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arXiv:quant-ph/0103123

Quantum message authentication codes

Howard Barnum

Published Mar 21, 2001• 13 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This paper has been withdrawn because of an error in the proof of Lemma 1. Without Lemma 1, the result of the main theorem (with the same proof, but omitting the use of Lemma 1 to extend things to general attacks) only holds for attacks in which the attacker applies a tensor product of Pauli matrices (for qubits) or generalized Pauli matrices. The resulting theorem is still relevant for quantum message authentication, but the very strong result claimed in earlier versions of this paper does not hold. These matters will be addressed further in joint work with Claude Crepeau, Daniel Gottesman, Adam Smith, and Alain Tapp. Thanks to them and to Debbie Leung for spotting the error.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0103123

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This paper has been withdrawn because of an error in the proof of Lemma 1. Without Lemma 1, the result of the main theorem (with the same proof, but omitting the use of Lemma 1 to extend things to general attacks) only holds for attacks in which the attacker applies a tensor product of Pauli matrices (for qubits) or generalized Pauli matrices. The resulting theorem is still relevant for quantum message authentication, but the very strong result claimed in earlier versions of this paper does not hold. These matters will be addressed further in joint work with Claude Crepeau, Daniel Gottesman, Adam Smith, and Alain Tapp. Thanks to them and to Debbie Leung for spotting the error.
Barnum, Crepeau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith (quant-ph/0205128) proposed methods for authentication of quantum messages. The first method is an interactive protocol (TQA') based on teleportation. The second method is a noninteractive protocol (QA) in which the sender first encrypts the message using a protocol QEnc and then encodes the quantum ciphertext with an error correcting code chosen secretly from a set (a purity test code (PTC)). Encryption was shown to be necessary for authentication. We augment the protocol QA with an extra step which recycles the entire encryption key provided QA accepts the message. We analyze the resulting integrated protocol for quantum authentication and key generation, which we call QA+KG. Our main result is a proof that QA+KG is universal composably (UC) secure in the Ben-Or-Mayers model (quant-ph/0409062). More specifically, this implies the UC-security of (a) QA, (b) recycling of the encryption key in QA, and (c) key-recycling of the encryption scheme QEnc by appending PTC. For an m-qubit message, encryption requires 2m bits of key; but PTC can be performed using only O(log m) + O(log e) bits of key for probability of failure e. Thus, we reduce the key required for both QA and QEnc, from linear to logarithmic net consumption, at the expense of one bit of back communication which can happen any time after the conclusion of QA and before reusing the key. UC-security of QA also extends security to settings not obvious from quant-ph/0205128. Our security proof structure is inspired by and similar to that of quant-ph/0205128, reducing the security of QA to that of TQA'. In the process, we define UC-secure entanglement, and prove the UC-security of the entanglement generating protocol given in quant-ph/0205128, which could be of independent interest.
Message authentication is a cryptographic task that allows the receiver to reject a message that is forged or has been tampered with. A protocol to authenticate quantum messages was proposed by Barnum, Crépeau, Gottesman, Tapp, and Smith [1] and stand-alone security was proved. Here, we are concerned with universal composable security (which requires a protocol to be essentially indistinguishable from the ideal functionality and ensures overall security when the protocol is part of any larger scheme). We show that the protocol in [1] is universal composably secure, and that most of the required key can be reused with universal composable security.
We prove a strong converse for quantum communication over Pauli channels within the class of stabilizer codes. If a code whose code space is a full joint eigenspace of a stabilizer group transmits above the coherent information of its own input state, its entanglement fidelity decays exponentially in the block length; the encoder may be any isometry onto that space and the decoder any channel. For memoryless channels this determines the ε\varepsilonε-quantum capacity of the class for every ε<1\varepsilon < 1ε<1, so that tolerating a constant error buys no rate; for antidegradable channels, such as the depolarizing channel with error probability p∈[1/4,3/4]p \in [1/4, 3/4]p∈[1/4,3/4], that capacity is zero, while for p∈[1/4,1/2)p \in [1/4,1/2)p∈[1/4,1/2) partial-transposition bounds provably cannot certify a strong converse. The proof uses neither additivity assumptions nor semidefinite relaxations: optimal decoding succeeds precisely on an event in a product probability space, so the blowing-up lemma of Ahlswede, Gács and Körner applies, and the side information it produces is charged against the coherent information. The argument also constrains near-deterministic decoding for codes of any kind, and we isolate the encoder-side statement that would extend it to all of them.