even have a definite meaning.What is information, and how would one process it?It took the development of theories of computing (in the 1930s) and information (late in the 1940s) for us to formulate mathematically what it means to compute or communicate.Yet these theories were abstract, based on axiomatic mathematics: what did physical systems have to do with these axioms?Rolf Landauer had the essential insight -"Information is physical" -that information is always encoded in the state of a physical system, whose dynamics on a microscopic level are well-described by quantum physics.This means that we cannot discuss information without discussing how it is represented, and how nature dictates it should behave.Wigner considered the situation from another perspective when he wrote about "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences".Why are the computational techniques of mathematics so astonishingly useful in describing the physical world [1]?One might begin to suspect foul play in the universe's operating principles.Interesting insights into the physics of information accumulated through the 1970s and 1980s -most sensationally in the proposal for a "quantum computer".If we were to mark a particular year in which an explosion of interest took place in information physics, that year would have to be 1994, when Shor showed that a problem of practical interest (factorisation of integers) could be solved easily on a quantum computer.But the applications of information in physics -and vice versa -have been far more widespread than this popular discovery.These applications range from improved experimental technology, more sophisticated measurement techniques, methods for characterising the quantum/classical boundary, tools for quantum chaos, and deeper insight into quantum theory and nature.In this thesis I present a short review of ideas in quantum information theory.The first chapter contains introductory material, sketching the central ideas of probability and information theory.Quantum mechanics is presented at the level of advanced undergraduate knowledge, together with some useful tools for quantum mechanics of open systems.In the second chapter I outline how classical information is represented in quantum systems and what this means for agents trying to extract information from these systems.The final chapter presents a new resource: quantum information.This resource has some bewildering applications which have been discovered in the last ten years, and continually presents us with unexpected insights into quantum theory and the universe.ii This thesis is dedicated to my mother.iii This thesis was begun as an intrepid adventure.It caught
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What are the information processing capabilities of physical systems? As recently as the first half of the 20th century this question did not even have a definite meaning. What is information, and how would one process it? It took the development of theories of computing (in the 1930s) and information (late in the 1940s) for us to formulate mathematically what it means to compute or communicate. Yet these theories were abstract, based on axiomatic mathematics: what did physical systems have to do with these axioms? Rolf Landauer had the essential insight - "Information is physical" - that information is always encoded in the state of a physical system, whose dynamics on a microscopic level are well-described by quantum physics. This means that we cannot discuss information without discussing how it is represented, and how nature dictates it should behave. Wigner considered the situation from another perspective when he wrote about "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences". Why are the computational techniques of mathematics so astonishingly useful in describing the physical world [1]? One might begin to suspect foul play in the universe's operating principles. Interesting insights into the physics of information accumulated through the 1970s and 1980s - most sensationally in the proposal for a "quantum computer". If we were to mark a particular year in which an explosion of interest took place in information physics, that year would have to be 1994, when Shor showed that a problem of practical interest (factorisation of integers) could be solved easily on a quantum computer. But the applications of information in physics - and vice versa - have been far more widespread than this popular discovery. These applications range from improved experimental technology, more sophisticated measurement techniques, methods for characterising the quantum/classical boundary, tools for quantum chaos, and deeper insight into quantum theory and nature. In this thesis I present a short review of ideas in quantum information theory. The first chapter contains introductory material, sketching the central ideas of probability and information theory. Quantum mechanics is presented at the level of advanced undergraduate knowledge, together with some useful tools for quantum mechanics of open systems. In the second chapter I outline how classical information is represented in quantum systems and what this means for agents trying to extract information from these systems. The final chapter presents a new resource: quantum information. This resource has some bewildering applications which have been discovered in the last ten years, and continually presents us with unexpected insights into quantum theory and the universe.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.