Von Neumann's psycho-physical parallelism requires the existence of an interaction between subjective experiences and material systems. A hypothesis is proposed that amends physics in a way that connects subjective states with physical states, and a general model of the interaction is provided. A specific example shows how the theory applies to pain consciousness. The implications concerning quantum mechanical state creation and reduction are discussed, and some mechanisms are suggested to seed the process. An experiment that tests the hypothesis is described elsewhere. Key Words: von Neumann, psycho-physical, consciousness, state reduction, state collapse, macroscopic superpositions, conscious observer.
Von Neumann's psycho-physical parallelism requires the existence of an interaction between subjective experiences and material systems. A hypothesis is proposed that amends physics in a way that connects subjective states with physical states, and a general model of the interaction is provided. A specific example shows how the theory applies to pain consciousness. The implications concerning quantum mechanical state creation and reduction are discussed, and some mechanisms are suggested to seed the process. An experiment that tests the hypothesis is described elsewhere. Key Words: von Neumann, psycho-physical, consciousness, state reduction, state collapse, macroscopic superpositions, conscious observer.
This is the final paper in a series that considers the rules of engagement between conscious states and physiological states. In this paper, we imagine that an endogenous quantum mechanical superposition is created by a classical stimulus, and that this leads to a `physiological pulse' of states that are in superposition with one another. This pulse is correlated with a `conscious pulse' of the kind discussed in a previous paper (Conscious Pulse I). We then add a rule (5) to the four rules previously given. This rule addresses the effect of `pain' consciousness on both of these pulses, and in doing so, it validates the "Parallel Principle" applied to pain. Key words: Brain states, consciousness, conscious observer, macroscopic superposition, measurement, state reduction, state collapse, von Neumann.
We examine the role of a conscious observer in a typical quantum mechanical measurement. Four rules are given that govern stochastic choice and state reduction in several cases of continuous and intermittent observation. It is found that consciousness always accompanies a state reduction leading to observation, but its presence is not sufficient to 'cause' a reduction. The distinction is clarified and codified by the rules that are given below. This is the first of several papers that lead to an experimental test of the rules, and of the "parallel principle" that is described elsewhere. Key words: Brain states, boundary conditions, consciousness, conscious observer, environment, decoherence, macroscopic superposition, measurement, state reduction, state collapse, von Neumann.
This paper elaborates on four previously proposed rules of engagement between conscious states and physiological states. A new rule is proposed that applies to a continuous model of conscious brain states that cannot precisely resolve eigenvalues. If two apparatus states are in superposition, and if their eigenvalues are so close together that they cannot be consciously resolved on this model, then it is shown that observation will not generally reduce the superposition to just one of its member eigenstates. In general, the observation of a quantum mechanical superposition results in another superposition. Key words: Brain states, consciousness, conscious observer, macroscopic superposition, measurement, state reduction, state collapse, von Neumann.
It is argued that Feynman's rules for evaluating probabilities, combined with von Neumann's principle of psycho-physical parallelism, help avoid inconsistencies, often associated with quantum theory. The former allows one to assign probabilities to entire sequences of hypothetical Observers' experiences, without mentioning the problem of wave function collapse. The latter limits the Observer's (e.g., Wigner's friend's) participation in a measurement to the changes produced in material objects, thus leaving his/her consciousness outside the picture.
Preciously given rules allow conscious systems to be included in quantum mechanical systems. There rules are derived from the empirical experience of an observer who witnesses a quantum mechanical interaction leading to the capture of a single particle. In the present paper it is shown that purely classical changes experienced by an observer are consistent with these rules. Three different interactions are considered, two of which combine classical and quantum mechanical changes. The previously given rules support all of these cases. Key Words: brain states, conscious observer, detector, measurement, probability current, state reduction, von Neumann, wave collapse.
Few things in physics have caused so much hand-wringing as von Neumann's collapse hypothesis. Unable to derive it mathematically, von Neumann attributed it to interaction with the observer's brain! Few physicists agreed, but tweaks of von Neumann's measurement theory did not lead to collapse, and Shimony and Brown proved theorems establishing `the insolubility of the quantum measurement problem'. Many different `interpretations' of quantum mechanics were put forward, none gained a consensus, and some scholars suggested that the foundations of quantum mechanics were flawed to begin with. Yet, in the last ninety years, no-one looked into now von Neumann had arrived at his collapse hypothesis! Von Neumann based his argument on the experiment of Compton and Simon. But, by comparing readings from von Neumann's book and the Compton-Simon paper, we find that the experiment provides no evidence for the collapse hypothesis; von Neumann had misread it completely! We suggest that von Neumann had relied on his phenomenal memory rather than the printed Compton-Simon paper, and his memory had failed him for once. Our finding has considerable implications for physics, which -- briefly sketched here -- will be discussed elsewhere in detail. An Appendix raises some questions for historians of physics.