Non-Locality and Theories of Causation

Hongfang Li

Marco Forgione

Menas C. Kafatos, Athanassios A. Nassikas, Daniel P. Sheehan

Retro‐causation has been experimentally verified by Bem and proposed by Kafatos in the form of space‐time non‐locality in the quantum framework. Every theory includes, beyond its specific axioms, the principles of logical communication (logical language), through which it is defined. This communication obeys the Aristotelian logic (Classical Logic), the Leibniz Sufficient Reason Principle, and a hidden axiom, which basically states that there is anterior‐posterior relationship everywhere in communication. By means of a theorem discussed here, it can be proved that the communication mentioned implies contradictory statements, which can only be transcended through silence, i.e. the absence of any statements. Moreover, the breaking of silence is meaningful through the claim for minimum contradictions, which implies the existence of both a logical and an illogical dimension; contradictions refer to causality, implying its opposite, namely retro‐causation, and the anterior posterior axiom, implying space‐time non‐locality. The purpose of this paper is to outline a framework accounting for retro‐causation, through both purely theoretical and reality based points of view.

N. Glenn Gratke

Paolo Faglia

Using a 'reformulation of Bell's theorem', Waegell and McQueen, (2020) argue that any local theory which does not involve retro-causation or fine-tuning must be a many-worlds theory. Moreover they argue that non-separable many-worlds theories whose ontology is given by the wavefunction involve superluminal causation, as opposed to separable many-worlds theories (e.g. Waegell, 2021; Deutsch and Hayden 2000). I put forward three claims. (A) I challenge their argument for relying on a non-trivial, unquestioned assumption about elements of reality which allows Healey's approach (Healey, 2017b) to evade their claim. In an attempt to respond to (A), Waegell and McQueen may restrict their claim to theories which satisfy such an assumption, however, I also argue that (B) their argument fails to prove even the so weakened claim, as exemplified by theories that are both non-separable and local. Finally, (C) by arguing for the locality of the decoherence-based Everettian approach (Wallace, 2012) I refute Waegell and McQueen's claim that wavefunction-based ontologies, and more generally non-separable ontologies, involve superluminal causation. I close with some doubtful remarks about separable Everettian interpretations as compared to non-separable ones.

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Péter Vecsernyés